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European Arms Talks Termed 'Waste of Time'
OW0712123488 Beijing XINHUA in English
0804 GMT 2 Dec 88

["Round-Up: Tedious Talks, Few Results (by Liu Yunfeng)"]—XINHUA Headline]

[Text] Vienna, December 1 (XINHUA)—After 15 years, the fruitless talks on conventional disarmament in middle Europe [as received] are winding down—to almost everyone's relief.

West and East negotiators to the talks conceded the lack of results at a news conference in Vienna today following the conclusion of the 46th round of the negotiation.

They set a date next year for a 47th round, but observers here doubt that it will be held.

Lambert Veenendaal, head of the Netherlands delegation, and Polish Chief Negotiator Tadeusz Strulak agreed that the long-drawn-out talks only served as a learning procedure.

However, they said their experience would have a great impact upon a new round of negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The middle-Europe nations, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Federal Germany, Democratic Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, attracted international press attention when they began negotiations in October, 1973.

However, as time passed, the media turned its attention elsewhere. Ultimately, even the negotiators themselves acknowledged that the talks were just a waste of time since neither side moved toward a substantial compromise.

During the talks, representatives of both sides attempted to limit the land forces of the other to 700,000 soldiers and 200,000 airmen, but disagreed over specific cuts in U.S. and Soviet forces as well as on the verification of nuclear weapons.

Given such deadlocks, the Warsaw Pact countries proposed a symbolic accord to wind up the talks, but NATO negotiators insisted on a substantial agreement.

Therefore, upon the conclusion of the 46th round of the talks, both sides, despite outside pressure for putting an end to the negotiations altogether, announced a new round would begin in February, 1989.

Observers here believe that a termination of the talks depends in large part on the beginning of all-Europe conventional disarmament negotiations between the 23 countries of the NATO and Warsaw Pact, and these are also deadlocked.

Both sides attending the preparatory meeting of the entire Europe conventional negotiations announced earlier this year that formal talks would begin in 1988. However, although the preparatory meeting has made some progress, this formal meeting is no longer expected to be in 1988.

It is, therefore, far more difficult to forecast when these negotiations might end.

U.S. Welcomes Soviet Disarmament Decision
HK1312045588 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
in Chinese 9 Dec 88 p 6

[Dispatch by Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500) and Cang Lide (0221 4539 1795): "The U.S. Government and Public React Strongly to Soviet Troop Reduction"]

[Text] Washington, 7 Dec—Soviet leader Gorbachev's announcement of the Soviet decision on a conventional arms reduction at the UN General Assembly session this morning has produced strong repercussions among people from all walks of life.

The U.S. Government welcomed this decision. President Reagan said in New York that he "sincerely agreed" with the Soviet decision on disarmament, adding that the United States would "naturally adjust" its military strength if Soviet disarmament could lead to the emergence of U.S. military superiority. Reagan also urged that the Soviet Union and the United States share their efforts in forbidding the use of chemical weapons throughout the world. In a speech prepared for the American Enterprise Institute, Reagan pointed out that if the Soviet disarmament program "can proceed swiftly and in an all-around way, history will say it is of important significance." Secretary of State Shultz said that the Soviet unilateral decision on disarmament was an "important step that deserves a welcome and is advancing in a correct direction."

As some high-ranking military officers said, if the Soviet military force in Europe is shifting from the offensive to the defensive, this will pave the way to an arms reduction between the two opposing sides in Europe. In addition, the United States and its allies will have to reappraise their military forces, military strategies, and military budgets. This move is the most important step taken by the Soviet Union since the founding of NATO.

A military expert from the Brookings Institute remarked that the Soviet attitude was serious in reducing its military forces and changing the military confrontation in Europe.

Some people in the press said that this Soviet decision would produce a major impact on Soviet-West European relations as well as on the Sino-Soviet summit that will be held in spring next year.

However, some people also pointed out that the total military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries will remain superior to NATO's even if the Soviet Union reduces its military forces in Europe as scheduled. While affirming this Soviet move, former Secretary of State Kissinger said that the United States should not reach a conclusion before it carefully studies all the details of the Soviet disarmament program.

A marked rise in the prices of bonds and shares on the New York stock market followed the news about Soviet disarmament.

USSR Troop Reduction Proposal Analyzed
OW1412094988 Beijing in Russian to the USSR
1900 GMT 12 Dec 88

[News Analysis: "Why Did the USSR Decide To Decrease Its Armed Forces by 500,000 Men?"]

[Text] At his UN General Assembly speech on 7 December, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union had decided to unilaterally decrease the number of personnel in its armed forces by 500,000 men within the next 2 years and at the same time to also considerably decrease the amount of its conventional arms. In the meantime, in coordination with its Warsaw Pact allies the USSR has decided to withdraw 6 tank divisions from the GDR, CSSR, and Hungary in 1991 and disband them; decrease the number of Soviet troops in these countries by 50,000 men; and reduce armaments by 5,000 tanks.

The Soviet Union decided to undertake this important disarmament step for very profound international and internal reasons. Everyone knows that for a long time the USSR and the United States pursued a policy of confrontation and spent enormous sums in the struggle for military supremacy. With the beginning of the eighties, the armed forces of both sides grew to unprecedented size. At one stage the international situation became extremely tense.

In recent years a relaxation of relations between the West and the East, mainly Soviet-American relations, became noticeable. Confrontation turned into a dialogue and mutual confidence was strengthened. In December last year the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty was signed, and it is being successfully implemented. Great progress was also achieved at the Soviet-U.S. talks on reducing offensive strategic arms. East-West relations on the whole are developing in a relatively stable way. This international situation created favorable external conditions for a unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces.

The Soviet decision to reduce its armed forces is closely linked with the new thinking of Mikhail Gorbachev. Speaking at the UN General Assembly session he noted that the world has entered a turning point in its development when force and the threat of force cannot and should not be instruments of foreign policy for the

solution of global, regional, and interstate problems. He also said that a new historical reality is appearing before our very eyes, a turn from the principle of overarmament to a principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense. Therefore, the Soviet decision on unilateral disarmament can be assessed as a concrete result of implementation of the new thinking.

During his visit to Poland last July, Gorbachev made a proposal for a conference of European heads of state to discuss the question of reducing conventional arms in Europe. Following this, a conference of the Warsaw Pact heads of state made a specific proposal on holding talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe in three stages.

While responding cautiously and coolly to these proposals, the West condemned the Soviet Union for acquiring conventional arms superiority. Now the Soviet Union has announced unilateral disarmament. This could help it in the talks on reducing conventional arms in Europe.

For many years the Soviet Union has incurred huge military expenses. According to the West, the yearly expenditure of the Soviet Union is about \$150 billion. The utilization of large sums, material, and scientific and technical sources for the development of the defense industry had a negative influence on the development of the economy. Now, the process of political restructuring in the Soviet Union is obvious but restructuring of the economy is sluggish. Under different conditions, a reduction in the armed forces could lead not only to a reduction of military spending, but also to an increase in the number of hands working in many industrial sectors. The Soviet Union intends next year to experimentally convert two-thirds of its defense enterprises to produce goods for civilian needs. This will undoubtedly facilitate the development of the economy and increase the standard of living.

Remaining Cruise Missiles Removed From Belgium

OW1512014988 Beijing XINHUA in English
1248 GMT 14 Dec 88

["Feature: Farewell to INF (by Le Zude)"]—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Brussels, December 13 (XINHUA)—With roaring engines, an American C-141 military transport plane took off Tuesday morning from Florennes Airbase in southern Belgium, flying home the remaining eight U.S. cruise missiles deployed in Belgium.

This brings the total of dismantled U.S. cruise missiles in Europe to 16, since the signing of the American-Soviet INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) treaty a year ago.

"Departure is always sad," said Belgian Defense Minister, Guy Coeme, "but the removal of the last cruise missiles from our land gives hope for the future."

People still remember that when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided in 1979 to deploy U.S. intermediate-range missiles in West Europe, a heated debate broke out in nearly all the countries concerned.

Although the anti-nuclear mood later calmed down a little in the face of an increasing Soviet military threat, the people's enthusiasm was aroused again when the United States and Soviet Union finally agreed on the INF Treaty last year.

When asked about the slack in business likely to occur in Florennes following the withdrawal of the 1,100 American soldiers in charge of the missiles, a shopkeeper there said, "peace is the foundation for real prosperity."

In southern Belgium, where the only maintenance center for cruise missiles is located, an official told reporters that even if they were to suffer a loss owing to the withdrawal of the missiles, they were happy about the hope for peace.

The dismantling of the cruise missiles also eased relations between East and West European nations.

Since June, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet Union, and five other East European nations have all established diplomatic relations with the European Community.

In NATO countries, public concern over nuclear weapons seems to be decreasing.

For instance, the recent proposal to renew the short-range missiles in West Europe has ended up in a failure to achieve unanimity among the Western allies.

As Belgian Defense Minister, Guy Coeme, pointed out, NATO should reconsider its modernization of armaments according to the development of East-West relations.

Responding to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's troop reduction proposal at the U.N. Assembly last week, NATO also put forth a plan to reduce offensive arms.

Following the vanishing C-141 with his eyes, Coeme said, "Indeed we have to be cautious, but the international situation is apparently developing in the direction of relaxation."

More on Gorbachev UN Speech

Favorable Assessment of Gorbachev's UN Speech

AU1012145788 Sofia BTA in English
1410 GMT 10 Dec 88

[Text] Sofia, December 10 (BTA)—All mass media are still commenting on Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to New York and the Soviet leader's speech addressed to the United Nations General Assembly. All papers voice the shared opinion that Mr Gorbachev's visit to New York is a remarkable event and point out the great interest of the public in Bulgaria in the ideas and the proposals put forward by the Soviet leader.

Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to New York lasted only one day because it coincided with the disastrous earthquake in Armenia, but this day will leave its imprint on many a year to come, NARODNA MLADEZH observes. The paper also marks the "unbelievable change in the political climate and the sincere aspiration of the Americans for understanding with the USSR." NARODNA MLADEZH also points out that the spontaneous hearty welcome Mr Gorbachev was given by New Yorkers exceeded all expectation and that the Soviet leader's meetings with Mr Ronald Reagan and George Bush proves the continuity of the positive trends in Soviet-American relations. Mr Mikhail Gorbachev's speech delivered at the UN General Assembly made even the sceptics believe that the world is entering upon a new era, the newspaper observes.

The VECHERNI NOVINI daily assesses Mr Gorbachev's speech as a manifestation of the new philosophy in international relations and a demonstration of Moscow's responsible and realistic policy aimed at innovating the world. At the end of 1988, mankind was given good hopes for peaceful existence, the paper writes. The press in Bulgaria foresees that the great reduction of Soviet Armed Forces Mr Mikhail Gorbachev announced will have an important favourable effect on the complex of negotiations on disarmament and detente both in Europe and in the world.

Gorbachev's UN Speech Praised

AU1212150988 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 9 Dec 88 p 5

[Editorial article: "Deeds Are the Most Topical Issue"]

[Text] We can say without exaggeration that Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the 43d session of the UN General Assembly is the focus of worldwide attention, that politicians and statesmen, government leaders, journalists, scholars, and common people all showed the same interest in it.

This is because Gorbachev's speech is an expression of the philosophy of the new political thinking which is consistently and irrevocably beginning to prevail in

international relations at the initiative of Lenin's country, which is undergoing renewal. There is even more—in the aforementioned document the new thinking is going over to new action, to specific and practical deeds on behalf of peace, disarmament, and cooperation among peoples and states.

There is no doubt that the unilateral steps of the Soviet country which, in accordance with the new historical reality, is embarking upon the path of "a changeover from the principle of super-rearmament to the principle of sensible defense sufficiency," have made an exceptionally great impression. Let us recall the following facts:

The number of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces is expected to be reduced by 500,000 men, and conventional weapons will be considerably cut down.

Six tank divisions are expected to be withdrawn from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary, and to be disbanded.

Referring again to the aforementioned countries, assault-landing units and other troops will be withdrawn, amounting to a total of 50,000 men, while armaments are expected to be reduced by 5,000 tanks.

The troops remaining in those countries will be re-equipped to transform them into totally defensive forces.

It is also envisaged that the number of troops and armaments deployed in the European part of the USSR will be reduced.

The total Soviet Armed forces deployed in that part of the USSR and on the territories of the European allied countries will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery weapons systems, and 800 fighter aircraft.

The armed forces in the Asian part of the USSR will also be reduced and a considerable number of Soviet troops are expected to be withdrawn from Mongolia....

The purpose of this action, as M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, is to call the attention of the world public to the requirement to change over from an "economy of rearmament to an economy of disarmament."

These courageous steps represent an unmistakable expression of the advantages of real deeds in international policy. They stem from the major resolve to advance from confrontation to cooperation, which should rather be called "joint creativity" and "joint development" along the path of democratizing the entire world order. The first Soviet leader, supported by strong arguments, convincingly and firmly explained the necessity of new methods and means to solve the newly emerging tasks and problems facing our contemporary world.

He did not try to lecture, but to persuade, by sharing the socialist concept about "searching for new paths toward the future" through observing every nation's freedom of choice and turning this freedom onto a generally valid principle, while countries and nations should open up to each other in order to exchange values and ideas for their mutual intellectual and material enrichment.

In the context of such thoughts there emerges a requirement for qualitatively new relations among states, for an internationalization of dialogue and a process of negotiations, in which all countries and nations will play an increasingly important role. In this connection, the responsible, integrative, and stimulating role of the United Nations was particularly stressed. Specific, exceptionally important, and urgent problems exist and should be resolved along the path of cooperation, under the auspices and with the cooperation of the United Nations, in the military-political, economic, scientific-technical, ecological, and humanitarian spheres.... The problems of development, foreign debts, ecology, space exploration, regional conflicts, and in particular those concerning peace in Afghanistan were thoroughly examined in Gorbachev's speech, and methods and means to solving them with the participation of the entire world community, through the internationalization of approaches and through endowing international relations with a more humane content were pointed out.

The speech contains numerous ideas and specific proposals. They were all welcomed not only with interest, but with the full support of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, because they express the common views of the socialist countries, their coordinated policy of peace and cooperation, and express the new understanding about the historical essence of the contemporary world and about new approaches to the 21st century. In this respect, our country's specific initiatives in consolidating good-neighborly relations and cooperation in the Balkans, in Europe, and the world also represent real support. It is high time to demonstrate our advantages with real deeds. The socialist world has expressed its readiness in an incontestable manner. Nevertheless, the world is one whole and is indivisible. It awaits the support of all people.

Special Disarmament Committee Meets in Bucharest

AU2012090688 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 16 Dec 88 p 7

[Text] Bucharest (ADN)—A meeting of a special disarmament committee of Warsaw Pact member states took place in Bucharest between 13 and 15 December. The meeting was attended by representatives from the foreign and defense ministries of the allied states. In consideration of the documents of the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee and the Budapest meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Committee, the participants discussed questions concerning the Warsaw Pact states' preparation of the forthcoming negotiations

on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, and measures for strengthening confidence and security in Europe. Emphasis was put on the importance of the measures, which were initiated by the Warsaw Pact states in the field of disarmament in the past, as well as on the practical steps for their implementation, which created the favorable basis for an early beginning and the successful implementation of the announced negotiations. In this context, particular mention was made of the special importance of the decisions on the unilateral reduction of Soviet forces, which were made by the USSR in accordance with its allies.

Pact Disarmament Commission Activities Noted *AU1612220588 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 2130 GMT 16 Dec 88*

["Session of Special Commission on Disarmament Issues of the Warsaw Treaty Participant States"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES, 16/12/1988—The fourth session of the Special Commission on Disarmament Issues of the Warsaw Treaty participant states took place in Bucharest, on December 13-15, 1988. Representatives of the foreign affairs ministries and of the national defense ministries participated in the session.

Based on the documents endorsed at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw and at the Budapest meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers' Committee, they analyzed problems related to the preparations for the future negotiations on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons and the steps to strengthen confidence and security in Europe.

The importance of the initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty participant states in the field of disarmament was highlighted, as well as of the concrete measures endorsed in that respect, that provided congenial conditions for the beginning and successful unfolding of the above-mentioned negotiations. The importance was stressed in that respect, of the recent decision endorsed by the USSR, after an agreement with its allies, on the unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The session proceeded in a working, comradely atmosphere, in the spirit of constructive collaboration.

Pact Defense Ministers Meet in Sofia *AU1712134188 Sofia BTA in English 2142 GMT 16 Dec 88*

[Text] Sofia, December 16 (BTA)—Army General Milan Vlacavik, minister of national defence of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Army General Heinz Kessler, minister of national defence of the German Democratic Republic, Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence of the Hungarian People's Republic, Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of national defence of the

Polish People's Republic, Colonel General Vasile Milea, minister of national defence of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Army General Dimitriy Yazov, minister of defence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, arrived here for the session of the Committee of Ministers of Defence of the States Party to the Warsaw Treaty, which will be held in Sofia tomorrow.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, and Army General Anatoliy Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces, also arrived for the session.

The participants in the meeting were welcomed by Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defence of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Received by Zhivkov

*AU1712170088 Sofia BTA in English
1611 GMT 17 Dec 88*

[Text] Sofia, December 17 (BTA)—Mr Todor Zhivkov, secretary general of the CC of the BCP and president of the State Council, stressed today the major importance of the speech which the Soviet party leader and head of state, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, delivered at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly, and more specifically of its part covering matters of disarmament.

Talking to Warsaw Treaty military chiefs who attended the regular session of the Warsaw Treaty Defence Ministers Committee here, the Bulgarian party leader and head of state expressed full support for the sweeping Soviet initiatives, which have met with a wide-ranging response around the world. At the same time, it was emphasized that the Warsaw Treaty countries view disarmament as a two-way process and expect the West to reciprocate.

Mr Todor Zhivkov received Army General Dobri Dzhurov, minister of national defence of Bulgaria, Army General Milan Vaclavik, minister of national defence of Czechoslovakia, Army General Heinz Kessler, minister of national defence of the GDR, Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence of Hungary, Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of national defence of Poland, Colonel General Vasile Milea, minister of national

defence of Romania, Army General Dimitriy Yazov, minister of defence of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, and Army General Anatoliy Gribkov, chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces, who briefed him on the agenda of the session. The Bulgarian leader expressed satisfaction with the results achieved and emphasized that the problems discussed are of great importance for the implementation of the ideas of new political thinking, for the restructuring in the socialist countries.

Mr Todor Zhivkov familiarized the members of the Warsaw Treaty Defence Ministers Committee with the tasks which the Bulgarian party and state leadership and the entire Bulgarian people are solving at this stage in fulfilment of the guidelines for restructuring in all spheres of life, and spoke about the proceedings of the plenum which the CC of the BCP completed this week.

Declaration Adopted

*AU1712163988 Sofia BTA in English
1620 GMT 17 Dec 88*

[“On the Warsaw Treaty Defence Ministers Committee Session]

[Text] Sofia, December 17 (BTA)—With the minister of national defence of Bulgaria in the chair, the Committee of Ministers of Defence of the States Party to the Warsaw Treaty held its regular session here today.

The session was attended by the ministers of defence of the member countries, by the commander-in-chief and by the chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

Under instructions from their governments, the ministers of defence considered and discussed the data on the overall correlation of forces and the numbers of the basic types of weapons between the Warsaw Treaty member states and the NATO countries and adopted on this matter a requisite declaration of the Committee of Ministers of Defence of the States Party to the Warsaw Treaty. As agreed, the declaration will be made public in due course.

The session was held in a businesslike atmosphere, in a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding.

Soviet Withdrawals Called 'Invitation to NATO'
AU1312120588 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 12 Dec 88 p 4

[Commentary by Major General Geliy Batenin, supplied by NOVOSTI]

[Text] The dynamics of the disarmament process must not only be continuous, but must also increase. To achieve this, boldness and innovation are needed in the approaches of the militarily powerful states, especially the USSR and the United States.

When the first Soviet leader presented the new ideas and views on the development of the world community from the platform of the 43d session of the UN General Assembly, we once again were witnesses of the merging of the new thinking with concrete disarmament policy. What points would I like to especially draw attention to from the military viewpoint?

First, the Soviet Union's readiness to withdraw part of its troops from the European regions adjacent to the line of contact between the two military-political alliances: the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In fact, this is not so much a "goodwill gesture" as a striving, dictated by the logic of the new thinking, to expand the disarmament process.

The Soviet initiative on this troop withdrawal represents an invitation to the United States, the other Western states, and all European countries that have allied troops on their territories to hold specific negotiations on returning the national troops to their own territory.

Second, our country has demonstrated its desire and will to create a comprehensive system of security to free the world from the fear of a military threat. Great progress has been made: The Soviet Union has announced its decision to substantially reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men within the next 2 years, as well as to make cuts in conventional weapons.

Third, cuts in armed forces will also be made in the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union.

All this serves as a practical confirmation of the defensive orientation of the Soviet military doctrine and its political essence, that our armed forces will never be used for aggression under any circumstances, and that they have the exclusive function of repelling an invasion from the outside.

General Semerdzhiev Speaks on Soviet Initiatives
AU1612175588 Sofia BTA in English
1732 GMT 16 Dec 88

[Text] Sofia, December 16 (BTA)—Commenting on the latest Soviet peace initiatives in an interview with the "SOFIA NEWS" weekly, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army and first deputy minister of national defence, describes the Soviet Union's decision to reduce unilaterally its armed forces, announced by Mr Mikhail Gorbachev in his U.N. speech, as "a most eloquent proof of the Soviet Union's love of peace, of the political will and extraordinary boldness of its party and state leadership." He expresses the conviction that the Soviet decision creates the "possibly most favourable conditions" for progress at the disarmament talks in Europe.

Asked whether Bulgaria will take any similar measures, Colonel General Semerdzhiev says that this country "fully recognizes the realities which have emerged as a result of World War II and has no territorial designs, that the Bulgarian people does not regard as an enemy any of its neighbours." The Bulgarian military chief emphasizes that "this is precisely what underlies the purely defensive orientation of the development of the Bulgarian People's Army, which finds expression in its limited numerical strength, in its organisational structure and combat training."

The chief of the General Staff expresses the hope that "the assertion of the principles of goodneighbourliness and cooperation" between Bulgaria and the adjacent NATO member states "will create prerequisites for further steps in this direction" (of disarmament). "Certainly, disarmament is a two-way street, and our moves will largely depend on the behaviour of the other side," Colonel General Semerdzhiev points out in his interview.

Gorbachev UN Speech Shows Regional Solutions

AU1312115588 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
10 Dec 88 p 5

[Jozef Janto commentary in the "Word on the Events" column: "Unravelling Regional Knots"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev's speech at the 43d UN General Assembly Session, and the new peace initiatives contained in it, are called a decision of epochal significance by almost everyone in the world. Although most commentaries primarily focus on passages dealing with Europe or with conventional weapons, the top Soviet representative also dealt very profoundly with all important global problems of our present world which concern the economically developed and the developing countries, and simultaneously indicated how they can be solved.

M. Gorbachev devoted a large part of his statement to regional conflicts. Although these are taking place in the "Third World," they inevitably alarm the whole world. However, in 1988 "a gleam of hope was introduced to our common worries in this sphere," he said, and devoted particular attention to the so-called Afghan issue. In resolving this issue, the Soviet Union has undertaken many positive steps. In the effort to enable the Afghans to resolve their problems (with the assistance of the United Nations and other forces), the USSR has proposed a ceasefire and a halt to all offensive operations throughout the country as of the beginning of next year, simultaneously stopping the arms deliveries to all hostile forces; it has proposed arranging an international conference on Afghanistan, and dispatching a contingent of UN forces to maintain peace in the country.

This initiative has evoked particular interest in Asia, which is perhaps the area most shaken by regional conflicts. For instance, the South Korean press recalled that the Soviet interest in solving and resolving the hotbeds of tension and in reducing the strength of USSR Armed Forces by 500,000 men, and so forth, can also contribute toward achieving military detente on the Korean peninsula and have a favorable impact on relations between South and North Korea (which the DPRK has been striving to achieve for some time—PRAVDA note).

True, apart from Afghanistan and Korea, several other dangerous hotbeds also exist in Asia and the Pacific. One of them is the Middle East. Although here, too, certain significant changes have taken place, such as when the PLO took a "significant constructive step, making it possible to search for ways to unravel the Middle East problem." The serious incident evoked by the United States in refusing Y. 'Arafat an entry visa, and thus preventing him from addressing the UN General Assembly in New York, has temporarily frustrated all possibility of pursuing this positive trend.

The solution of the so-called Cambodian issue can serve as an example of different approaches and courses. Although M. Gorbachev's speech did not specifically mention this problem, it was nevertheless one of the main topics during the recent visit paid by PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Moscow. The Chinese side has even called this problem the focal theme in the negotiations, also because it considers it to be the most important of the three obstacles preventing the development of Sino-Soviet, and naturally also Sino-Vietnamese, relations. Beijing insisted that the SRV recall its units from Cambodia, where it had sent them at the request of the legitimate Cambodian Government to help defend the country against the Pol Potites (who had been guilty of a terrible genocide of the Cambodian peoples during 1975-78, after which they withdrew to Thai territory, from where they were, and are, also supported by China). The fact that every obstacle on the path toward peace can be mutually resolved, provided there is political goodwill to do so, was affirmed by the statement issued by the Cambodian Ministry of Defense the day before yesterday [8 December] which stated that six Vietnamese divisions with a total of 18,000 men would be withdrawn from the People's Republic of Kampuchea from 15-21 December. This represents the last part of the contingent of 50,000 SRV volunteers. A total of 32,000 Vietnamese soldiers have returned home since June 1988.

True, unilateral decisions (be they ever so significant, sincere, or even epochal) are never sufficient; they must be accompanied by adequate measures taken by the other side. This applies to both sides involved in the Cambodian conflict (aimed at preventing the Pol Potites from again threatening Cambodia), to conflicts in other parts of Asia (for instance in Afghanistan or the Middle East), and on other continents, but also to other problems which are most alarming to the world at large; this applies, above all, to all armament and disarmament issues. However, the Soviet peace initiatives in recent years have been so immense, and have been welcomed with such enthusiasm by whole nations, that the forces which do not wish them well are finding it increasingly difficult to find counterarguments and excuses why they "cannot" act in the same way.

CPCZ Central Committee Approves Gorbachev Initiative

LD1612211988 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 1730 GMT 16 Dec 88

[Text] The CPCZ Central Committee approved a statement on the new initiatives delivered at the 43d UN General Assembly by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The CPCZ Central Committee highly values the new Soviet initiatives. It sees them as a comprehensive program for strengthening the political dialogue at a time when mankind is supporting with great hopes the proces

of further improving the international situation, particularly in Europe. It is a program which shows specific ways of tackling the most complicated international problems and contributes to a new quality of international relations and to a system of coexistence respecting the difference of interests of states and nations, and is based on the priority of humanitarian values. In its orientation, it opens up a broad scope and possibilities for developing all- round international cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and technical, security, disarmament, environmental, and humanitarian spheres. The CSSR will continue to take an active part in this program through its initiatives and concrete steps.

The CPCZ Central Committee values and supports the Soviet Union's decision to reduce its Armed Forces and conventional weapons, including the withdrawal of some of its tank troops from the territories of the CSSR, the GDR, and Hungary. This is evidence of the readiness of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to consistently implement the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries. We express the conviction that this gesture of goodwill will receive a positive response from the NATO countries, and that it will be a significant impetus to the process of European disarmament, stresses the CPCZ Central Committee's statement on the new initiatives delivered at the 43d UN General Assembly by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev.

More Reaction to Gorbachev UN Proposals

'Historic Importance' of Step

AU1212132688 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 9 Dec 88 p 2

["He." commentary: "Great New Initiative for Disarmament and Peace"]

[Text] The decisions of the Soviet Union on disarmament and international security and the new initiatives to improve the international situation which were announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the 43d UN General Assembly, correspond to the peace doctrine of socialism. They are of utmost importance. They are meeting with lively agreement all over the world; the GDR, too, welcomes and fully supports the new Soviet measures. The decisions give a powerful new impulse to the process of disarmament, which was started with the INF Treaty and in which many obstacles still have to be overcome.

They set a forceful example also for the other side, where NATO military men adhere to their strategy of nuclear deterrence by giving the outdated legend of a threat from the east as a "reason," where the intermediate-range missiles that have to be eliminated are to be "compensated for," and where military expenditure continues to skyrocket.

The Soviet initiative consists of steps that are not linked with any conditions. Over the next 2 years the USSR will unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and substantially reduce its conventional armaments. By 1991 the USSR will have withdrawn six tank divisions from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary and will disband them. Erich Honecker called this withdrawal—which was agreed on in coordination with its allies, the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary—a step of practical, historic importance. In addition, airborne assault units, airborne units for pioneer operations, and other troops will be withdrawn from the Soviet forces stationed in these countries. The Soviet forces in the above-mentioned countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks. The remaining Soviet divisions will be given another structure than today's, a structure that will be a clearly defensive one after the comprehensive withdrawal of tanks.

Reductions will also be made in the European part of the USSR so that there and on the territories of the allies, the armed forces will be reduced by a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat planes. Substantial reductions are also planned in the Asian part of the USSR.

Of course, as Mikhail Gorbachev stressed, the defense capability of the country will be maintained at a sensible and sufficiently secure level so that no one will be tempted to endanger the security of the USSR and its allies.

In the interest of safeguarding international security and consolidating peace, the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact states are again making considerable unilateral advance moves. Suspicion is to be eliminated, trust and cooperation are to be promoted. This is evidence of the seriousness and determination to implement our peace program, Erich Honecker noted.

'Western Powers Turn' Now

AU1212131788 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 9 Dec 88 p 2

[Klaus Wilczynski commentary: "Again the USSR Is the Trailblazer of Peace"]

[Text] On the eve of the first anniversary of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev presented to the United Nations a truly historic, unilateral disarmament step that is not bound with any conditions: He announced a considerable reduction of conventional armed forces on the part of the Soviet Union. With this, the USSR demonstrated its determination not to leave things at the start of disarmament but to continue the process that has been initiated.

It was no accident that Gorbachev chose the UN General Assembly for his speech, which was assessed as a great concept by politicians of all camps already on the day it was delivered. Looking at the 21st century, he developed the basic outline of a total restructuring of international processes, which is necessary in view of the realities existing in the world. This affects all essential fields of coexistence among the states, from security policy and the problems of the Third World to ecology.

All these processes—this is the leitmotiv—are to be shaped in such a way that civilization is preserved and that the world becomes safer for all and more suitable to normal life. The will of all countries is necessary to learn how to deal with each other in such a way.

Mikhail Gorbachev did not leave any doubts that the different social systems and values exist objectively as an expression of different class interests. One cannot ignore this. However, the struggle of ideologies must be conducted with peaceful means and each party should prove the advantage of its social system. The most important thing is, however, disarmament. Proceeding from this, the Soviet leadership decided to again demonstrate its readiness to reduce armaments through deeds. The announced measures are of extraordinary importance because they are the pivotal point of an entire process.

Over the next 2 years, the personnel of the Soviet Army will be reduced by half a million men. At the same time, conventional armaments will be considerably reduced—both things will be done unilaterally, independent of the disarmament negotiations envisaged in the CSCE process.

In coordination with the Warsaw Pact members, six tank divisions will be withdrawn from the GDR, the CSSR, and Hungary by 1991 and will be disbanded. Airborne assault units and other units, including complete airborne units for pioneer operations, will be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet forces stationed in these countries. The Soviet troops in these countries will be reduced by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks, the remaining units will be newly structured—in a clearly defensive way.

Troops and armaments on the European territory of the USSR will also be reduced. There and on the territory of its European allies, a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 planes are to be removed compared with today. Considerable parts of the Soviet troops will return home from Mongolia.

The USSR is thus taking the bull by the horns. It has defeated the argument with which opponents of disarmament are currently blocking any further steps and "justifying" their attempts to compensate for the intermediate-range missiles with new nuclear weapons: an

alleged superiority of the USSR in conventional armament. Now the unequivocal proof of the Soviet readiness to drastically reduce conventional weapons, too, has been put on the table. These generous measures clearly show to the world the defensive character of the military strategy of the USSR and its allies.

It is self-evident that the GDR fully supports the Soviet initiative, as Erich Honecker stressed on Wednesday evening [7 December]. It corresponds to our country's very own interests and is fully in the spirit of our policy of dialogue and such disarmament initiatives as the one for the establishment of nuclear-free and chemical weapons-free zones in central Europe.

At the Seventh SED Central Committee Session, Erich Honecker said that during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev the GDR and the USSR affirmed that they are working together for the continuation of the disarmament process without a break. The unilateral Soviet measures serve this goal. Now it is the Western powers' turn to act.

Defense Minister Interviewed on Military Policy

*LD1212235688 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1815 GMT 12 Dec 88*

[Text] Some military policy information from the past days: Some of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary are to be withdrawn. The formations remaining here will be stripped of their offensive character. The budget of the Hungarian People's Army will be reduced by 17 percent. What do the generals say about this? Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, the minister of defense, and the freshly appointed head of the Political Main Group, Major-General Lajos Krasznai, reply.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] Does Hungary have a military doctrine?

[Karpati] There is one, of course, a defensive doctrine. We do not regard anyone as an enemy. We do not want to attack anyone. However, it is necessary to look at the structure, the arms, of the military forces which are at our disposal. And here, especially in Europe, in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact countries—to which we also belong—there also exist devices which are suitable for the offense. These must be eliminated.

[Reporter] Yes, but you know, very many people heard on the radio the reknowned military policy expert Lieutenant Colonel Szentesi, who said that the reduction of the strength of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, properly speaking, brings the declared goals, the doctrine of a defensive character, close to reality. So far we know that Soviet troops of a defensive character are in our country, and now we have learned that these have devices with offensive goals, and that precisely these devices—airborne assault units, tank (?divisions)—will be withdrawn from Hungary. Therefore, what is declared and practiced do not always correspond; we have now recognized this.

[Karpati] Look, soldiers do not always lay their cards out in statements. I believe that this is quite clear in the world. But you and others also know well how many B-52 bombers, how many missiles there are in Europe. What kind of devices are they?

But regarding who has what, I think before the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries begin next year, certainly within a short time everyone will put what he has on the table. If these talks begin, then they can only be substantive negotiations; and in the present world it is inconceivable for someone to speak about false data.

[Reporter] I had an opportunity to meet young military officers in private, and they said that they were not taken by surprise by defense expenditures being reduced. Second, for quite a long time young officers have been wondering if it is possible to rationalize the Hungarian

Army, and quite a few have said that the Hungarian Army would need rationalization. A leaner army is better suited to a lean country.

[Karpati] Well, it will not be so lean as not to be able to accomplish its tasks. However, the other factor which we have to consider deeply, especially now, is the country's capacity to take on economic burdens. What can the country bear? It is also our duty to keep in mind that in order for the country to set off economically on the path to extricate ourselves from this nadir, we have to contribute. For this reason, we now have to [words indistinct] our requirements more tightly.

[Reporter] Is it not a defeat that they are reducing military expenditures? Do the generals not feel that they have suffered a defeat?

[Karpati] I think that we can not speak about any kind of defeat, but about judging the real situation. I would say that those who now are committed to the socialist social system, who fear for and protect the results we have achieved until now, are in favor of our army. They understand it very well, for example, the very many deputies who made contributions at the session of the defense committee last week. As for whether the Hungarian Army's preparedness, strength, is ensured for the defense of the homeland's independence and our social system, I would like to tell you, yes, in my best judgment.

[Reporter] Does the Hungarian People's Army also have a certain internal security role, task? Now, that its budget is decreasing—that according to our best knowledge 10 or so generals, 50-odd colonels have retired—can the Hungarian People's Army fulfill this?

[Karpati] I think that their having retired can not be linked to this, because these comrades are 60 years old or more and from a very young age they served the cause of the people very honorably. But regarding your question on whether there is an internal security role, every army in every country has such a task and role. The Hungarian People's Army is prepared for this.

[Reporter] You said the fact that several dozens of senior officers had retired, such large numbers, is not linked to the financial situation, that a smaller army means a smaller force of officers. Then, did political considerations perhaps play a role?

[Karpati] There is no question of that at all. Look, the issue here is that our officers corps were commissioned all at once, in a large number, in 1948 and 1949, as young people.

[Reporter] Is it a generation change?

[Karpati] [word indistinct] a generation change. By the way, it is quite a serious problem that they will reach 60-62 years simultaneously, like the ones who have now retired en masse, although behind them are very well prepared, younger people, who will be fully competent in the same positions.

[Reporter] So some generals and chief officers remain?

[Karpati] Some remain.

[Reporter] For example, how many top officers are there in this building? If not in this building, then in the Army?

[Karpati] Well, I could not tell you all of a sudden, but there are more than 50 generals in the Hungarian People's Army.

[Reporter] That, by the way, is what proportion? I read that in Latin America every 10th soldier is a general. How does this stand in our country?

[Karpati] There are great differences, because if you look at Cuba, there, for example, major is an extremely high grade. If we look at our Austrian neighbors, there, too, there are very few generals. If we go a little eastwards, there are enormous numbers of generals. This changes according to country.

[Reporter] It is now a generally known statistic that the Hungarian People's Army has roughly 105,000 soldiers, but correct me, if...

[Karpati interrupts] I do not want to correct you, because if that is what you know...

[Second reporter] I know of 200,000.

[Karpati] That is not true, it is excessive.

[First reporter] Then how many are there? Is it a secret, by the way?

[Karpati] Yes, I said earlier to you that I think that within a very short time, probably all kinds of statistics will be made public, not only on the Hungarian People's Army, but on every army of the Warsaw Pact. I would like to ask for a little patience from you.

[Reporter] But in the military statistics published in London, I believe that this statistic of 105,000 figures...

[Karpati interrupts] Not too many people read that. By the way, it is quite a good periodical.

[Reporter] So we should consider this 105,000 as authoritative.

[Karpati] It is quite a good figure.

[Reporter] We have now heard from you that the number of generals, chief officers has decreased. Is this strength decreasing, or is it, after all, the same?

[Karpati] It is now stable. Later, in the course of negotiations, I trust that it may decrease.

[Reporter] You said earlier that an old, great generation is leaving; I wonder if you might feel yourself to be in this generation?

[Karpati] Feel free to say it, because I, unfortunately, belong to it. Because I am over the age of 62.

[Reporter] Is it possible to conclude that perhaps there might be a change in the position of minister of defense?

[Karpati] When it happens—on the one hand, it does not pertain to me, for I am not the one who will decide this. However, I think that now, at the present moment, it is not on the agenda.

[Reporter] Maj Gen Lajos Krasznai, head of the Political Main Group, is a complete newcomer. How long have you been wearing the general's uniform?

[Krasznai] Since a week ago.

[Reporter] Is it not strange?

[Krasznai] Well, it is strange since I had not worn a uniform in the past decades. However, it is not strange in that earlier, I wore one for a good many years. I do not know if you know: I first put on a uniform at the age of 15, as a student of the Ferenc Rakoczi II Military Secondary School. So, this means that once, in 1954, I prepared for a military career. So then we were called small generals, since at that time there was a red stripe on the blue trousers. And my life later developed differently. I reached the point of being an active airman; I was a first-year student at the Gyorgy Killian (?Air Force Academy) in 1956. And when, after the '56 events, these military schools, colleges were transformed, reorganized, I entered civilian life. I have worked as a political worker for roughly 25 years of my 31-year active career.

[Reporter] The small general became a big general. I nevertheless have to ask how a reservist lieutenant colonel becomes a major general.

[Krasznai] By the Presidential Council promoting him, on the basis of certain considerations.

[Reporter] However, such an appointment can not entail military specialist knowledge.

[Krasznai] Not really. Not military specialist knowledge. But, how should I put it, the head of the Political Main Group is not the primary strategist in the Hungarian People's Army. That is why there is a chief of general

staff. Perhaps I have to add that, after I worked as a party worker, as a district first secretary in Pest county, I attended the Miklos Zrinyi Military Academy. It was a 2-year course.

[Reporter] Do party workers have to complete this course?

[Krasznai] Not every one has to complete it, but there is such training for higher party and state leaders; and this training goes on now, as well, in quite scanty numbers. There are some who attend this on the basis of considerations of the Central Committee and competent leaders of the Ministry of Defense.

[Reporter] The minister of defense said earlier that no political considerations whatsoever can be seen in the fact that several dozen senior officers are retiring. But behind that, I believe that there might be some kind of political consideration in the appointment of a new head of the Political Main Department in the Hungarian People's Army, in the person of Lajos Krasznai, former Pest County first secretary. Or am I mistaken?

[Krasznai] Properly speaking, there is no political consideration in the manner the previous one left, because he, too, was one of those who had worn this uniform for nearly 40 years. Now, there may be—and I believe that there is—some political consideration in their having brought in a civilian, a civilian politician, to this post. This was shown to me when they said that I should accept this task because the further direction, advancement, of political work in the Hungarian People's Army continues to be important—it is important—based and built on old values. And perhaps a personality with different experience, political experience can bring new thoughts into this work; perhaps he can make initiatives in a direction which accords with the renewal of the Army.

[Reporter] Not long ago we heard that in the Soviet Union, the next minister of defense will be a civilian. Is it conceivable that a civilian might direct the Hungarian generals in the coming period?

[Krasznai] Properly speaking, everything is conceivable in principle. I could not say in what direction or how the political reform process will progress, or what results this will bring. However, obviously the highest political and state organs will decide on this at the time.

[Reporter] One of the most important elements of the party program is the necessity to separate the party and the state. Very much is heard about direct party direction having ceased in certain ministries—for example, most recently in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. How can the Ministry of Defense, which, let us say, is the buttress of the system, along with the police, react to this challenge, or to this theoretical-ideological change?

[Krasznai] We, too, have to study how it is possible to modernize the system of political institutions within the Hungarian People's Army. As far as I know in the first half of next year the Hungarian People's Army's Party Committee will discuss the proposal of how we want or wish the structure and operation of the system of political institutions within the Hungarian People's Army to develop.

[Karpati] It is necessary to bring it closer to changes that are taking place in society. Naturally we have certain provisos. We are not planning alternative organizations here, in the army, in the future, either.

[Reporter] And if a young soldier, a member of the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] comes in?

[Karpati] Yes, if a young soldier who is a member of FIDESZ comes in, he will continue this, that is—if he goes away on leave, I think that he will then take part in the activity, work, going on there. Within the army, his conception, opinion, thinking, etc, will remain, and probably will constitute the subject of debate in the course of work and political training that goes on here. However, there will be no possibility for this organizationally.

[Reporter] Therefore, a freedom of outlook will prevail within certain frameworks.

[Karpati] Well, this can not be prohibited by anyone. What he can proclaim here, or how he can influence his fellow soldiers, is another question. [end recording]

Hungarian Official Terms Soviet Pullout 'Right Decision'

*PM1512150988 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 15 Dec 88 p 3*

[Interview with Colonel Geza Sipos, deputy chief of the People's Army Main Political Directorate, by own correspondent A. Kaverznev: "Trust Will Save Peace"; date not given—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Budapest—A. Kaverznev, our correspondent in Budapest, met with Colonel Geza Sipos, chief of the Agitation and Propaganda Directorate and deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Hungarian People's Army.

[Kaverznev] Tell me, Comrade Colonel, did the Soviet leadership's decision to withdraw six tank divisions plus some airborne and ground attack units from GDR, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian territory take you by surprise?

[Sipos] The decision itself was no surprise to us because we had already been given separate advance notice. Not about the actual content of the statement or the number of troops to be withdrawn, but about the basic thrust of the statement.

The personnel demonstrated equally great interest not only in those sections of Comrade Gorbachev's speech which dealt with disarmament problems but also the comments on general political and economic questions. The tasks to be given to the Hungarian People's Army in connection with the withdrawal of the Soviet military units from Hungary will have to be determined, and it will also be necessary to decide what we have to do to maintain our country's security at the proper level. Of course, we shall have to assume certain duties which the Soviet troops used to perform.

It is very important to emphasize that we heard no extreme views on the troop withdrawal—neither excessive delight nor gloomy pessimism—during the discussions. On the one hand, we regard the withdrawal of 25 percent of the Soviet troops as part of the single process of reducing international tension. On the other, it is good that our country is among the first that the Soviet military units will be leaving, although we know very well that this will be quite a lengthy process.

[Kaverznev] In your opinion, what effect could the declared reduction in the number of armed forces have on the military equilibrium in Europe? Specifically, will Hungary's security not be diminished?

[Sipos] Because the question is addressed to me personally, I will give you my personal opinion. I am convinced that the Soviet side's decision will force NATO to respond. I welcome the reduction of arms from the viewpoint of the correlation of forces in Europe, too—this is a well-considered move, one which does not threaten to upset the balance of forces. In view of the existing asymmetry it could even be a good basis for talks in the future. Nor should the propaganda significance of the new Soviet initiative be dismissed.

The withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops from three European countries in no way diminishes the Warsaw Pact's defensive capability. This applies to Hungary's security, too. I am convinced that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops will not make Hungary more vulnerable. These steps have been considered a hundred times, a thousand times over. This is the right decision.

[Kaverznev] Incidentally, I have heard the opinion expressed that the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary add nothing to the country's defensive capability—in fact, quite the reverse, that they are to some extent a destabilizing factor. What do you say to this?

[Sipos] We can scarcely examine all aspects of that most complex question right now. Our history shows that there was a temporary need for Soviet troops on Hungarian territory. This gave a certain psychological confidence to people, who wanted to build socialism in our country. I hope that we have now reached such a stage in society's development and such a level of confidence in international relations that Hungary can set an example for other countries by reducing conventional, traditional

arms. Meanwhile, a NATO country such as Italy could reciprocate. When the question of our security has arisen during the various talks, we have set out our position in these terms: Our motherland's security is safeguarded not by the Soviet troops temporarily stationed here but also by the policy in the spirit of the new political thinking which the socialist countries are pursuing.

In conclusion, there is one more point I want to make. We would like to maintain our military collaboration with our Soviet comrades at the old level and even strengthen it in some sectors—particularly in view of the recent decision. And when the time comes for us to bid farewell to the Soviet military units we will organize a ceremonial send-off and, as is customary between good friends, we will thank our Soviet comrades for their help and for the fact that they have taught us many things. Believe me, I do not say this only out of politeness.

Defense Minister Comments on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Karpati Confirms USSR Division Withdrawal
LD1812095888 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0900 GMT 18 Dec 88

[Text] Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati has confirmed that the Soviet Union will withdraw a full armored division from Hungary on the basis of the unilateral arms reduction announcement. The minister gave a statement to the television program newsreel after his return from the Sofia conference of the Warsaw Pact Defense Committee. He said that the Soviet Union would also reduce their air forces stationed in Hungary and that the troop withdrawal will also affect many sub-units [alegyseg].

MTI Reports on Karpati's Comments
LD1912143088 Budapest MTI in English
1305 GMT 19 Dec 88

[Text] Budapest, December 19 (MTI)—The session of the Committee of Defence Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member states recently held in Sofia was especially important, said Colonel-General Ferenc Karpati, Hungarian minister of defence, to Monday's edition of the Hungarian newspaper 'NEPSZABADSAG'.

Colonel-General Karpati went on to say that the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization had set out a proposal of great significance in Budapest in 1986 on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces deployed between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals. 'Besides, we proposed that NATO and the Warsaw Treaty member states should exchange military data concerning the region. Unfortunately, we did not receive an answer for a long time, but some weeks ago, NATO unilaterally made information public without informing us in advance.

'At the Sofia session, we discussed and analysed this move and found that the data and comparisons made public by NATO were unrealistic. They do not take all components of the armed forces and armaments into consideration and give a biased picture about power relations, as if the Warsaw Treaty Organization had an edge in all fields. This, however, is not true.

'The data made public by NATO can by no means be regarded as a realistic basis for talks. To facilitate the starting of genuine talks next year, we looked into the facts concerning power relations and decided to go public soon with our findings. According to our calculations, in the global sense there is a balance of power in Europe between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

'In this context, we studied what steps were needed to bring our defence doctrine, set out in Berlin last year, into line with our political targets, and the military

structure and armaments should also be in accord with this. We are working very hard on this. That is, we would like to eliminate the means for an unexpected attack.'

On the unilateral reduction in armaments and troops announced by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UN, the Hungarian minister of defence underlined:

'An armoured division is to be withdrawn from Hungary together with several supplementary units, and the air-force temporarily stationed here will also be reduced. This means a unilateral reduction.

Asked whether Hungarian forces would be reduced too, the colonel-general replied, 'Not now. A measure of this kind depends on the development of talks on arms and armaments in Europe. Should make [as received] headway there, Hungarian troops could also be reduced. We are seeking to reach agreements that apply to the forces of the Hungarian People's Army. A force of sufficient size, suitably trained for the defence of the Hungarian People's Republic in the long run, however, must be maintained.'

Honecker Reaction to Gorbachev Proposals Viewed

*LD1312135088 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1100 GMT 13 Dec 88*

[By Djordje Milosevic]

[Text] Berlin, Dec 13 (TANJUG)—Never before has Berlin's reaction to an international event been so swift and direct as in the case of the recent speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in the United Nations last Thursday, in which the Soviet leader announced a withdrawal of a number of Soviet troops from the Democratic Republic of Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

East German state and party leader Erich Honecker welcomed the Soviet decision within hours of Gorbachev's speech. To do this, Honecker even added a passage to his toast prepared in advance of a formal dinner in honour of visiting Yugoslav Presidency President Raif Dizdarevic, a fact to which foreign reporters' attention was particularly drawn.

A day later, Berlin's official stance was confirmed by the party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and by Defence Minister Army General Heinz Kessler.

Kessler, however, lost no time praising the Soviet decision but went further by claiming that the move would by no means diminish the defence strength of the Warsaw Treaty. Apart from its European dimension, Moscow's decision to withdraw six tank divisions from three European countries also has an international aspect. In addition to the GDR's 120,000-strong Army under direct Soviet command, the Soviet Union has in the German Democratic Republic five Armies numbering about 400,000 troops and equipped with most advanced armaments.

The fact that this huge military potential geographically confronts strong NATO forces in the neighbouring Federal Republic of Germany has always had a special significance in intra-German relations.

Berlin's defence minister last summer offered his West German counterpart, Rupert Scholtz, a dialogue on the two countries' possible contribution to the process of disarmament in Europe. It was especially stressed on that occasion that the Warsaw Treaty does not want military supremacy nor has any intention of ever waging aggressive wars, but would also not allow the supremacy of "the other side".

Bonn's reply to the proposal still has not been received.

As unofficially learned in Berlin, the Soviet decision would not take much to carry out as indicated at recent talks between minister Kessler and ranking military officials of the command of the Soviet military contingent in the GDR.

Defense Minister Kadijevic Press Interview

*LD2012212988 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0132 GMT 20 Dec 88*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Dec (TANJUG)—"Bearing in mind the positive trend in the development of international military and political relations, as well as the fact that our country is a significant factor of peace and stability not only in this region but beyond it as well, it is certain that, at this point in time, we are not threatened by the danger of external aggression. At the same time, the present and future role of the military factor in the world, especially as a negative shift may still not be excluded, does not permit any kind of weakening in the defensive capability of the country because, in practical terms, no one in the world is doing this. This is all the more true because the activity of the external factor, including the military factor, must always be evaluated in the context of the situation in the country."

This was stressed by Colonel General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense, in an interview to TANJUG, NARODNA ARMIJA, and FRONT. He replied to a number of questions on the influence of the external and internal situation on the country's security and on the development of the concept of all-people's defense and our Armed Forces, put to him by the chief editors of these publications—Mladen Arnautovic, Stipan Sikavica, and Predrag Pejic.

The full text of the interview is as follows:

[Question] Bearing in mind the fact that the country's security and defense should be seen in the context of the situation and development of international relations, could you please first of all give us your assessment of the most important characteristics of the military and political situation in the world?

[Kadijevic] In the world today, the processes of integration and disintegration in the economic, political, and military spheres are developing at the same time. The fundamental contradictions of the contemporary world continue to remain, some in a modified form, and with less pronounced ideological aspects and with more of other aspects—state and regional aspects. New centers of economic and military power are appearing.

A certain cooling-off in the war and crisis flashpoints is significant. This confirms that international problems cannot be resolved by the application of military force.

[Question] How do you, Comrade General, view the relations between the superpowers and the military blocs in the context of such a military and political situation in the world?

[Kadijevic] It is precisely the relaxation of tension in the relations between the superpowers which is making its mark on the current positive tendencies in overall international military and political relations.

Whether this is a lasting road toward peace or whether it will be destroyed by the emergence of some new objective obstacles, no one can say for certain at present. The key to the answer lies in the question of whether the global strategic goals of the superpowers are changing or only being modified, in other words whether both sides want to change these goals or only one side. Historical experience indicates that sudden shifts in the situation are possible.

[Question] What is your view of the further development and role of the military factor in world developments?

[Kadijevic] Here are several important facts on the situation, and tendencies in this sphere, because it is only from these facts, and not from good wishes or propaganda that worthwhile answers can be obtained.

It is positive that it was decided to withdraw and destroy about 4 percent of overall nuclear potential and that negotiations have been set in motion on the reduction of strategic nuclear armaments by 50 percent and this means that the present 12,000 nuclear warheads—the number available on each side—would be reduced in number to 6,000 each. However, even this would be sufficient for mutual annihilation. It is quite immaterial whether this capability for destruction is a single or a six-fold one.

Efforts to achieve reductions in conventional forces through negotiations are very positive. The announced unilateral reduction in the USSR's Armed Forces is encouraging and stimulative. However, in parallel with this, activities are developing which are operating in an opposite direction. In the West, the belief is that nuclear armaments must continue to retain their chief function of being a deterrent. This sets an absolute limit to the reduction in nuclear armaments. The number of countries possessing nuclear weapons is expanding.

The United States is imposing the doctrine of so-called rivalry, including the SDI program ("Star Wars"). Here they are insisting on the greater participation of West European countries in the implementation of the goals and overall expenditure of NATO forces and also in the strengthening of conventional forces and increasing the military budgets of the West European countries. This is explained by the claim that the USSR's conventional forces significantly outnumber those of NATO.

In view of the fact that nuclear arms and nuclear doctrines are primarily designed to have a deterrent function, increasing attention is being devoted to conventional rather than nuclear arms, and conventional military doctrines which have a more realistic possibility of being applied in practice. This is why, in parallel with the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear armaments, there has been an intensification in the process of the development of conventional arms on the basis of high technology and achievements in the development of space-based weaponry.

The strike-power and firepower of conventional weapons is being increasingly enhanced, something which in practical terms ensures the conditions for a reduction in the differences between, and exceeding of the thresholds of the effects of, small nuclear weapons systems and conventional weapons, and the "drawing together" of nuclear and conventional strategy. In essence, increasingly offensive military doctrines are being perfected and new ones are appearing on these foundations. It is obvious that the further miniaturization of tactical nuclear arms is being carried out, and the basic tendency here is that these too can be applied in conventional military doctrines.

I would note in particular that in present-day conditions most attention is being devoted to the so-called doctrine of low-intensity effects which, in essence, implies various forms of the use of forces and facilities, from special war to armed activities of relatively limited proportions. This doctrine is intended primarily for regions and countries of the "Third World."

In other words, it could be concluded that a general detente has come about both in the relations between the superpowers and in international relations as a whole, and that the negotiations on disarmament can lead to the establishment of a new balance of forces at a lower level, but one nevertheless sufficient for mutual destruction. Here the basic factors dictating the policy of disarmament lie, apart from in security interests, also in the economic interests of the main protagonists.

[Question] Comrade General, what could you tell us very briefly about the influence of the international military and political situation on the security of the SFRY?

[Kadejevic] Bearing in mind the positive trend in the development of international military and political relations, and also the fact that our country is a significant factor for peace and stability not only in this region, but also beyond it, it is certain that, at this point in time, we are not threatened by external aggression. At the same time, the current and future role of the military factor in the world, especially as a negative shift can still not be excluded, does not allow any weakening in the country's defense capability because in practical terms, no one else in the world is doing this. This is all the more true because the activity of the external factor, and also the military factor, must always be evaluated in the context of the situation in the country.

[Question] You mentioned our internal situation. How do you assess its influence on the security and defense of the country?

[Kadejevic] In current conditions the security and defense of Yugoslavia depends primarily on its internal stability. Here the interdependence and influence of the overall stability and defense capability of the country should be clearly seen.

To the extent which the development of our country is secured in keeping with its fundamental orientations, as the most important elements making for stability, the conditions are being created for the full expression of the established functions of all-people's defense and social self-protection. A weakening of all-people's defense could stimulate aggressive intentions or give an impetus to old aspirations and initiate new ones against Yugoslavia and individual parts of it.

[Question] Bearing in mind this importance of the internal situation for the security and defense of the country, there is an obvious need for it to be overcome as rapidly and energetically as possible. Please could you give your views on the basic causes and major preconditions for emergence from the present crisis.

[Kadejevic] Two kinds of causes lie at the basis of today's crisis. The first, initial, or basic one lies in some major failings of a systemic nature in the socioeconomic and sociopolitical system and in the interaction between the two. The second kind of cause arose as a consequence of the first, only to be transformed later on itself into the causes of the current inflammable economic, political, and in particular intranational situation.

Precious time has been lost in searching for solutions, so work must now be done very quickly, in an operative and rational way. The situation in our economy, above all, indicates the need for this. At the basis of this situation lies idleness, autarky, and the huge three-pronged (state, self-managing and sociopolitical) and three-tier (from the work organization through the municipality to the federation) superstructure.

Time has shown that the difficult social crisis cannot be overcome by methods used so far. To overcome this situation it is necessary to alter the assumptions on which we have constructed some of our misconceptions and above all adopt measures so as to separate work from idleness. Material motives are the basic factor and the only way in which this can be resolved. Measures are needed which, with regard to the position of employees, take away their monopoly over jobs so as to ensure competition between all of the population which is capable of doing work, because unless this happens there is no confirmation of the social character of the means of production.

There is no doubt that the basic reforms of the economic and political system and the further democratization of the LCY are creating the conditions for overcoming the present situation.

[Question] What, in your opinion, are the basic conditions for the success of the reforms?

[Kadejevic] The most important condition lies in the reply to the question: Are changes envisioned which serve to remove the fundamental causes of the crisis? On the whole, I believe they are. However, in terms of their

volume and depth—some are and some are not. Most has been done in changing the economic system and when it is a matter of the range of changes in the sociopolitical system it is worth bearing in mind that inappropriate solutions have remained which would make it possible for the federation to perform effectively those of its state functions which it has been authorized to carry out. [sentence as received]

A second important condition is that the system itself, by its functioning, ensures that adopted decisions are implemented in practice, so that their implementation is not dependent on someone's goodwill. The practice hitherto of calling only on conscientiousness and individual preparedness has not provided the expected results and nor can it provide them objectively speaking. This is also confirmed by the events following the 17th LCY Central Committee session. Despite the fact that at the session itself an enviable unity of political stands was achieved, a different type of behavior was expressed immediately after it had ended. In making concrete principled decisions each person implemented what was in his own interests, as a result of which everything which had to be and could be done was nowhere near done.

[Question] In recent talks with retired generals and admirals, you said that members of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] would be involved to the greatest extent in the struggle by all social forces for the emergence of the country from the crisis. Could you please say something more specific about this.

[Kadejevic] We shall work on this task both as an institution and as individuals. We shall work, above all, within the YPA and also through the institutions of the sociopolitical system and in public. The focus of our involvement will be on the further construction and strengthening of the concept of all people's defense and especially the Armed Forces.

[Question] In overcoming the unfavorable situation in society, overcoming the counterrevolution in Kosovo is very important. What is the Army doing to contribute to overcoming this difficult situation which is exceptionally important for the overall stability in Yugoslavia?

[Kadejevic] By its very presence in Kosovo, the Army is acting objectively as a factor of stabilization and a powerful warning to all those who in this area might possibly attempt to threaten by force the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social system of Yugoslavia. The important of the cooperation which the Army is receiving daily from the population of the province—from young people, working people in organizations of associated labor, representatives of sociopolitical communities, etc—is great.

Throughout the YPA, there prevails in any case recognition of the fact that the most rapid possible destruction of the counterrevolution in Kosovo represents a defense and self-protection issue of the first magnitude. This is

why members of the Army are supporting all those measures which lead to the secure return of mutual trust among the population in this territory and its political-security stabilization, and they energetically oppose any resistance which impedes the implementation of these measures, regardless of the nature in which this resistance is manifested and who initiates and carries it out.

[Question] What are the main problems which you are facing in the Armed Forces in this difficult time in carrying out your tasks?

[Kadejevic] There are a number of such problems. I would stress only a few of the most important ones. The first and most important is the problem of financing the Armed Forces. I will state only several of the major facts which confirm this.

At no time in the last 10 years has the YPA obtained funding as established by a plan. It has been receiving regularly up to one-third less. This year the real value will be not 5.20 percent, nor 4.94 percent, but 3.85 percent of the country's national income. No major system in the country could withstand such a financial blow.

When we made up the YPA's 5-year development plan in 1985, we were already lagging behind in a significant way in terms of the quality of the technical factor, which has an important place in evaluating the configuration of forces. We set ourselves the goal not of reducing the difference here but of halting any further increase. In the first instance, 5.20 percent and in the second instance, 6.61 percent of national income was needed. Since we continued to receive significantly less funding, this gap in the quality of the technical factor was deepened to our detriment, despite the fact that we restricted and restructured all forms of expenditure on technical modernization.

How our investments in the Armed Forces appear compared to some other countries is indicated by the following data:

In 1988, investment in defense amounted in our country to \$85 per capita, while in Bulgaria for example, it was \$509, in Italy \$278, in Greece \$266, in Austria \$192 and in Switzerland and Sweden over \$400 dollars.

Or, according to the latest statistics of the well-known SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] in Stockholm, Yugoslavia is in 19th place in Europe in terms of per capita defense expenditure. According to the "cost price" of a soldier, Yugoslavia spends least in Europe in "maintaining" its Army.

In such unfavorable conditions for securing monetary funding, we were forced to carry out certain changes in the program plans of technical modernization, and also to drop some of them and to restrict some others and to extend the periods in which they are to be realized.

As you know, the SFRY Presidency adopted a decision on the reduction of the numerical size of the Armed Forces by 13 percent, and this has already been achieved. I would mention for the time being, with regard to the reduction of Armed Forces in the world, there are in the main only proposals by some countries. No one else apart from ourselves has done this up to now.

[Question] Does this mean, Comrade General, that a further lagging behind has come about in the quality of the technical factor of our Armed Forces?

[Kadejevic] Yes, this gap has since 1985 increased at an even more rapid rate. We are now lagging behind significantly in the number of modern tanks, aircraft, and artillery for support and antitank warfare and in other third-generation facilities.

It was precisely for these reasons that it was vital that the YPA's financing should be resolved in a constitutionally different way from the way in which this has been done hitherto. Of course, we have not resolved definitively the issue of the YPA's financing but we have created the constitutional precondition for this to be resolved in a stable way and on a long-term basis.

[Question] What you just said now confirms that the attacks on the YPA budget are completely unfounded. Since these are not the only ones, can you tell us something about the character of attacks on the YPA?

[Kadejevic] You are right, although it should be stressed that the attacks on the YPA budget are at this time the most dangerous form of attack on the YPA and on the defense of the country in general. These attacks even go so far as to treat this expenditure on the country's defense as the cause of the current situation in the economy and, analogous with this, the YPA is even accused of [causing] the existing economic crisis.

It is not difficult to see, and it is still less difficult to prove, the lack of truth in these accusations, both from a defense point of view and also from an economic point of view. I shall only recall a few major facts and let each person draw his own conclusions. You have seen from the above statistics what the position is in terms of defense expenditure in Yugoslavia compared with our neighbors which, in addition, have their own powerful allies. Over the last few years, the Army budget has been reduced by 6.17 percent to, in practical terms, 3.85 percent of national income in 1988. In view of the fact that the estimate for this year was made in October and that inflation has been greater than was envisioned, it is evident that the above-mentioned percentage will, realistically speaking, be even less. In connection with this striking fact here are a few observations. Which other social structure has so drastically reduced its expenditure? Why is the economy continuing to sink into crisis despite such a reduction in the Army budget? The answer is very simple: If work continues to be done as hitherto, nothing will help it. And, finally, it is known

that the YPA is not a conventional budget consumer because about 65 percent of Army funding is engaged directly in the country's economy.

Another kind of problem comprises the direct attacks on the YPA, on its character, and on its place and role in the sociopolitical system and the system of defense. These attacks come from various ideological positions, but basically their aims are the same. Here are some of the most characteristic ones:

Over the last year or two, attacks designed directly to destroy the federal state have been most intensive. The exponents of these attacks judge that all the functions of the federal state, except for the defense function, are weak, inadequately defined, and objectively inefficient, and if the backbone of the defense function—the YPA—were to be successfully broken, then the federal state too would definitively collapse.

There are also attempts, if not pressures, in which efforts are made to introduce into the Armed Forces' command system institutions of the social system, although their role here is not envisioned by the SFRY Constitution. In this, the desire is to reduce the role of the YPA in armed combat at the expense of territorial defense, in other words, aggressively promote in a partisan-style way the combined form of armed combat and thus move closer toward the concept of republican armies instead of a united YPA.

The third kind of attack which could be very deleterious for the YPA's Yugoslav character are the attempts to link its cadres with republican and provincial concepts even when these concepts are not Yugoslav concepts. This relates, of course, also to the reserve officer corps.

I would also stress that the attacks on the Army which have come from some social environments, have to a significant extent occupied the attention of and distracted members of the YPA from their regular duties.

Compared to the past in which those who conducted the attacks were testified opponents of this country and the revolution, today attacks on the Army begin in and are even supported in some legal social institutions.

These attacks go as far as to contain claims about the alleged support for the idea of a putsch among the officers.

As I have already stressed on several occasions, it is obvious that these are pure fabrications. We are faced here with two extreme and equally unacceptable attitudes to the role of the YPA. Those who favor the first alternative advocate a hard-line policy and insist that the Army must play the role of an arbiter in resolving all the vital issues of our survival and development. The other view which insists on "confining the Army within barracks" is in direct conflict with the character and the working-class nature of the YPA.

[Question] On several occasions and especially in your recent report to the SFRY Assembly, you stressed that the SFRY Armed Forces, and the YPA in particular, will continue to develop in accordance with the country's existing potentials and depending on the degree to which its security is being threatened. Can you tell us more about the objectives and priority tasks in further developing the concept of all-people's defense and the Armed Forces.

[Kadejevic] In order to understand our present and especially our future defense organization, I would like to draw your attention to only some of the facts surrounding the historical development of the concept of all-people's defense: It originated at the time of the national liberation struggle—Tito was its creator and its values were demonstrated in the national Liberation War; its experience and especially the substance of that part which includes a combined form of the armed struggle have been used and validated during many liberation wars after World War II. In this way, the Yugoslav and particularly Tito's contribution to the world military theory have been confirmed in practice.

The concept has also been recognized as the most exemplary form of organizing the defense of our society. Its development in the entire postwar period has been continuous and without much deviation due primarily to the fact that Tito was directly involved in it and that he was constantly trying to protect it from attempts at distortion.

Some aspects of my assessment of the situation clearly lead to the conclusion that the goals and tasks of the system of all-people's defense in safeguarding the country's security remain the same. What is being changed is the fact that there has been a shift in priority and emphasis. Our emphasis today is on the need to fulfill our tasks by developing our function of a deterrent to potential aggression since this is the most rational and, in modern circumstances, very realistic form of defense.

We are to be efficient as a deterrent, two prerequisites are needed. The first concerns the country's overall stability which, from the point of view of our security, has to be fought for. The other presupposes a specific kind of equipment and training for the Army to enable it to counter modern and technically highly equipped armed forces and new military doctrines to be applied by potential aggressors, including various forms of operations from the special warfare arsenal.

Our priority tasks in further developing the Armed Forces and above all the YPA will be: to maintain and enhance the Army's moral-political unity over the program of safeguarding and further developing the achievements of our socialist revolution and on the basis of Josip Broz Tito's revolutionary thought; to modernize our military organization to keep abreast with present-day developments in fields from information technology to the younger generation's social conscience; further

theoretical and practical development and modernization of our military doctrine and combat skills; to improve the organizational and formation structure of the units; to improve the capabilities of our Armed Forces by equipping them with modern weapons and providing them with top-class training to enable them to achieve the necessary level of combat readiness and to carry out their special-purpose tasks; to modernize the system of leading and commanding; further to improve the system of recruiting, to modernize combat training and military education.

[Question] What is being done to attract more young people for the Army and military schools, especially from those areas in which young people are not so keen to chose the career of professional soldier?

[Kadejevic] The Army has been carrying out a whole range of various activities in an organized and systematic way. In addition, we continue to search for even better ways of improving the status of the officers, cadets, and students, to modernize the education system, and to open up all of our educational institutions to other social structures. We are also trying to modernize our information and propaganda activity and to bring it closer to the mood of young generations. However, all of this will not be enough for overcoming the problem you have referred to. Two important measures are necessary to take: the first and the most important one is to evaluate more adequately the difficulty of the military profession from both material and other aspects.

As soon as it is given an opportunity, society must do this. Secondly, we need more direct and efficient work in those environments where the interest in military schools has been inadequate. This includes political work and a whole series of incentives which society can objectively provide, as is done in some other countries.

[Question] What is the average age of army officers (for instance, how old is our youngest general)?

[Kadejevic] From the point of view of age, younger officers are in a majority. About 60 percent of officers are under 40, about 29 percent between 40 and 50, and about 11 percent over 50. The average age of the officer cadre is about 37.

There are several generals who are 51 and this year a number of officers will be promoted to the rank of major-general at 49. We are taking steps to shift the age average in favor of younger generations.

[Question] Comrade General, you were barely 20 when you participated in the final operations for the liberation of the northwestern parts of the country with your 26th division in May 1945. This prompted us to ask you how

you assess the trends amongst the younger generation and whether you think it is capable of carrying the burden which the overcoming of the crisis involves.

[Kadejevic] It is never a good idea to be absolute about things, not even about specific rules of armed struggle. However, it is absolutely certain that a more rapid tempo of the development of society is not possible without a substantial advancement of the social status of the young generation. The knowledge acquired in the Army irrefutably confirms that the present younger generations have to a large extent accepted the fundamental values of our society and that they are loyal and devoted to socialism, self-management, the federative body of our community, brotherhood and unity, our nonaligned policy, and the system of all-people's defense and social self-protection.

However, one has to bear in mind that negative social trends have lasted for an unacceptably long time, which mostly affects young people. They rightly manifest dissatisfaction at unemployment, failures in the system of upbringing and education, the violation of brotherhood and unity, nationalist euphoria, the erosion of moral values, etc.

Comprehensive and lasting solutions to these and other problems and shortcomings are the best way to improve the social status of the younger generation and secure conditions for directing its creative potential towards the general progress of our entire community. The young are those most interested in the country's future. This is why their words and deeds must be taken much more into consideration when seeking solutions for our present problems.

[Question] What would you say, in a form of a message, on the occasion of the forthcoming holiday of our Army?

[Kadejevic] I am convinced that the vast majority of Yugoslavs, especially the younger ones, accept the security of Yugoslavia as their life-long interest and at the same time as a fundamental condition for the progress of society as a whole.

We in the YPA will continue our persistent work on the consolidation of its popular, revolutionary, and Yugoslav character. This is why we ought to understand by now that the way to a better, richer, and more humane life is through better, more substantive, and more productive work and that there is no other way. Everything else is an illusion, including various demagogic slogans, as well as empty, sterile talk, with which our country is unfortunately overloaded.

[Unidentified Editor] Finally, comrade general, we congratulate you personally and all the members of our Army on your holiday 22 December and wish you further success in the strengthening of the country's defense force.

Problems in Conventional Arms Control Considered

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[Article by Sergei Vybornov, attache at the Third European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Vladimir Leontyev, third secretary at the First European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The Future of the Old Weapon"]

[Text] With the start of real disarmament marked by the Soviet-American Treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles the problem of conventional weapons has moved to the forefront. Plans for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals up to their complete elimination, on the one hand, and rapid modernisation of old, "traditional" types of weapons which open up totally new possibilities for their use, on the other, lead to the redistribution of military functions between nuclear and conventional armaments in favour of the latter.

This redistribution and the "compensation" of reductions in nuclear arsenals by the buildup of conventional arms is extremely dangerous because the measure of control by central political organs of the state over conventional weapons and their military use is substantially lower than over nuclear, and especially, strategic weapons.

Throughout the postwar period conventional armed forces and armaments have practically been overshadowed by the strategic and tactical nuclear systems. The presence of such a heavy "counterweight" as nuclear weapons minimised the importance of conventional arms balance, diminished the significance of qualitative and quantitative imbalances and asymmetries in personnel, number of divisions, tanks, artillery, tactical aviation, etc. According to military strategists, the nuclear weapons were supposed to perform all operational tasks both in the offensive and the defence, to reverse the most unfavourable course of combat in favour of the side using such kind of weapons.

Nuclear weapons have become a permanent, organic element of the armed forces of nuclear powers. Both the tactics of conventional armed forces and specifications of "classical" weaponry were adjusted to nuclear weapons. In this context, the historically established balance of conventional forces seemed to suit both sides (though this was not stated publicly) which did not seek any substantial changes in this field. Implicitly this is confirmed by, inter alia, the inefficiency of the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe conducted during fifteen years and the results of which were hardly any better than those of the disarmament effort of the League of Nations.

The Soviet programme of general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons up to the year 2000 has delivered a tangible blow on the dogmas of military strategy

which emerged in the era of nuclear confrontation, on the habitually soothing confidence in the possession of a reliable and effective "superweapon". Publications in both the Soviet and Western press testify to the fact that changes in ideas, the comprehension of the realities of modern world are not an easy process. However, such changes are essential because they serve as an important guarantee of the irreversibility of disarmament and exclusion of "compensatory" approach to the solution of relevant problems.

The detailed analysis of problems concerning the promotion of security in the process of disarmament and, in the first instance, of the question of conventional forces and weapons' place and role in strengthening international peace and maintaining strategic stability is acquiring particular importance. It is the conventional armaments which in the context of deep reduction and, more so, of elimination of nuclear weapons are to guarantee national security and the defence of sovereign rights of interested parties. They consume the greater part of today's world military expenditures. We are on the verge of a new spiral of the most ruinous qualitative arms race, primarily in non-nuclear sphere; in certain fields we seem already to have begun to enter it.

However, some Western analysts assert that the cost of a weapon's system has the same growth rate as the gross domestic product (GDP), in any case, in those countries where there is a close link between the military and civil industries, therefore the arms race can be continued without raising the proportion of military expenditures in the GDP. Incidentally it is worth mentioning that, in our opinion, Western potential for raising military expenditures is quite considerable notwithstanding previous stereotypes. First, the NATO countries are far from utilising the full potential of their military-industrial specialisation and cooperation in the production of conventional armaments making only first steps in this highly lucrative field for military monopolies. Second, most NATO states have systematically fallen behind the agreed targets for the growth of military budgets, a situation which may change. Third, the absolute figures of aggregate Western GDP are substantially higher than for the socialist community which is equally important. Finally, the possibilities for "belt-tightening" in socialist countries are far from boundless which is not exclusively due to economic factors.

The problem of conventional armaments has the most acute character in Europe where runs the line of contact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty members, and hence the imminent threat of a direct clash between the two largest military alliances. Europe is also the seat of the negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments which were held at the beginning of a subregional basis (Central Europe) and which are now being raised to a regional basis covering the whole continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals. However,

neither diplomats nor scientists have for the time being been able to work out a mutually acceptable plan for reducing the level of conventional confrontation in Europe.

The main obstacle here seems to lie not only and not so much in the lack of the official figures though their publication would, undoubtedly, be of utmost significance for any serious discussion on quantitative criteria for the balance and on the ways to lower it. It seems that the problem rather lies in the fact that the process of a radical reduction of conventional armaments should be not so much of the regional as of the global nature. It can be realised in full only on the global basis which in practice would be tantamount to general and complete disarmament.

What could, however, be the model of a militarily stable situation in Europe based on conventional armaments? The problem is by no means an easy one even in respect of nuclear weapons bearing in mind that in Europe at present there are four centres and about ten systems consisting of three main elements: ground, air and naval, with approximately similar characteristics. It is relatively easier to build such a model in respect of the Soviet-American balance. But any attempt to introduce into such model the nuclear forces of third parties and qualitatively new nuclear systems poses insurmountable difficulties to experts on modelling the strategic stability.

In the case of conventional armaments, however, the number of inputs grows tremendously—instead of maximum four centres and ten systems of weapons one has to account for tens of countries and hundreds of systems with an indefinite degree of equivalency. All this makes the problem an extremely difficult one.

Many states participating in the Warsaw Treaty-NATO balance in Europe have to take into account in their military policy and in the development of armed forces the factor of third parties. This places rigid limits on their capacity to conduct mutual or unilateral reforms of armed forces. Quite naturally, a situation when some states would go back to the military capabilities of 1914-1918 and the others would at the same time acquire the potential of the year 2000 is excluded. That is a good subject for science-fiction writers but not for politicians. Outside threats are not limited to 16 member states of NATO nor to seven Warsaw Treaty members. One should not forget about it, otherwise we would only waste time and effort on the construction of far-fetched, unrealistic models.

If the threat posed by the strategic nuclear weapons is of universal nature, tactical nuclear weapons and, particularly, conventional armaments pose a threat primarily to European countries. Let us take NATO conceptions on the use of conventional armaments to deliver strikes at deep operational formations of Warsaw Treaty countries and superimpose them on the political and economic map of Europe. Let us purely theoretically plot mirror

reflection of these points on the map of Western Europe. Taking into account that NATO in the case of war plans to use conventional armaments for strikes at military targets up to 800 kilometres away and using the GDR-FRG border as a reference point we get a zone stretching approximately from Brest on the Bug to the eastern suburbs of Paris. In addition, NATO capability to deliver conventional strikes against the USSR territory is limited whereas the US territory remains practically invulnerable.

Hundreds of high-risk economic installations are situated in the designated zone with Western Europe leading in nuclear reactors and Eastern Europe—in chemical plants. Thus, any war, including a conventional one, is totally unacceptable to Europeans. However, from the West European standpoint this cannot be said about its major potential adversary, nor about its major ally whose territory can be effectively hit only by strategic nuclear weapons.

Thus, the unresolved problem of conventional forces posing a specific threat to European states can lead to an ironic, at a first glance, situation when they can be more interested in the maintenance of strategic nuclear weapons than the major nuclear powers—the USA and the USSR. The underestimation of this fact could complicate the realisation of deep reductions in the USSR and US strategic arsenals and even cast doubt on them. (By the way, the elements of such reaction were evident in connection with the US consent to "double zero" option.)

Europe's geographic situation is characterised not only by the lack of operational depth in its western part. Europe is asymmetrical in its concrete potential for the reduction of the level of armed forces and armaments concentration. Indeed, there is practically no place in its western parts to withdraw troops by, let's say, disposing defence in depth, as proposed by some western experts. Under present conditions it is politically impossible for NATO to redeploy the American GIs or Bundeswehr excess contingents withdrawn from West Germany in, for example, France or Spain. (However, such a prospect is not that unrealistic in the context of the current military rapprochement between France and West Germany and of the efforts to develop West European military integration.)

Further on, the withdrawal of agreed contingents with their materiel beyond the zone of reductions (from the Atlantic to the Urals) would obviously mean that the Soviet Union would have to relocate large troop contingents to the Asian part of the country. That is not likely to be received positively by such our neighbours as Pakistan, China and Japan as well as the USA. Partly suppressing one hotbed of tension we would simultaneously create conditions for a new one.

Nor should one lose sight of some political implications of the elimination of nuclear weapons along with retention of conventional armaments. In the case of Europe this would mean that on the basis of equal military risks in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals we can single out the above-mentioned subzone from the western border of the USSR to the territory of France. This territory coincides with what some Western politicians call Europe "from Brest to Brest", i.e. Europe without the Soviet Union.

In Europe we cannot ignore the significance of historical experience either. It was studied by many generations of military historians, and publications describing it are stacked on numerous shelves in bookstores. At the same time hardly any of the authors would assert that the armed forces of Nazi Germany in 1937 or 1939 surpassed the military might of its potential adversaries or were even equal to it. Using modern language, that unfavourable imbalance in conventional armaments, however, did not prevent Germany from unleashing the war, defeating Poland, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and France, throwing out British expeditionary force from the continent, attacking the Soviet Union and holding the strategic initiative at the "Eastern front" for almost one and a half years.

It is difficult for all Europeans, be it in the east or in the west of the continent, to forget such an experience. The recollections of bloody, destructive wars cannot be abolished by any order or an international agreement. The high emotional tension of this kind can be removed only by mutual painstaking effort which would last for many years. But this task is a realistic one which can be exemplified by German-French reconciliation after the Second World War. Obviously, we do not pay much attention to war prevention mechanism in relations between the developed capitalist states whereas it should be studied very attentively (especially, as the problem of a military confrontation between socialist states is not completely removed from the agenda). How could, for example, the Germans and the French, the two nations which from time immemorial waged wars with each other, manage to become good friends and allies in just a few decades? In short, there are many things to be taken into account while working out the particulars of the comprehensive system of international security and plans for the construction of a "common European home".

The multi-purpose nature of the majority of modern armaments creates a special set of problems. Viewing the development of weaponry military strategists as long ago as in the beginning of the 1960s made a conclusion that the difference between the defence and the offensive was getting slighter and slighter. This is particularly obvious in the case of conventional armaments the vast majority of which is suitable for both offensive and defensive purposes and acquiring a more and more universal character.

The example is the emergence of a new type of aircraft-fighter-bomber designed for attacking both air and ground targets—on the basis of fighters and bombers of the last war. Another example is an anti-tank grenade-launcher which was conceived as a purely defensive weapon but turned out to be suitable also to neutralise weapon emplacements, i.e. for offensive actions which is confirmed by the experience of modern local wars.

One and the same means are being used both for crushing the defence and for repulsing an attack, whereas an equal technical level of the armed forces allows both sides to use the whole range of operational opportunities even in the case of a hypothetical elimination of entire classes of conventional armaments or mutual reduction of their efficiency, striking capabilities and mobility.

In fact, if a modern motorised infantry division (or a similar one) discards its tanks retaining the rest of its armour we would get a military detachment the strike capability of which is not less than that of a tank division of the Second World War. If we take away armoured vehicles and cars from the infantry we would get divisions of the 1914-1918 type. If we take away machine guns we are ready for the Russo-Japanese or Franco-Prussian wars. We can pull this chain for a long time without getting a positive result that would guarantee peace and stability.

Even specific offensive and defensive means are developed practically simultaneously on the basis of symmetry and according to the action-counteraction principle (this is one of the ways of spontaneous maintenance of stability). Besides, it can be easily seen from the history of wars that the margin between the "challenge" and the "response" is not that wide as it might seem at first sight. Thanks to trenches, magazine rifles and machine-guns during the First World War the defence triumphed, but it was in those days that such means of overcoming the defence as tanks, bombers, etc. did appear. The defence on the fronts of the First World War was stabilised not so much by the lack of offensive technical means as by the underdeveloped state of military theory which focussed on operative and tactical objectives.

Brussilov's breakthrough of 1916 and the total defeat of the French army in 1940 are two sides of one coin. In short, the defensive and offensive nature of weapons is determined not so much by their technical specifications as by conceptions of their use which can also be changed.

There is no unanimity either as to the methods of reducing the armaments. Though asymmetrical cuts proposed by NATO can seem attractive in the context of pure arithmetics they do not take into account the essential differences in the development of armed forces, tactical conceptions, historical traditions, methods of troop control and factual deployment. On the other side, simultaneous mutual reductions based on the principle

of equal security require prior recognition of another factor—an approximate parity of forces on both sides which is now denied by many in official political and military circles in the West.

Quantitative reductions of conventional armaments have one major defect—their efficiency is limited in time. Qualitative development of armaments constantly improves their efficiency, thus allowing to achieve the same result with fewer means. Where prior to the Second World War the count went in thousands, now we need hundreds and tomorrow, perhaps, dozens will be enough.

Apart from quantitative comparisons, we cannot ignore such important aspects as battle training of troops, the quality of their control, means of reconnaissance, including by electronics. The list can go on. But it is essential that many of the listed parameters cannot be expressed arithmetically, moreover (and fortunately) they are impossible to compare subjectively.

In other words, the dialectics of the modern arms race lies in the constant qualitative modernisation of means of combat with the quantitative aspect playing an auxiliary role.

The real possibility for the reduction of conventional armaments would appear probably when there is an agreement on limiting or putting an end to qualitative arms race, and industry is no more capable for rapid conversion to military production.

Obviously, a proposal to cease immediately all military-oriented R&D or to renounce the industrial production of the existing armaments would seem utopian. However, an agreed termination of work on new programmes beginning with, for example, 1990 or 1991 could become a reality. The production of technology-intensive types of armaments can be raised substantially in a short period of time only if its mass production has started prior to that necessity. No matter what superweapon is created in a lab, its industrial production would take years.

Due to the fact that the current research would give first industrial results not earlier than in 1998-2000 (R&D and industrial implementation of high technology programmes last in average 10-15 years), it would be possible starting from the year 2000 or somewhat earlier to mutually renounce mass production of newly designed armaments. It would be realistic even now to make a first step and to renounce the modernisation of the systems in service. The process of gradual termination of qualitative arms race should be accompanied by the establishment of the system of multiple confidence-building measures in the military and technical field.

The package of measures aimed at the limitation of qualitative capabilities can be extended to all types of weapons or to those which are most destructive and

mobile. A third option presupposes a freeze on all the developments except those of new stationary air and army defence systems having no mobile and offensive potential whatsoever. In the course of time this would create such conditions under which the "sword" would gradually lose its efficiency against the "shield" and be scrapped due to uselessness.

Moreover, unlike the direct deep cuts in or elimination of the whole classes of conventional armaments which are feasible, in our opinion, only on the global basis, the termination of qualitative arms race would require the participation of only several states outside Europe and North America which are independently capable to conduct the complete cycle of development and production of the most modern weapons of various classes. They are Brazil, Israel, South Africa, India, China, Japan and, in the future, the "new industrial states".

The reduction of conventional armaments in Europe could hold quite unexpected implications, namely, dealing with the economic aspects of their production. Unlike the strategic nuclear missile systems which are totally dependent on state budgets of corresponding countries, a certain part of conventional armaments can be bought and sold (even if there are some political limitations). The production of armaments occupies a substantial place in the activities of companies which determine the industrial image of the country.

Western Europe has been and remains one of the primary international markets of armaments. However, no country of the region is capable of producing independently the whole range of necessary armaments, therefore they have to import them more and more often. The exporters are firms from the USA and other West European countries. On basis of reciprocal trade in armaments the states of Western Europe are able to sustain the development of science-intensive branches of industry which are strategically important for them. Proceeds from the export of armaments are largely used to finance the R&D of these firms in the key spheres of technological progress, including the civilian ones. The curtailment of the European market would make it necessary for many West European countries either to convert their military industries to civilian production or to eliminate some of them completely.

It should be recalled that the practical solution of the problem of military industry conversion in the West is complicated by an extensive participation of private and mixed enterprises in the military production whose normal functioning is now guaranteed by military contracts. Therefore, a substantial reduction in the level of conventional armaments in Europe most certainly would meet with fierce resistance on the part of the members of the military-industrial complex who will obviously strive to compensate the quantitative curtailment of their sales by the growth of quality and, consequently, of prices.

Thus, the problem of conversion of military industry to civilian production that is not inferior to military hardware from the point of view of its technical level and profitability is closely tied to the problem of arms reduction and strengthening of stability in Europe. That is why these two problems should be dealt with simultaneously. The fewer people are disadvantaged by disarmament the more lasting it would be. However, this does not mean that Warsaw Treaty and NATO members cannot reach essential agreements on the reduction of the present level of military confrontation on the continent.

Moreover, in the regional framework it is more or less possible to solve the problem of reducing the threat of a surprise attack as well as preventing it altogether. It is proposed to this end to establish special zones and corridors, to extend measures of confidence and to take some other steps. Perhaps, it is possible to go even further. In view of the fact that reasonable political and military leaders in the West acknowledge the approximate parity of forces in Europe the situation could be stabilised by limiting, for example, the means of both sides to mobilise reservists.

It would be opportune, probably, to consider such steps as the reduction of stockpiles of military hardware and ammunition. They should, in the first instance, cover the reserves of equipment which form the material potential of both sides to increase sharply troop strength in a crisis situation. The solution of the problem of equipment reserves (naturally, not only in Warsaw Treaty countries but also in Western states, including the "forward-based materiel" of the US Army in Europe) would allow to eliminate such factor as the military significance of the human potential which is difficult to equalise.

The maintenance of peace is based not only on goodwill, moral considerations and strict economic estimates but also on the key notion of strategic stability which forms the military mechanism of the system of the maintenance of peace coexisting with political, economic and moral-psychological mechanism.

The military mechanism is the most tangible among them. It is always under the control and guidance of governments of the interested parties, it is the most manageable and has the least inertia. It undergoes the fastest changes but these changes are not spontaneous; they are the result of the policy-making decisions which can be confirmed, changed or substituted by others according to the situation. However, the construction of this mechanism requires not only decisions but also investments on the part of states. Judging by direct public investments the military mechanism of the maintenance of stability is the most expensive. Its construction and functioning directly affect all the citizens contributing to the state budget, and they have every reason to be interested, at least in general terms, in where the funds go and how efficiently they are used.

However, the tangible nature of military mechanism is a two-edged weapon. Being flexible and obedient under a rigid and public political control it can break loose under the slightest indulgence. This would in turn lead to political decisions based not on a thorough analysis of the situation but on the illusions of the race for superiority, momentary emotions, obsolete stereotypes, certain technological innovations. Many such examples are given by the activities of the military-industrial complex in the leading Western countries which has transformed from the instrument of state policy into an autonomous political force.

Another essential feature of the strategic stability mechanism is its multilateral nature. "It takes two for a wedding", says a French proverb. Intentionally or not, stability is formed by the whole range of mutually dependent and interrelated actions of both sides. In other words, by the combination of consistent measures to achieve military superiority and counter-measures to neutralise them which are independently taken by each of the sides. That confrontation structure of development has given rise to the present mechanism of strategic stability which is cumbersome, quite unsteady and hard to control, any minute capable of self-destruction.

However, there is another way. It presupposes concrete agreed and multilateral action. That is the way of cooperation dictated by new thinking. On this way it is possible to improve and rationalise the present mechanism of military stability. In other words, to eliminate the elements of sharp conflicts, to lower the level of military confrontation up till its complete elimination and exclusion of a military factor from the sphere of interstate relations (at least, from the relations of the great powers).

Cooperation in strengthening the strategic stability requires a common approach, uniform understanding of tasks, purposes and means of the conducted policy. Otherwise, there is a real danger that separate breakthroughs in the direction of lowering the level of military confrontation would still be isolated actions immediately compensated by a buildup and modernisation of armaments in other fields. A similar situation was depicted in the old Greek myth about the fight of Hercules with Hydra. As is known, Hydra's heads which had been cut off grew again which made the situation "stable" for Hydra but not for Hercules. The latter had found his own way to stabilise it by searing the wounds thereby preventing the heads from regenerating.

The present situation in the field of disarmament looks more like a fight between Hydras in which both sides are equal in their potential to restore the lost heads and warheads. The lack of common understanding of stability (or else, its common understanding as a confrontation of outdated military power criteria) immediately raises the question of compensation of any disarmament measures.

Disarmament is simultaneously an end and a means, or rather more a means than an end. It is the means for achieving a world based on security and non-violence, i.e. a militarily stable world. Therefore, the issue of maintaining stability in the course of disarmament, at all its stages is acquiring a priority status. Its analysis and coordination should precede all disarmament measures. The post-factum consideration of the problem of stability would inevitably open up possibilities for unilateral conflicting interpretations and decisions.

A polycentric, multi-polar nature of today's world makes it imperative to analyse thoroughly the issues of maintaining and strengthening stability in the process of disarmament. Certain steps taken by one or two states can change the situation for the third one, provoke response on their part leading, in turn, to the transformation of the original situation and casting doubt on initial decisions.

Noteworthy in this respect is the mixed reaction of the European nuclear powers vis-a-vis the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the desire to compensate the withdrawal of Pershings and cruise missiles by equivalent systems (the French mobile MRM S-4, a project for a Franco-British cruise missile), by the increase in strike capability of their SLBMs, etc. As the result medium-range missiles would remain in Europe even after the implementation of the Soviet-American agreement; the only changes would be in their deployment areas and identification marks. Would this provoke a response from the other side, and if so, what kind of response?

Thus, the problems of disarmament and stability are closely linked together as are the problems of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments. It is impossible to solve them separately, they can be solved only in totality. That is why it becomes more and more necessary to work out a combined programme of disarmament and strengthening of stability. Foundations for that are not lacking. In the field of nuclear disarmament provisions contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement of January 15, 1986 are being successfully implemented. A necessary complement to them has been provided by the declaration on negotiations to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe adopted at the recent Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw.

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Critique of Pre-Gorbachev Approach to Arms Control

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Georgiy Melorovich Sturua, head of a department of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO: "Soviet-American Relations at the New Stage"]

[Text] Among the events which have denoted a lessening of tension in the world, first place belongs to the normalization of Soviet-American relations. Never before has the history of these relations experienced such intensive top-level dialogue. The fourth summit in 2 years 6 months between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan concluded at the start of June. This meeting essentially completes the series begun in November 1985 in Geneva.

The Geneva debut produced promising results for both sides. Having completed the protracted stage of a return to the rhetoric and practice of the "cold war," the USSR and the United States demonstrated their capacity for the establishment of dialogue based on realism. And there were for this development of events, granted all the immense importance of the subjective factor, objective reasons.

However inadequately the shape that had been taken by Soviet-American relations, Moscow and Washington recognized full well, albeit in a differing key, the political imperative—the continuation of negotiations to curb the arms race. Their temporary suspension in 1984 had illuminated the fact that no alternative to negotiations would be accepted by the public opinion of either side. Regardless of the fruitfulness of the negotiations even, their very continuation represented a kind of assurance against an uncontrollable deterioration in the strategic situation.

Material to an all-embracing assessment of the first half of the 1980s is also, probably, the following observation: the present leadership of the White House was among the few U.S. administrations not to have threatened to use nuclear weapons in the course of this crisis or the other.

And, finally, the two terms of the Reagan presidency will go down in history as a period when the United States and the USSR were not involved in a head-on confrontation in any new regional conflict.

The limits of the deterioration in mutual relations which the USSR and the United States could permit themselves were ascertained in the course of the first half of the 1980s. In spite of rhetorical excesses, these limits appear narrower than those which existed in the 1950s-1960s. If the period that has been completed is described

as a "second cold war," compared with the original model it is distinguished by greater rationalism, which does not, of course, make it more acceptable.

The way toward increased interaction was difficult for both sides. Much has been said and written about the evolution of the Republican administration's foreign policy views. The distance which it has covered is impressive. From the idea of the nonacceptance of negotiations with the USSR as legitimizing the continued existence of this "social aberration" to the President's speech from the rostrum of Moscow State University against a backdrop of red banners and his words to Soviet students: "Your generation is living in a most exciting, promising period of Soviet history." From the persistent pushing of the plan for the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe to ratification of the INF Treaty. Let us not discount the intention of the President himself to conclude his term in the White House effectively, particularly in the atmosphere of the smoldering "Iran-Contra" scandal. The version that the President would like to leave office in the garb of peacemaker which has gained currency simplifies his behavior motives in at least one aspect: he would rather be credited with the conclusion of an agreement per his plan (the "zero option"), which, breaking with "unacceptable tradition," actually provides for U.S. security by an asymmetrical reduction in the military power of its principal adversary.

More significant, however, is something else: the permissibility—after so difficult an era in Soviet-American relations—of the very idea of completing a presidential career with a rapprochement with the "Soviets" and a visit to Red Square. It could only have arisen given a particular correlation of political forces and "state of mind" in the United States. The wave of neoconservatism with its pathological anti-Sovietism is receding. The economic ailments picked up as a result of the abrupt leap forward in military spending are making their presence felt more distinctly. The public mind in the United States is approaching the level of rejection of the fallacious "better dead than red" dilemma. The opinions of ordinary Americans and the U.S. ruling elite revealed by polls had created favorable prerequisites for a positive change in administration policy in relations with the USSR. President Reagan is called the "great communicator" precisely because he has at times expressed the prevailing mood very accurately and has not only shaped it but also followed it.

An interesting assessment of the transformation of political life in the United States and of the President himself is contained in the American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR: "Neoconservatives called Reagan their leader.... From the very outset the neoconservatives did all in their power to prevent agreements with the Soviets. The fact that the Senate ratified the INF Treaty by 93 votes to 5 was a cruel blow for them. The latest shock for them has been the fact that this week their own hero has smilingly set off for the Kremlin and taken his wife with

him, what is more.... He is treating the leader of the USSR Communist Party as a friend. He is doing this on the grounds that there has been change under Gorbachev. The USSR is changing, rather than it being changed. And all this is confounding the fundamental beliefs of the neoconservative movement. It has lost Ronald Reagan."¹

The transformation of administration policy in respect of the USSR has borne out the predictions of the Soviet America specialists who were maintaining back in 1980 that Reagan's conservatism would objectively put him in a better position from the viewpoint of the capacity for concluding an agreement with Moscow. But these experts still could not have taken into consideration in their analysis another most important condition of the normalization of Soviet-American relations. As the "Strategic Survey of the World Situation in 1987-1988" prepared by London's International Strategic Studies Institute, which was put out on the eve of the Moscow summit, said, "the development of events in the Soviet Union was the key factor which raised the world situation to a qualitatively new level."

Perestroika, which has introduced so many changes and which promises even bigger change within the country, was the engine of the normalization of Soviet-American relations. Its epoch-making, historic significance for the fate of the planet is acknowledged universally East and West, although it is far from always and everywhere greeted with satisfaction. By its powerful appeal to humanitarian and for this reason unifying principles the policy of perestroika is providing for a way out from the mire of confrontation into which the international community had driven itself further and further.

For an understanding of the basic mechanisms of the international effect of perestroika fundamental significance is attached to the following proposition of M.S. Gorbachev's report at the 19th party conference: "...learning lessons from the past, it has to be confessed that administrative-command methods did not bypass the foreign policy sphere either. It happened that even most important decisions were made by a narrow circle of persons without collective, comprehensive examination and analysis and sometimes without proper consultation with friends even. This led to an inappropriate response to international events and the policy of other states and to wrong decisions at times. Unfortunately, it was not always carefully considered what this version of action or the other could cost the people and how it could turn out."

The surmounting of the administrative-command features of our political system is leading to the demolition of negative (and by no means always wrong, unfortunately) ideas about Soviet society. As the 19th party congress said, the outside world is "discovering" the Soviet Union anew. The image of the Soviet Union cultivated in the West as a totalitarian closed society is in

its death throes. Of course, we should not delude ourselves—it is still too early to speak of a total departure from the stereotypes to whose formation the establishment in our country of the administrative-command system, the crimes of the Stalin period and the stagnation of the Brezhnev years contributed. This system has begun to yield its positions, but it continues to exist as yet, and conditions conducive to the reproduction by the West's propaganda machine of the "enemy image" persist.

Another mechanism of the positive impact of perestroika on the international situation is the transformation of Soviet foreign policy which it has brought about. Deforming the socialist nature of our state, the administrative-command system could not have failed to have also influenced the policy which it pursued in the international arena. It lacked the readiness for prudent compromise, flexibility and drive and to a certain extent it was nurtured by scholastic views of social progress and international relations. In the name of justification of its own failures and mistakes it was predisposed toward the excessive exaggeration of the significance of external factors. Within the framework of foreign policy efforts the interests of the survival of this system itself were gradually and at times imperceptibly substituted for the interests of all of Soviet society expressed in the consistent pursuit of a policy of peace and disarmament. The erroneous interpretation of the scale of the external danger and its main directions proceeded also, it should be noted, from the insufficient provision of the decision-making authorities with carefully analyzed information. All this engendered a situation wherein the priority nature of such a strategic task as a radical reduction in international tension, regardless of the subjective intentions of individuals and organizations, objectively diminished. It would be perfectly logical to conclude, I believe, that the existence of the administrative-command system was an obstacle in the way of a strengthening of general peace and strategic stability.

Recognition of the shortcomings of the former foreign policy course combined with the surmounting of the rigid managerial-bureaucratic structures which has begun to show is imparting dynamism to the USSR's actions in the international sphere and affording extensive scope for maneuver. The acquisition of flexibility not only does not mean a retreat from socialist ideals but, on the contrary, makes it possible to uphold the interests of the Soviet Union both as a socialist state and a great power more effectively.

The experience of the conclusion of the INF Treaty is highly indicative in this respect. The basis thereof is the "zero option" idea, which we had rejected repeatedly in the past. Meanwhile the Reagan administration's vigorous attempts to portray matters such that the United States, thanks to its tractability and military power buildup, had succeeded in gaining the upper hand on this issue are not meeting with the response which it anticipated. The world community does not see the INF

Treaty as a one-sided victory for White House strategists—even if we turn our thoughts away from whether certain influential circles in the U.S. Government really did aspire to the signing of some agreement on nuclear arms in Europe. In addition, the treaty is rightly considered a real achievement of the Soviet perestroika. Outside of its framework—were it possible even, which is highly doubtful—it would have appeared to have been a compromise imposed on us, and not an essential component of the long-term policy of disarmament elaborated by Moscow in the latter half of the 1980s.

It should be emphasized that at the present time the empirical aspect in the modernization of the USSR's foreign policy course predominates noticeably as yet over a scientific comprehension of the methods and forms of solution of the problems confronting our country and the deep-lying causes of the difficulties and setbacks which we are experiencing. Conditionally speaking, the "practitioners" outpacing of the "theorists" is perfectly natural for this stage: simply commonsense and life itself even have frequently demanded immediate action and indicated the direction in which it had to be taken.

Specifically, study of the 1970s detente period affords abundant food for thought. Many of the procedural propositions of the foreign policy section of M.S. Gorbachev's report at the 19th party conference were based on an analysis of precisely this period. Comparing this period with the flow of events since the Geneva summit, we discover a number of striking differences. They are grounds for maintaining that we are experiencing now not a short-term concurrence of two factors: the peaceable policy of one side and the sober reflection of political leaders of the other (the explanation of detente in some of our publications appears this superficial and facile) but the formation of a qualitatively new, more stable situation—the development of constructive and realistic Soviet-American interaction.

The movement of relations between the two countries to a higher level and the imparting to them of a more civilized character was possible largely as a result of the revision commenced by the Soviet Union of the approaches and dogmas which predominated in the 1970s and which brought about the short-lived nature of detente.

This applies primarily to the general philosophical question of the correlation of the class struggle (in the form of the confrontation of the two systems—socialism and capitalism) and peaceful coexistence. The proposed solution seemed very simple and logical: these phenomena should not be made to clash but separated per the appropriate spheres. One pertains to the sphere of relations between the systems, which are of an antagonistic nature, the other, to the sphere of relations between states, which should be constructed on an understanding

of the inevitability of coexistence, if we and our political and ideological opponents do not wish to perish in a thermonuclear conflagration.

However paradoxical, the adversaries of peaceful coexistence accurately spotted the weakness of this postulate, its metaphysical nature, if you like. The dialectical interconnection between systemic confrontation and interstate relations is a reality which cannot be abolished by any ingenious theoretical gambits. Conservative ideologues in the United States hastened to open politicians' eyes: look, the Russians themselves are affirming that peaceful coexistence and detente must promote the spread of socialism throughout the world. Detente is just a clever trick of the Soviets, and there can be no mutually profitable detente since our interests are irreconcilable. It was the antagonism of interests which was taken as the point of departure also by those who deduced from the possibility of detente the danger of class peace, the consignment to oblivion of the interests of the working people and so forth.

In the 1970s the improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States did not affect the deep-lying seams. Neither side precluded the expediency of agreements regulating—and no more—the main parameters of the arms race, but a foundation of relations of the new type necessary for a start to a process of real disarmament was lacking. The pathological mistrust of the USSR and fears that we were prepared to “exploit” the United States and avail ourselves of its technological resources to strengthen our own military machine erected insurmountable barriers in the way of an expansion of trade and economic cooperation. Reacting painfully to everything that would undermine the ideological assurances of its existence, the administrative-command system opposed a real rapprochement of the two peoples, without which true peaceful coexistence is inconceivable. The establishment of the foundations of cooperation was impeded by the fact that U.S. ruling circles viewed the problem of rapprochement through the prism of “psychological warfare”.

The weakness of the detente of the 1970s was the fact that it was approached as a zero-sum game: your victory is our defeat, and vice versa. It reflects not someone's good or ill will but the objective nature of Soviet-American relations and the mutual relations of the two systems throughout their history almost.

Today, freeing themselves from the shackles of dogmatism, Soviet social scientists are reaching the conclusion that in the modern world the classical models of socialism and imperialism such as they were in the 19th and first quarter of the 20th centuries no longer exist. Their “habitat” has become fundamentally different compared with that era. Today we understand better than ever that the joint “residence” of the two systems on one planet will be prolonged, if this is not prevented by a fatal world war III.

In other words, a situation has arisen which was not foreseen and has not been examined in Marxists' theoretical constructions. At the same time the works of K. Marx and V.I. Lenin provide the methodological key to a correct evaluation of the current stage of the development of world civilization. The proposition concerning the priority of interests and values common to all mankind over exclusively class interests, which they advanced and which has come back into political use recently, is assuming clearly expressed urgency. The sphere of interests and values common to all mankind is gradually expanding. The incorporation therein of the activity of states belonging to opposite social systems is intensifying the trend toward mutual influence.

I believe that the peaceful coexistence concept should today be invested with a different meaning not amounting either to an elementary enumeration of rules and principles of international law recorded in a whole number of international documents or to an understanding thereof as a specific form of class struggle unacceptable to the other side (it was no accident that the political and psychological associations induced by this term prompted the American delegation at the Moscow summit to turn down the insertion in the final document of a paragraph on the place and role of peaceful coexistence). It would be more accurate, probably, to describe peaceful coexistence as a process of the mutual influence of states of different types based on the realization in their practical activity of the idea of a broadening community of interests.

The critics of detente in the United States rejected it as an unsuccessful experiment either because mutually acceptable rules of its conduct were allegedly not agreed or because the Soviet Union was allegedly attempting to insist on its own rules. Without getting into an argument concerning the possibility of the formulation of universal rules of detente, study of its 1970s version reveals by no means the picture painted by American critics of the improvement in Soviet-American relations in the last decade. The actual content of detente largely corresponded to its “superpower” version advanced by the United States. The defects of the administrative-command system involuntarily dragged the Soviet Union into an unprofitable tug-of-war. This was manifested distinctly in the question of arms and the approach to the “third world”.

Both the United States and the USSR entered into negotiations without complete arms limitation concepts. Such ideas could have taken shape only as a result of direct contacts and given the elucidation of the parties' specific positions. It has to be confessed that the traditions of supersecrecy and privacy in military-political decision-making put us in a less advantageous position compared with the United States, where a strong culture of strategic thinking, to whose development civilian specialists had made a pronounced contribution, had taken shape. Arms limitation problems require a combination of the efforts of the military and diplomats,

political scientists and economists, environmentalists and engineers. Such coordination between them in the Soviet Union had to be established and doors which had previously been closed to them had to be opened simultaneously with the start of and, subsequently, in parallel with the rapid movement of the negotiations.

We embarked upon a period of detente without having dispensed with the baggage of outdated views. In 1969 the Strategic Rocket Forces commander-in-chief wrote: "Imperialist ideologues are attempting to blunt the vigilance of the peoples of the world, resorting to the propaganda dodge that there will be no winners in a future thermonuclear war.... Victory in a war, if, for all that, the imperialists unleash it, will be on the side of world socialism and all progressive mankind."² And in 1971 the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL declared that "the military-technical policy of the CPSU is geared to the creation and preservation of the socialist countries' military superiority to the forces of war and aggression."³

It is possible in all this to partly find an explanation for the uncritical borrowing from the West of the principle of parity as formally corresponding to the conditions of detente. Another, more essential cause, perhaps, of the enshrinement of this principle in our policy was the preference accorded the administrative-command system of military-technical means of safeguarding security, which, evidently, was more in keeping with its pressure-power nature. M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech at the conference: "...having concentrated tremendous resources and attention on the military aspect of countering imperialism, we did not always take advantage for ensuring the state's security, reducing tension and for mutual understanding between peoples of the political possibilities afforded in connection with fundamental changes in the world. As a result we allowed ourselves to be dragged into an arms race, which could not have failed to have been reflected in the country's socioeconomic development and its international position."

Outwardly, the parity principle is simple: a country adhering to it adopts a policy of maintaining approximate equivalence with an enemy in the military sphere. Difficulties arise upon an interpretation of what might be signified by "approximate equivalence". On the 25th anniversary of the Caribbean crisis the American side affirmed that, despite the United States' possession of a many times bigger nuclear potential, parity had already been established by that time inasmuch as it was then considered that the USSR could respond with a nuclear attack following a United States' first strike. Parity could signify something else also—quantitative equality in the main parameters of the strategic forces. True, there arose the question: what parameters to take as the reference point—the number of launchers, say, or warheads? And, further: should our strategic potential be equal to the analogous U.S. potential or the aggregate strategic power of all states opposed to the USSR? Parity could also be

determined in accordance with equality of strategic possibilities, including those which could be termed nothing other than destabilizing.

In fact we gravitated right from the start toward the interpretation of parity as approximate quantitative equality, and with regard for the fact that the S&T revolution knows no boundaries, toward equality of possibilities also. As a result we found ourselves, by virtue of the fact that it was the United States which was the initiator of the majority of directions in the arms race, captive to purely mechanistic logic: for each new system of yours we responded with our own. Naturally, the relationship was more complex here. Our engineers were not dozing even without U.S. prompting, but the appearance "there" of another strategic weapons system served as a most important factor of the creation of something similar "with us".

The United States' intensive implementation of the "star wars" program has demonstrated most graphically the vulnerability of the mirror reflection method. According to this logic, we should have created our own space-based strike arms, exceedingly costly and causing a deterioration in the strategic situation. Concern to maintain parity thus understood ultimately involved us in an endless arms race inasmuch as there was to our response a counterresponse forcing us also not to stand idly by. We thus played into the hands of certain U.S. circles endeavoring to exhaust us economically in the course of military rivalry and making skillful use of our efforts to maintain parity as proof of the existence of the "Soviet military danger".

It should be noted for fairness' sake that in having adopted the simplistic interpretation of parity the USSR also achieved, albeit at a high price, one positive result: the futility of the arms race and its unprofitability to the United States itself have become increasingly obvious to American ruling circles also.

It is clear also that it would have been very difficult discovering the minuses of the parity concept in the context of detente without having experienced it in practice. The new thinking has to be "achieved through suffering". It does not appear suddenly, alas, as at the waving of a magic wand, but comes into being as a consequence of the recognition of contradictions, conflicts and mistakes.

In the latter half of the 1970s-start of the 1980s the USSR declared fundamental doctrinal propositions: unconcern for military superiority, the impossibility of victory in a nuclear war, the inevitability of the fatal consequences of a new war for civilization and no first use of nuclear weapons. We have not always kept pace with the march of time, probably, and have not always acted in anticipation of events. Only in the latter half of the 1980s was it possible, evidently, to advance the proposition that the party delivering a nuclear first strike "condemns itself to agonizing death—and not from the

retaliatory strike even but from the consequences of the explosion of its own warheads."⁴ The process of maturation of the new political thinking with its central idea of the impossibility of ensuring one-sided security was spurred by such events as the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, the USSR's departure from the negotiations on a limitation of nuclear and space arms and Chernobyl.

While not having abandoned the parity principle in the latter half of the 1980s, Moscow suffused it with different content, putting at the forefront the principle of a reasonable sufficiency prescribing a nonexcess of military efforts by defense needs and the building of nonoffensive defenses. The new principle differs from the parity principle for the better by virtue of three circumstances. First, it points fundamentally in the direction of study of objective needs of defense, and not a blind response to the enemy's activities. Second, it provides an orientation toward consideration not only of military-technical but also political and economic aspects, which affords great scope for compromise solutions. Third, its application affords an opportunity for severing the arms race spiral. The absorbing phase of building bridges from doctrinal propositions to practice is now opening before us.

I would like to express certain thoughts in this connection. To follow formal logic, arrival in the latter half of the 1980s at the reasonable sufficiency principle means that in preceding decades we had built up some "military surpluses" of which we may today calmly get rid (this proposition is very popular, incidentally, both among our friends and our opponents in the West). At the same time a number of very difficult questions arise: what kind of "surpluses" are these, is it appropriate to abandon all of them, how should they be eliminated and within what kind of timeframe? In addition, the conclusion concerning the possibility of unilateral arms reductions does not, evidently, take into consideration to the proper extent the inevitable conservative nature of military planning. The military, which is responsible for maintaining dependable defense capability, proceeds in military organizational development and preparation from the worst-case scenario, that is, from the fact that the situation could take shape in extremely unpropitious manner. Computations attesting an insufficiency of military efforts could always be demonstrated in principle. Whence, actually, the conclusion concerning the unrealistic nature of attempts to ensure security by exclusively military means.

Under any circumstances, when the Soviet Union has embarked on the path of new political thinking even more, there are distinctive limitations determining ceilings to the efforts made in the military sphere (financial and economic resources were the most serious inhibitor in the past). The kind of inhibitors we could be dealing with today will probably be clearer if answers are given to, specifically, the following questions: what interests and to what extent is NATO prepared to defend by way

of the aggressive use of armed force, under what circumstances might war begin between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is a lengthy conventional war in Europe possible, what size of nuclear potential will guarantee the inevitability of retribution, what should the minimum scale of such retribution be, what consequences would unilateral arms reductions have for the disarmament negotiations? The list of questions could obviously be continued. Answering them, we would approach an understanding of the set of problems connected with the "military surpluses". There can undoubtedly be no unequivocal answers, but this merely indicates that, first, the principle of reasonable sufficiency does not presuppose automatic unilateral reductions—it is easier acquiring "surpluses" than getting rid of them—second, any decisions pertaining to the realization of this principle entail a degree of risk.

The customary strategy of the approach to events in the "third world" predominantly from the standpoints of Soviet-American relations, an approach which was a component of the American version of detente, had not been revised in the Soviet Union with the onset of the 1970s. Undue optimism in respect of the spread in the developing countries of the socialist development model and an exaggeration of their capacity for advancing along the noncapitalist path let us down. In reality, there were no real grounds for such in the vast majority of countries which were formed on the ruins of the colonial empires. A study of the self-assessments contained in the programs, socialist in form, of the parties and movements in "third world" states substituted for a thoughtful and dispassionate analysis of the actual facts and situations.

Our theoretical errors resulted in serious political difficulties. The defeats sustained by the attempts to realize socialist dreams were explained almost exclusively by a saving reference to the "intrigues of imperialism," of which there were in fact sufficient examples. Yet in one-sidedly concentrating attention on the export of counter-revolution to the "third world" we embarked on a path of confrontation with the United States and gave the West an excuse to accuse us of "exporting revolution".

The correct idea of detente not putting an end to the Soviet Union's support for the anti-imperialist movement was reduced at times to a level where virtually automatic military assistance to any forces laying claim to the role of anti-imperialist forces was considered our international duty. When the United States and its allies dispatch tons of military freight to the developing world and step up their interventionist potential, the problem of military supplies to patriotic forces from the Soviet Union remains pertinent in many cases, but assistance to the anti-imperialist movement should be appreciably broader both in terms of resources and of forms and, probably, not always so rectilinear. Nor has the fact that

Soviet weapons have subsequently ended up in the hands of dictatorial, antipopular regimes contributed to a positive impression of the Soviet Union's policy.

Opposition to the United States in some part of the developing world has led to the formation of protracted regional conflicts. The antagonism between various groupings relying in their skirmishes for power on the USSR and the United States has developed into a permanent armed struggle which has been a heavy burden on the local population and has exacerbated international tension.

Whatever shape the situation has taken, the conversion of the "third world" into springboards of Soviet-American confrontation has meant that the United States has been the winner. First of all, such clashes have assumed in the eyes of part of public opinion the appearance of a cynical "superpower" struggle. Our waste of material resources in the "third world" and their diversion from our own needs cannot have failed to have caused satisfaction in Washington.

The establishment of the new political thinking is being accompanied, I believe, by an as yet incomplete reassessment of our views of the socioeconomic dynamics of the "third world". Solutions to regional conflicts based on the fruitful idea of national reconciliation are being sought. It is still too early to say that the developing world has been taken wholly out of the framework of the USSR-United States confrontation. However, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan which has begun and the reduction in the size of the Vietnamese military contingent in Cambodia indicate that regional conflicts are tending to lose their significance as a bone of contention between the great powers.

Many kind words were said at one time about the period of Soviet-American detente. And the majority of them should not be jettisoned—this was the first far-reaching experiment in positive interaction between the USSR and the United States in the nuclear era. Nonetheless, the need to understand why detente failed is more obvious than ever today. Detente in the form in which it appeared to the two parties was doomed from the start, I believe. For this reason.

Washington hoped to keep afloat the ship of the "American empire". Without renouncing "imperial" goals and obligations, Washington administrations believed that detente would permit them to contain the pressure of the changes in the world unfavorable to the United States, behind which, they believed, stood the "Soviets". As a result, according to the designs of the American leadership, detente, having modified somewhat the terms of the rivalry with the USSR in a direction favorable to the United States, was to have reduced the scale of the burden of maintaining the "empire".

Nor did detente presuppose any revolutionary change in political thinking from the Soviet viewpoint (the situation of the latter half of the 1980s is in sharp contrast in this respect. According to M.S. Gorbachev: "...not simply an improvement but the decisive renewal of foreign policy was required. New political thinking was needed for this"). Undoubtedly, the noble ideas of a strengthening of peace and a winding down of the arms race largely determined the Soviet approach to detente. However, confining ourselves to this customary conclusion today, it would seem, means stopping half-way to the truth. Having begun to bring our country to a precrisis condition, the administrative-command system naively attempted to patch up the ever increasing holes by exploitation of the economic and S&T potential of the West. It is difficult not to see that this system with its long-standing habits of the conduct of international affairs finally revealed its helplessness when the changed world insistently demanded a rethinking of the tasks and priorities of foreign policy and the forms and methods of its realization.

The main lesson of the 1970s detente period is evidently the fact that stable cooperation between the two great powers is impossible given preservation of the "imperial" pretensions of the United States and the administrative-command system in the USSR.

A dual-key procedure is employed for the launching of ballistic missiles: two operators have to insert keys in slots and turn them, after which the missile-launch mechanism is unlocked, and the missile is launched. In order for the launching of a long-term normalization of Soviet-American relations, in order for it to become irreversible, the corresponding actions of both powers are needed. The Soviet Union has carried out its part of the common assignment and turned its "key" to an improvement in relations between the two countries. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference demonstrated a capacity for the adoption of nontrivial solutions of problems, specifically, in Soviet-American relations, and for the formulation of far-reaching compromise in the name of general peace and security.

But at the same time one has the impression that the United States is being slow to follow the USSR's example in full. One senses as yet a certain confusion on the part of Washington politicians, who evidently do not yet know how to react to Moscow's bold steps on the way to disarmament.

The administration's tactics at the Moscow summit testify to an absence of precise criteria in the choice of the entire strategic line in respect of the USSR of the era of perestroika. Like many other influential political forces in the United States, it is still in the grip of outdated concepts preventing the ultimate victory of constructive principles. The signing of the INF Treaty and the Afghanistan agreements removed the bite of the

trite accusations leveled at the USSR, which prompted the administration to put the emphasis on the question of the "violation" of human rights in the Soviet Union.

It is perfectly possible to attribute the President's tactics to his endeavor to make both ends meet—the "old Reagan" and the "new Reagan"—his desire to please the forces of the right and the election campaign which is now under way. Undoubtedly, all this is exerting a certain influence. At the same time we are in this case encountering the manifestation of something more complex and fundamental.

We should here give the floor to the authoritative Western expert C. Bertram, former director of the London International Strategic Studies Institute, who writes: "Western unity throughout the postwar period... has been obliged largely to the common perception that the threats to the West's security are unambiguous.... Gorbachev's striking initiative in the arms control sphere presupposes an attempt to relinquish the inordinate Soviet military capital investments. He is demonstrating Moscow's desire to leave vulnerable positions in the 'third world,' and his public calls for reform, 'democracy' and accountability are contributing to the creation of a less intimidating idea of Soviet military power in the West. Were the unity of the Western alliance to depend only on the 'Soviet threat,' this could create a disturbing prospect for the West's cohesion."⁵

C. Bertram's argument correctly spots the dilemma whose unsolved nature is together with other factors holding back an acceleration of the pace of the Soviet-American dialogue. A cornerstone has been knocked from the foundation of the military-political strategy of NATO and the United States. The United States and the West as a whole have found themselves confronted with the need to cardinally revise their foreign policy and military-strategic views and determine the azimuth of their movement not for a year, not for 5 years but for decades ahead. Merely the scale of the task and the psychological lack of preparedness for its accomplishment at precisely this time, not to mention the long history of hostility and convinced anti-communism, cannot fail to delay the positive development of East-West contacts. An "engineer" with precisely the biography of R. Reagan could very likely have begun to apply the brakes on the American side to the locomotive of the "cold war". But leaders with different views and a different administration will evidently have to couple the train to another locomotive. The idea repeatedly expressed at the time of the Moscow negotiations by P. Salinger, former press spokesman of President J. Kennedy: the continuity of the Soviet-American dialogue, which is gathering momentum, could be secured by a new summit, in the course of which Reagan would introduce M.S. Gorbachev to presidential candidates G. Bush and M. Dukakis, would seem productive, incidentally.

The 19th CPSU Conference was quite definite in advocating the utmost intensification of the processes of perestroika and demonstrated convincingly by its entire course that the policy of democratization is not a tactical move but a long-term strategy reflecting the aspirations of the entire Soviet people. It removed many doubts among our overseas partners, contributed to the surmounting of negative ideas about the Soviet Union, expanded the base for mutual understanding as a whole and denoted the qualitatively new level toward which the international community is moving.

The auspicious prospects of an improvement in Soviet-American relations which are opening up are just one possibility of the multivariant development of international life. We need to be able to avail ourselves of it. So, where will the road lead following the Moscow summit? There is today ever increasing reason to maintain that the answer to this question will largely be determined by whether an American perestroika—restructuring of the foreign policy thinking and military-political strategy of the United States—will begin and, if so, when.

Footnotes

1. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1 June 1988.
2. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 30 August 1969.
3. KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 9, 1972, p 12.
4. PRAVDA, 19 August 1986.
5. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1987, p 945.

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'Common European House' Not Closed to Americans

18160002c Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 88 pp 35-45

[Article by Prof Gennadiy Anatolyevich Vorontsov, doctor of historical sciences: "From Helsinki to the 'Common European House'"]

[Text] Passing through periods of rise and fall, successes and difficulties, the all-European process has demonstrated its vitality even under conditions of an abrupt exacerbation of the international situation. Following the signing in Washington of the INF Treaty and its ratification in Moscow, the question of the subsequent fate of security and cooperation on the continent has come to be discussed in particularly lively fashion in political and military circles, among economists and

scientists and in the broadest public circles. Despite the difference in viewpoints and views, the scales of public opinion are inclining in favor of the continued development of the all-European process. The "common European house" concept, whose realization would make it possible to create a truly firm, stable edifice for the good-neighborly residence therein of all European peoples, which has been put forward by the USSR, is winning growing recognition.

I

Although the Helsinki accords themselves are the result of compromise, mutual concessions and consideration of the interests of the various participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the further development of the all-European process has shown that ideological views and approaches have exerted a very important and at times determining influence on their realization. Despite all its achievements, the relaxation of tension managed merely to erode, and for a limited period, what is more, the traditional boundaries of confrontation. The level of confrontation, which has grown noticeably since the latter half of the 1970s, has invariably put at the forefront the question of "who wins". There have just as inevitably here been calculations of political "wins" and "losses". Thus foreign policy has reflected states' ideological positions and contradictions to a considerable extent. This has been graphically confirmed by the course of development of the all-European process right up to the mid-1980s.

While setting a high value on the role of the USSR and the other European countries of the socialist community as the main generator of detente and cooperation on the continent, mention should at the same time be made of a number of factors which ultimately have not contributed to a stimulation of the influence of socialism on the surmounting of negative trends in European affairs since Helsinki. The stagnation period was reflected in the USSR's foreign policy positions also. The growth of precrisis phenomena in the country's economy reduced the aggregate potential of socialism in European affairs and the possibilities of countering power approaches on the part of the West.

The acceleration of the material preparation for war and the growth of antidetente trends manifested in the policy primarily of the United States and also other NATO states were by the end of the 1970s even in decisive confrontation with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accords.

Under pressure from Washington, in 1978 the North Atlantic alliance adopted a new long-term military program for the following 15 years.¹ Neutron weapons (the R. Reagan administration decided on their production in 1981) also were earmarked for the "European theater". This was followed by the NATO leadership's

adoption of the "Rogers Plan" providing for the modernization of the armed forces and the creation of new conventional arms intended primarily for strikes not only against "forward lines" but deep into the heart of the enemy's defenses also.²

The buildup of nuclear weapons in Europe, primarily the deployment on the territory of the United States' West European allies of new American missiles, was of a particularly destructive nature. The deployment of Soviet increased-range operational-tactical missiles on the territory of the GDR and Czechoslovakia began in response. Events developed per the well-enough known "challenge-response" or "action-counteraction" pattern.

Turning to the "second basket" of Helsinki, it may be noted that a considerable recovery has been observed as a whole since 1975 in economic and S&T relations between European states. Their mutually profitable nature has manifested itself with sufficient certainty. A number of agreements between East and West has been concluded for a lengthy period, and the formation of joint commissions on a bilateral basis has played a positive part also. Deals on a compensation basis have become a new form of cooperation. According to data of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, commodity turnover between West European states and CEMA members in Europe grew by a factor of 1.8 from 1975 through 1983.

However, in this sphere also political and ideological considerations have frequently gained the upper hand over the manifestly mutually profitable nature of trade, economic and S&T relations. This applies primarily to the United States, whose leaders have particularly graphically subordinated their economic and trade policy to the interests of the ideological struggle. This approach is wholly contrary to the spirit of Helsinki and the principle of cooperation between states, which should develop on the basis of complete equality and promote mutual understanding and trust between peoples and a strengthening of peace and security, recorded in the Final Act.³

The NATO countries are restricting in advance their economic cooperation by lists of strategic commodities whose export to the socialist countries is prohibited. Set up back in 1949 for the purpose of exercising control in this sphere, CoCom (Coordinating Consultative Committee) is a most clearly expressed anachronism of the "cold war". However, the United States stepped up its activity at the start of the 1980s, endeavoring to extend the list of prohibited strategic commodities. This was accompanied by the imposition of boycotts and embargoes.

The ideological struggle has assumed, perhaps, the most acute nature and forms in the humanitarian sphere. In the period of preparation even and during the All-European Conference the Western delegations attached particular significance to the "third basket". Since the signing of the Final Act the West has always made

humanitarian problems the center of discussion. In addition, they have become the main component of the ideological attacks against the socialist states. Thus responding to the question of the Austrian paper *DIE PRESSE* of what for the United States was of most importance in the all-European process, F. Zimmerman, leader of the American delegation at the Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the All-European Conference, declared that this was human rights. According to him, the state of affairs in this sphere could "jeopardize" realization of the all-European process.⁴

The West European states also periodically raise these problems in quite abrupt form. By no means fortuitous, it would seem, was the simultaneous publication on the day the Vienna meeting opened by the West German *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG* and the French *LE MONDE* of an article symbolically entitled "Security Has More Than Just a Military Dimension". Its authors—the FRG and French foreign ministers—make the cornerstone the human rights problem.⁵

A tendency to interpret these questions one-sidedly may be observed in the West's political circles, however. It is expressed, first, in the disproportionate emphasis of humanitarian problems and their presentation as the cornerstone of the entire all-European process. And this is done, what is more, frequently in a tutoring tone accompanied by unconcealed attacks and accusations. It is essentially a question of attempts to introduce to the socialist system the system of values and views of bourgeois society and to arrogate to themselves the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the corresponding countries.

The recent speech at the Vienna meeting by D. Mellor, minister of state at the Foreign Office, who declared that "agreement will not be achieved until Moscow makes good its promises in the human rights sphere,"⁷ may serve as a clear example of this approach. Second, in its presentation of humanitarian issues the West unlawfully constricts them, as a rule, putting the emphasis more often than not on contacts between people, exit controls and so forth. The most important human right—the right to life—fundamental socioeconomic rights and a number of other questions of a humanitarian nature are deliberately lost sight of.

The Western states' positions are most ideologized in this sphere. It is here that the attempt to extend the ideological struggle to the sphere of interstate relations may be seen exceptionally clearly. It is here that they hope to secure considerable dividends. Following the signing of the Final Act there was a strengthening of the ideological component in Western countries' foreign policy, particularly in the period of the exacerbation of tension. Such processes were observed particularly distinctly in the United States with the assumption of office of the R. Reagan administration. They repeatedly assumed extreme forms close in terms of their manifestations to "psychological warfare".

The increased confrontation in Europe and worldwide, the growth of military and political tension and the exacerbation of the ideological struggle impeded the development of all-European cooperation. It was in this period that the question of the further fate of the Helsinki accords and the prospects of development of the all-European process arose in earnest. It would be no exaggeration to say that it underwent a most serious test of strength. This was seen very graphically in the course of the meetings in Belgrade (October 1977-March 1978) and Madrid (November 1980-September 1983).

These meetings may serve as a kind of reference point for an understanding of the essence and particular features of the development of the all-European process in the 1980s. Both the results and the prospects of the development of two trends, two approaches were manifested in sufficient relief. One of them led to an exacerbation of confrontation, the other, to constructive quest for solutions to difficult problems of world politics. An analysis of the interaction of the trends permits certain conclusions.

First, the impasses preventing progress in other areas of the all-European process also showed through clearly. Not only the socialist states but the West also began to display growing concern in connection with the slowing or blocking thereof.

Second, differentiation among the Western states also was revealed sufficiently distinctly. The most extreme manifestations of the ideological irreconcilability actively propagandized across the ocean, particularly in the years of the first Reagan administration, did not, nonetheless, become widespread in West Europe. Although they were supported by certain circles, the trend toward a more balanced approach was maintained in the West European countries as a whole.

The differences have been manifested most noticeably, perhaps, in the sphere of economic relations. The openly discriminatory policy of the United States and its tactics of threats and blackmail have not met with sufficient support even in the NATO allies. The West European states, which are far more interested than the United States in economic cooperation with the East and which impart to it independent significance to a certain extent, expressed disagreement, on the whole, with American extreme manifestations of discrimination in trade and with Washington's endeavor to subordinate East-West economic cooperation to its political and ideological goals. The allies' reluctance to follow Washington's lead led to such unprecedented measures on the part of the United States as the use of sanctions against the "guilty". Differences between West Europe and the United States also concerned such questions as the Afghanistan situation and the events in Poland. Analyzing the European aspects in the R. Reagan administration's policy, Oxford University professor M. Howard notes a growth of disagreements between the United States and the allies. There is a revival of sentiment in West Europe in

support of a "policy of maneuvering between the two blocs," he believes. As far as opposition groupings, on the other hand, are concerned, M. Howard observes, they aspire with growing force to the constitution of all of Europe within a stable "zone of peace between the two nuclear giants."⁸

In evaluating the significance of specific elements in the position of Washington's allies I am not inclined to exaggerate them inasmuch as they are manifested within the framework of class community. However, despite this, the dialectics of the general and the particular may be seen sufficiently clearly. Whereas the United States has given precedence to the human rights problem as the main condition for studying questions in the sphere of military detente and economic, scientific and other cooperation, the practical approaches in West Europe have taken shape somewhat differently. A greater degree of balance and an endeavor to avoid a peremptory tone has, for all that, been characteristic of Europeans as a whole. The human rights problem has come to be assigned a most important place within the framework of their policy, but **together** with other problems of security and economic and S&T relations rather than **above** them.

Third, the formation of a group of nonaligned and neutral European countries (the "N + N group") may be considered a new phenomenon which is appreciably influencing the all-European process. Not bound by the strict conditions of Atlantic discipline, they have displayed much independence and constructiveness. They are united by an understanding that their future is linked with a strengthening of European security by way of cooperation, dialogue and mutually acceptable steps, and not via a rise in the level of confrontation. Evaluating the growing role of the "N + N group" in European affairs, the Austrian expert R. Torovsky wrote: "The broad spectrum manifested in the neutral and non-aligned states in the ideological, social, political and many other spheres could make the achievement of consensus more difficult. But even more important is the fact that this spectrum provides for a preliminary filtering, whose end product could prove acceptable within the framework of broader debate.... A proposal which passes through this complex filter of various opinions will almost automatically lead to a constructive mean, which will contribute to the further balanced development of the Helsinki process."⁹

It should be noted that the "N + N group" is not only actively shaping its own positions but also endeavoring to energetically put them into practice, frequently acting as a mediator between East and West. This was the case in the period of completion of the Madrid meeting, whose final document was drawn up on the basis of proposals of the neutral and nonaligned states.

New impetus has been given the all-European process as of the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union embarked on the path of perestroika. The socialist states have once again assumed the initiative in European affairs. Under

current conditions the policy of confrontation and obviously destructive attempts to drive the dialogue into impasses of insoluble contradictions have been finding increasingly less support. The isolation of the obstructionist policy was manifested particularly noticeably at the meeting on contacts between people in the spring of 1986 in Berne.

The Soviet Union and other socialist states submitted in the course of the conference 24 proposals (the USSR alone submitting 14 of these), which encompassed the broadest range of questions. A compromise version of the final document preliminarily approved by the delegations of all 35 states was prepared as a result of the negotiations. However, at the last minute the United States vetoed it, breaking the consensus which had taken shape.¹⁰ This is how London's THE ECONOMIST commented on the Berne meeting: "...The meeting to develop East-West contacts concluded without agreement. This happened twice last year—in June in Ottawa and in November in Budapest, but did not attract much comment. But there is one difference on this occasion. At the end of the negotiations in Berne a split had arisen between the Americans and West Europeans...."¹¹

II

The world had arrived at the 1980s with heaps of weapons—both nuclear and conventional—and a high level of confrontation and mistrust. The threat of a nuclear cataclysm with all its predictable and unpredictable consequences had grown sharply. As a result the task of defining lasting security arose with new seriousness. In the search for a way out of the situation it was possible to act in two ways.

One was the traditional way of power politics in accordance with the way of thinking and acting which are built on the "balance of terror" and the permissibility of wars and conflicts. Continuation of the arms race at an increasingly high S&T level with a real prospect of a position being reached whereat the adoption of vitally important decisions in a very short time could depend not on man's intelligence but prove to be captive to technology is justified in this case.

In the channel of this approach lie the concepts "nuclear deterrence" and "retroarmament" and the accelerated development of conventional forces and weapons in accordance with the "Rogers Plan," which continue to be propagandized by militarist circles in the United States and West Europe. They fear real measures in the disarmament sphere. Whence such steps as, for example, Washington's decision to begin production of binary weapons at a time when work is being completed in Geneva on a convention banning chemical weapons. Or, on the other hand, the endeavor of certain NATO circles headed by the British Conservatives to "compensate" for the consequences of the INF Treaty with the deployment of other types of nuclear arms in Europe.

The other way is based on the new political thinking and recognition of the fact that the level of equal danger for the opposite sides is incredibly high. And, given the continued growth of nuclear arms, the danger will increase and could reach limits whereat the existing parity ceases to be a factor of military-political deterrence. In addition, the very nature of today's weapons, particularly weapons of mass extermination, and their tremendous power of destruction no longer ensure a possibility of sure protection even for a state which possesses the most consummate and powerful S&T resources. The guaranteeing of security is shifting increasingly to the political plane, becoming primarily a political task.

Europe's experience in this respect is highly indicative. The arms race, which, it was believed, was to have strengthened security, essentially led to the opposite result. The level of European security was reduced, particularly as a consequence of the deployment on the territory of the continent of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The INF Treaty in fact recognizes this. However, disregarding this class of weapons even, mention has to be made of the massive concentration of armed forces and arms in Europe along the line of contact of the two systems. But the material preparation for war objectively cannot in itself remove the misgivings and mistrust in relation to one another.

Nor is an effective solution promised by such a traditional approach per the "challenge-response" pattern, within the framework of which the actions of one side pertaining to an arms buildup and steps aimed at achieving superiority are compensated by the corresponding measures of the other side. As a result the level of confrontation has merely risen, and the mutual danger has grown. In turn, the traditional "action-counteraction" chain has been accompanied in "mirror form," as a rule, by not always appropriate evaluations of the situation and the changes therein, suspicion, hostility and excessive emotion and pride.

Undoubtedly, the achievement of parity at one time performed a tremendous positive role. However, what is promising in the future is the preservation of balance not at the highest possible but at the lowest possible level. This is the way for which the USSR calls. European security, like international security as a whole, could and should be general and mutual here. This presupposes equal security for all, a renunciation of the strengthening of one's own security to the detriment of the other side and strict observance of the balance of mutual interests. Such is the path of struggle against militarism and for a strengthening of peace and the establishment of stable mutually profitable relations between countries with different systems at both the global and regional levels.

The Soviet concept of all-embracing security reveals broad vistas for the solution of military, economic, political and humanitarian questions. It is geared to making peaceful coexistence a universal principle of interstate relations both worldwide and in individual regions.

The all-European process is a part of this concept in terms of its basic parameters inasmuch as it essentially covers all directions of its development. In this sense the three "baskets" of the all-European process may be seen as integral parts of the Soviet security concept. Also identical is their ultimate goal—the strengthening of peace and security.

In addition, there is sufficient reason, in my opinion, to believe that the concept of all-embracing security could and already is partly undergoing a kind of "running-in" at the regional level, within the framework of the all-European process. Europe is a beneficial field for its testing in practice for a whole number of reasons.

Primarily it is the continent where the two main military and political alliances confront one another directly and where the line of direct contact of the two social and political systems runs. Intensive relationships in the economic and humanitarian spheres are observed here. Unique experience of the solution of problems of war and peace, experience that is both negative and positive, has been accumulated here. It is sufficient to recall that it was on this continent that the two devastating world wars arose. But it is here, on the other hand, that the unprecedented all-European process has been developing. Finally, besides objective factors, subjective factors such as the level of social consciousness of the need to prevent a new war and the level of recognition of interdependence in the solution of military, political, economic and humanitarian problems are also manifested most intensively in Europe.

It is by no means fortuitous that the shoots of the new political thinking, which envisages a renunciation of the confrontation stereotypes and the evolved canons of the old thinking and a call for new approaches corresponding to current realities, also appeared for the first time precisely in Europe. In this respect the Helsinki Final Act contains many elements which correspond to the criteria of the new political thinking and are an illustration not only of the possibility but also fruitfulness of realistic, compromise approaches—political, and not power.

III

A central issue of the normalization of international life is securing trust. Real progress toward a strengthening of such comes about only with a great deal of work after a lengthy period of confrontation and takes time. All the more interesting is the European experience, which testifies that even such a delicate question may be solved successfully if the ideas of the new political thinking are the guide.

Advancement of the problem of trust to the forefront of international life precisely now, at a pivotal moment of the development of international relations, is perfectly justified inasmuch as the phenomenon of trust is called upon to participate actively in the creation of images of the perception of this state, people and political force or

the other. It also performed a considerable role in the shaping of the traditional "enemy" image or "friend" image stereotypes. The significance of trust increases in the nuclear age, when states possess arsenals of destructive weapons capable of wiping out, and many times over, what is more, everything living on Earth. An acute shortage of trust between East and West has been manifested particularly in periods of increased confrontation. A confrontational atmosphere engenders the formation of inappropriate ideas about one another and inflates mistrust and hostility. In such an atmosphere there is increased danger of nuclear catastrophe as a result of an accident, mistakes and technical malfunctions.

In this respect the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament provided very important material for reflection and generalization. The differences in the approaches of the participants and the quite acute contradictions between them both on general and a number of specific problems delayed formulation of the final document appreciably. A powerful impetus was essential for progress. This impetus was the new political thinking advanced by the Soviet leadership. It was this which made it possible to overcome the disagreements, which, given the traditional approaches, seemed insoluble.

The successful completion of the Stockholm conference, in turn, lent impetus to the all-European process as a whole. The Vienna meeting, which began in November 1986, is intended to raise it to a new level. Mention has to be made of the exceptional importance for accelerated progress in Vienna of the visit to the United States of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and President R. Reagan's visit to the USSR. The conclusion and entry into force of the INF Treaty were major events in international life and a victory for the new political thinking. The readiness of the USSR and the United States for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms on condition of the preservation of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was adopted in 1972 was confirmed at the summit negotiations also.

European affairs also, specifically, the tasks of strengthening stability and security in Europe, were discussed in Washington and Moscow. In the Moscow joint statement both leaders "welcomed the progress made as of this time in the formulation of the mandate of new negotiations on armed forces and conventional arms and expressed hopes for the speediest and balanced completion of the Vienna CSCE meeting."¹² The Soviet and American leaders also emphasized their adherence to the further development of the all-European process. The USSR and the United States will continue to cooperate with the other participants in the Vienna meeting in order that it may conclude with substantial results in all the main areas.

IV

The Vienna meeting is continuing under the conditions of an improvement in the international climate in Europe and the world as a whole. There are signs that it will culminate successfully in the adoption of significant decisions.

A growing influence on the all-European process is being exerted by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The USSR sees the future of the continent in the context of the building of a nuclear-free world, a trusting and respectful attitude toward one another and sincere and constructive cooperation. The concept of the "common European house" advanced by the USSR merits particular attention in this connection.

Much has already been done to ensure that this concept acquire civil rights. Fundamental significance in the course of its construction is attached to the fact that the European continent consists of states representing different social systems. The participants in opposite military-political alliances and neutral and nonaligned states are located here. There are contradictions and differences between them in the social, political, economic, humanitarian and other spheres. They are of an objective, long-term nature and they have to be taken into consideration.

However, the existence of this divided Europe by no means disaffirms the other—the presence of interdependence, wholeness and community based on thousands of threads of relationships in the most diverse spheres. The dialectic of the general and the particular which really exists in the fate and activity of the European peoples is illumined by different facets in each specific period.

Nor is the movement to the forefront of the "common European house" concept for this reason by any means fortuitous. It is based on universal values common to all mankind and rises above ideological disagreements and contradictions, expressing the fundamental requirements of the preservation and development of European civilization as a single whole. This concept is counterposed to both the theory and practice of the division of Europe into blocs and camps and is leading to active quest for a common, really protected, guaranteed community of the European peoples based on intelligent rules.

This concept has real prospects of realization under present conditions. After all, there is a certain historical and cultural wholeness of our continent. The centuries-old cultural, historical and intellectual heritage of the European peoples is of a significance common to all mankind. The Soviet Union represents, naturally, a European power traditionally linked with the other peoples and states and of the continent. Such a notable landmark as the millennium of the baptism of Rus is a convincing reminder of this connection.

In speaking of the historical and cultural community of the European peoples, of course, we should keep in mind the relatively complex nature of the relationships and mutual influence in this sphere between the socialist and capitalist states. However, the traditions and legacy of European culture, the eras of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and philosophical and social schools and teachings constitute a substantial common base. Despite the ideological disagreements, historical and cultural traditions continue to influence the interaction of national cultures, and relations between European peoples are developing in the cultural sphere on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. It is sufficient to recall the work of the cultural forum in Budapest in the fall of 1985 within the framework of the all-European process.

Economic and S&T ties are a serious material basis for the construction of the "common European house". They are undoubtedly developing most intensively within the framework of the two integration processes. However, the general economic interaction of the capitalist and socialist states is an objective necessity. It is dictated by the current stage of the S&T revolution, the growing internationalization of production, the availability and distribution of raw material and manpower and the traditional economic and trade relationships which exist in Europe.

All-European economic and S&T cooperation is now capable of rising to a new, higher level. The establishment of direct relations between CEMA and the European Community would contribute to this to a considerable extent. It is well known that there are very active relationships between countries belonging to these groupings. It is sufficient to say that trade between them in 1987 amounted to approximately R40 billion. The establishment of official relations between CEMA and the EC was an important new step. The joint declaration on this was initialed on 9 June in Moscow and signed on 25 June 1988 in Luxembourg.

Thus the "common European house" concept is based on the historical, cultural, political and economic prerequisites which already exist in Europe. Their totality creates a unique situation here, different from other continents. Under current conditions it is more conducive to realization of the ideas of the new political thinking.

The cornerstone of this concept is the idea of the wholeness of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The interdependence of the fate of the peoples populating it would be manifested exceedingly clearly primarily in the face of a devastating nuclear catastrophe. But this is an extreme version. There are together with it many common intensifying problems which can only be solved together. Take, for example, environmental problems of a truly global nature. Or the problem of the safe development of nuclear power. The 1980s have provided many object lessons of how serious these problems are and how necessary for their solution the close interaction of all states is.

It is by no means fortuitous that the idea of a common house for Europe is shared not only by the East European socialist countries but in the West of the continent also. Spokesmen for political and social circles and prominent officials of the FRG, Italy, France and other states are speaking in support thereof. According to French President F. Mitterrand, "it is time the Europeans became masters of their own destiny."¹³

The growth of European trends in countries of the Old World has elicited a guarded reaction across the ocean. Although there have been from Washington no official statements against the appeal for the creation of a "common European house," this subject is being discussed extensively in the most varied circles, nonetheless. Unconcealed concern at Europe's endeavor "to create its own political character and once again take control of its destiny in matters of war and peace" is being expressed here. The Soviet "common European house" concept is being seen there as an attempt "to split the alliance" and virtually to separate the United States from West Europe.¹⁴

This formulation of the question does not correspond to reality. It is sufficient to closely read the section "Europe and the United States" in M.S. Gorbachev's book "Pere-stroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World" to conclude that the Soviet concept by no means pursues the goal of setting West Europe and the United States against each other.¹⁵

Of course, the building of a "common European house" could strengthen Europe's role in the world and increase its independent contribution to world affairs. However, the growth of Europe's independence or the "Europeanization" of the policy of its states by no means imply a policy of detachment of West European countries from the United States. While acknowledging the interdependence between European countries proper, it would be paradoxical to deny the existence of close linguistic, historical, cultural, political, military and other ties between the Old World and the New. For this reason a realistic vision of the "common European house" by no means signifies that it is closed to Americans. This would be contrary to the very idea of mutual trust and equal cooperation.

The all-European process is called upon to play an important part in realization of the "common European house" concept. There is already within its framework an evolved mechanism of interaction. A characteristic feature of this mechanism consists of the consensus nature of decision-making, which suits all its participants. Whereas the "common European house" appears as the state of mutual relations of the complex of European states, the all-European process contains within it various forms and directions of movement along this path.

It is possible with this process to determine sufficiently specifically at each given moment both the level of community of the European states in the solution of this problem or the other and the level of disagreements and contradictions. Thus the said process is laying the foundation of the "common European house," and the contours of this house are appearing quite clearly, what is more.

At the same time I believe that the construction of this house is not exhausted by the all-European process. Let us take, for example, questions of disarmament as a most important pillar of a truly stable "common European house". Exceptional importance for a solution thereof, particularly in the nuclear aspect, is attached to the Soviet-American dialogue, the INF accord particularly.

Many forums exist and could exist for the building of the economic, S&T, cultural and humanitarian components of a "common house" in Europe. The main thing, obviously, is not the discussion of this question or the other but how it is discussed and what the aspiration is.

The increased assertiveness of many European states and various public forces in the search for peace, trust and cooperation on the continent and in the direction of movement toward a "common European house" has been observed recently. It is sufficient to recall the proposals concerning the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe, the authors of which are socialist and capitalist states. Joint proposals are being put forward increasingly often on behalf of communist parties of the socialist countries and the West's social democrats. The assertiveness in this direction of representatives of the most diverse public circles has increased considerably.

Of course, the idea of a "common European house" has many influential opponents also. They would like to maintain tension and prevent all-European cooperation. Reflecting the interests of militarist circles and the military-industrial complexes, they aspire to social revanche and are gambling on a destabilization of the socialist countries and the detachment of the East European socialist states from the USSR. These circles are continuing to think in categories of confrontation and mutual fear and mistrust. In their opinion, "the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe... is essential for preserving nuclear deterrence."¹⁶

A considered analysis of the situation that has taken shape in Europe shows that, despite the existence of favorable objective factors, realization of the ideas of the new political thinking is impossible without the active and purposeful efforts of its supporters. The building of a "common European house" is no easy matter. It will require tremendous enthusiasm, political will, confidence of success and much time. Using and developing the beneficial ideas of Helsinki and relying on the achievements of the all-European process, it is essential to move toward an increased level and intensity of cooperation, trust and good-neighborliness on the continent.

Footnotes

1. NATO REVIEW NO 4, 1978, pp 30-31.
2. See B. Rogers, "Sword and Shield. ASE Attack of Warsaw Pact. Follow-on Forces" (NATO'S SIXTEEN NATIONS No 1, 1983, pp 18, 26).
3. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Final Act, Helsinki 1975," Moscow, 1975, p 338.
4. DIE PRESSE, 30 September 1986.
5. SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 4 November 1986.
6. "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe....," pp 336, 338.
7. Quoted from THE TIMES, 16 April 1988.
8. M. Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS No 3, vol 66, 1988, pp 490, 491).
9. P. Torovsky, "The Conference Shall Take Place Outside Military Alliances. On the Role of the Neutral and Nonaligned States of Europe in the CSCE Process" (AUSTRIA TODAY No 2, 1986, p 10).
10. For more detail on the course and results of the Berne meeting see "From Madrid to Vienna. Report of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation in the Course of the All-European Process on the Basis of the Helsinki Final Act," Moscow, 1986, pp 161-177.
11. THE ECONOMIST, 31 May 1986, p 69.
12. PRAVDA, 2 June 1988.
13. Quoted from THE NEW YORK TIMES, 8 July 1986.
14. See C. Layne, "Atlantism Without NATO" (FOREIGN POLICY No 67, Summer 1987, pp 29, 31).
15. See M.S. Gorbachev, "Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World," Moscow, 1987, p 218.
16. K.-H. Kamp, "Die Modernisierung der nuklearen Kurz-streckenwaffen in Europa" (EUROPA ARCHIV, 25 May 1988, p 275).

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UK Defense Minister on INF Eliminations
18010114 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Sagaydak, Molesworth—Alconbury—London: "Missiles Flying Away by Plane"]

[Text] At exactly 1400 hours Greenwich time on 9 September 1988, the enormous mass of the American C-5 Galaxy transport plane, its four engines roaring with the strain, reluctantly tore loose from the ground and took a course to the northwest, toward the United States. On board the aircraft were two mobile launch installations intended to launch four cruise missiles apiece. Three minutes later a Starlifter transport lifted off from the same runway at the British Alconbury airbase carrying two American BGM-109 cruise missiles in the cargo section. These missiles, within the framework of the so-called NATO "dual solution," had been based in England at the U.S. airbases of Molesworth and Greenham Common and aimed at Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union along with 112 other cruise missiles. Each has an operational range of 2,500 kilometers.

According to the treaty signed in December of last year in Washington, the Soviet Union and the United States are obliged to destroy their ground-based medium- and short-range missiles with an operational range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The first batch of missiles was destroyed some time ago in the USSR. The Americans set to fulfilling their treaty obligations later. And here were two missiles sent from Western Europe to the state of Arizona, where they would be destroyed over the next three years. As a Pentagon representative reported, there is still no concrete schedule for destroying them. It is known only that the 16 missiles still at the Molesworth base will be sent to the United States in the next two or three months, and then the withdrawal of the 96 missiles from Greenham Common will begin.

The road to the Molesworth airbase runs past Cambridge, then crosses central England from east to west. The trip from London is only one-and-a-half to two hours. A camp of the advocates of the nuclear disarmament of Great Britain is at the gates of the airbase. Today there are many people there, it is animated. People of the most diverse ages and professions have assembled to celebrate their victory, the path to which had not been easy: The English fighters for peace had been on the watch here through hot weather and cold, arranging meetings and processions, and sometimes even living barriers in the path of the tractor-trailers carrying ever newer American missiles to the base.

American territory begins behind the gates of the base, encircled with a very high fence made of steel framing and barbed wire. The brief and American-style business-like procedure for getting passes, and your correspondent was among other journalists on Army buses who went right into the heart of the airbase, where three tractor-trailers in camouflage colors were parked on an asphalt surface in front of the hangars.

Before the vehicles moved toward the exit in order to transfer their deadly cargo to the neighboring airbase at Alconbury (Molesworth cannot handle large transport aircraft), Great Britain's Minister of Defense, G. Younger, and U.S. Ambassador C. Price spoke to the journalists. Noting in passing that the Soviet-American INF Treaty was a significant contribution to international security and entailed real reductions in nuclear arsenals for the first time in history, the speakers began speaking expansively on how the initiators of the Washington agreement had been the NATO countries. The speakers remained modestly silent about how the NATO people had been in a state of shock for the whole first half of last year, when they were unable to reply to a series of Soviet proposals for a long time. It was as if there had been no efforts on the part of the NATO member countries, and first and foremost Great Britain, to block the progress at the Geneva negotiations with a mass of conditions and caveats.

The questions that followed the press conference, however, showed that the correspondents were least occupied with the historical digression in the speeches of the minister and the ambassador. They were interested in something else: weren't the NATO plans to modernize its nuclear arms an attempt to circumvent the treaty, and what fate would befall the warheads from the cruise missiles? In other words, wouldn't the nuclear weapons be returning to England, only in other weapons systems? For instance, on cruise missiles for the American F-111 aircraft?

As for the warheads, they are the property of the United States, said G. Younger. They could not be used, since they were manufactured especially for the medium-range missiles subject to destruction. The fissionable materials could in turn be employed for either peaceful or military purposes, the minister noted. A decision to transfer additional F-111 aircraft or other nuclear systems to England has not yet been made.

Frankly speaking, I did not obtain complete clarity from the answers of G. Younger. When the sirens proclaiming the beginning of the movement of the tractor-trailers with the missiles began wailing, I was able to put several questions to the minister.

"In the Soviet Union they are concerned about the possibility of the compensation measures by NATO that could follow, the press asserts, in a very short time. What can you say about that?"

"We do not intend to replace these missiles. We never wanted to deploy them at all. But since a threat exists, we would like to preserve for ourselves the possibility of inflicting an answering strike."

"You were mentioning an intention to preserve a range of possibilities for the employment of nuclear weapons. Does Great Britain intend to compensate for the missiles being withdrawn with other types of nuclear weapons?"

"I hope that we will never have any ground-based medium-range missiles again."

"And what about the F-111s?"

"We should preserve them as long as a threat exists..."

The participants in the peace camp at the airbase entrance perceive the policy of the British government and their senior partners from the United States in a different fashion. Catherine Twelvetree [transliteration] from Leicester, a former actress, hopes that today will become a real beginning for the process of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

"I am happy that common sense has finally prevailed," she said. "After all, so many nuclear arms have been stockpiled that any attempt to use them would signify suicide. Chernobyl showed us all what radioactive infection is. And after all, the accident at the Chernobyl power plant cannot even be compared to the smallest nuclear explosion."

"Several minutes ago, Defense Minister Younger tried to assure me that no compensation measures would be undertaken. What do you think about the possibility of replacing the nuclear weapons being removed from England today with other ones?"

"I am sure that they will try to replace these missiles with something else. We therefore intend to preserve our peace camps at the Molesworth and Greenham Common airbases. And we will fight until we achieve what we want—the universal elimination of nuclear weapons."

The engines began to drone, raising up a cloud of dust and bending the withered grass by the runway. The takeoff runs, and the transports tore away from English soil one after the other, bearing the first two American missiles subject to destruction across the ocean. When the outlines of the aircraft were concealed behind the high hangar, those present looked at the cloudy sky for a long time: I was probably not the only one thinking that other aircraft would nose down from behind the clouds someday, by the will of the NATO strategists delivering other missiles to British soil. Would that it never happens!

Military Writer Urges Comprehensive International Security System

*18070015 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Oct 88 p 3*

[Article by Col V. Yeshchenko: "Wounds on the Body of the Planet—The Dangers of Regional Conflicts and Their Settlement on a Political Basis"]

[Text] There is no more important and urgent task for mankind today than the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security. And the problem of settling regional conflicts and crises occupies a special place in its resolution, as sounded with a new force at the current 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly. One cannot be reconciled to the fact that after World War II there has practically not been a single peaceful day on our planet. From 1945 through 1988 the world community has endured over 160 local wars and armed conflicts in which almost 100 countries have been involved. About 20 million people have perished over this time, and many tens of millions of children have become cripples and orphans.

The greatest tests have fallen to the share of the peoples fighting for their freedom and national independence. People remember the wars in Korea at the beginning of the 1950s and in Indochina (1964-73), along with a number of other bloody battles. The Arab people of Palestine have been waging a heroic struggle for over 40 years. An uprising of Palestinians occurred on 9 Dec 87 on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip, seized by Israel in 1967. They are against the occupation of Arab land and for the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. The war for the possession of the West Sahara has gone on for 12 years. At the center of the conflict is the fate of the Saharans, and 100,000 Saharans have quit their ancient lands, occupied by Morocco, and settled at refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. Moroccan troops have almost completely cut off the West Sahara from the outside world, surrounding a large portion of this territory with a wall of sand and stone, trenches and strong-points with tanks and radar installations.

Ethnic conflicts are materially undermining regional security. Take the Kurdish problem. Over the 40 postwar years, the Kurdish people, living, aside from Syria, in Iran, Iraq and Turkey, have made war for almost 10 years with demands to grant them national self-determination. Representatives of the 30-million-strong Kurdish people, deprived of a state formation, have not yet laid down their arms. The zones and intensiveness of the conflict on the soil of the Kurdish problem are acquiring new and more dangerous dimensions. Analogous ethnic problems, the source of wars, armed conflicts and crises, exist in Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, India, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi, Indonesia, Spain, Cyprus and other countries.

Many wars and armed conflicts are engendered by contradictions between the capitalist and the developing countries and among the developing countries themselves. The Iran-Iraq war, which has lasted almost 8 years, is just such a conflict. Over a million people have perished in it on both sides. More than another 1.8 million Iranians and Iraqis have been crippled. The material losses of both warring parties are valued at 400-500 billion dollars.

People call the local wars and armed conflicts bleeding wounds on the body of the planet. In today's mutually dependent world, they pose an enormous danger to the whole system of international relations as well. After all, each of them could at any moment escalate into a global war. Recall that the United States, for example, has entered wars being waged between other countries as a third party over 10 times. Other states, not only in the past but in the present as well, are participants in regional conflicts, helping to pull them into a tight knot both with the aid of armed forces and with deliveries of arms, advisors and moral support, or else simply through tolerance toward the aggressor.

The security of some countries cannot be ensured at the expense of the security and interests of others. Relations among mankind today should be built with a regard for the interests of all peoples and countries on the basis of the free choice by every people of its own path of social and political development. This formula has become a cornerstone of the new political thinking that guides the Soviet Union. Our country is taking consistent steps to break up crisis situations on a just and honest basis. It is ready to interact with all states and international organizations on this issue. Especially important is such interaction among the great powers, whose contribution to the settlement of regional conflicts could play a decisive role. The Geneva agreements for a political settlement surrounding Afghanistan is a practical manifestation of such actions. They have not only paved the way to a long-awaited peace on Afghan soil, but have also created a model for the resolution of conflicts in different regions of the planet. It must unfortunately be asserted, however, that the position taken by Pakistan with the support of the United States in relation to these agreements is putting into doubt the possibility of their complete fulfillment and undermining trust toward these peaceable actions.

In Southeast Asia the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] has proclaimed a policy of national reconciliation, which has created the essential foundation for settling the situation surrounding Kampuchea. Almost 40,000 insurgents have laid down their arms and gone over to the side of the PRK government since 1979. In May of this year, Vietnam and Kampuchea decided to withdraw the Vietnamese volunteer forces, numbering about 125,000 men, by 1990.

The process of political settlement in southwest Africa is developing with the participation of the United States, South Africa, Cuba and Angola.

The search for ways of settling the difficult knot of conflicts in Central America continues. The discussion concerns first and foremost a cessation of the bloodshed on Nicaraguan soil. Some 46,000 Nicaraguans have lost their lives in the war since 1981. The material losses inflicted on the country's infrastructure, trade and economy has reached 3 billion dollars. And all this time the United States has been arming the unvanquished Somocistas and other counter-revolutionary rabble and egging them on to fight the Sandinista government. A process of merging the internal and external counter-revolutions is currently underway under the aegis of the United States, which combined with the lavish American aid is impeding the achievement of national reconciliation in Nicaragua. And the process of political settlement has moved from its standstill anyway thanks to the persistence of the Sandinistas.

Peace-making tendencies are also making their way in a number of other crisis situations as well. Not all problems in breaking up armed conflicts are yet given to resolution, however. The path to peace in the Near East is a difficult one. The Arab-Israeli confrontation is one of the most chronic and complicated. The five Arab-Israeli wars over a span of 40 years have driven the thorn of hostility so deep into the body of the region that the wound at times seems fatal. Great efforts are needed by the Arab countries, the PLO, Israel and the whole world community to heal the Near East region and ensure equal security for all states there.

The year 1988 is nonetheless concluding under a sign of definite progress in the democratization of international relations, the involvement of broad world opinion and small and medium-sized countries in the processes of settling conflicts and crises, growing collaboration between the USSR and the United States and improving relations among states with opposing social systems on the principles on peaceful co-existence. Over the past year we have been able to nourish or create preconditions for the reinforcement of regional stability and security thanks to the political settlement of a whole series of local armed conflicts. The peoples of the planet have a reserve store of political wisdom for diminishing the burden of bloody wars in the future. And it must be used immediately and to the utmost.

12821

Troop Cuts, Improved Quality of Recruits Linked
18010150z Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 88 p 6

[PRAVDA Military Department report under the rubric "We Serve the Soviet Union!": "The Main Mission"]

[Text] Yesterday, Army Gen D.T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense and candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, A.D. Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and

Navy, and V.I. Mironenko, First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, met with the Army and Navy Komsomol aktiv in the Soviet Army's Central Club imeni M.V. Frunze.

The meeting was occasioned by the approaching 70th anniversary of the Komsomol. A glorious anniversary, it goes without saying. We would mention at the outset, however, that none of the high-flown, exultant reports were heard yesterday. On the contrary, the discussion was serious and based on principle. Particularly since the envoys from the districts, fleets and groups of forces had something to share.

The readers are aware that the fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on the strengthening of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy was analyzed at a 13 October session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It was noted that the main mission assigned by the party Central Committee, that of fundamentally strengthening military discipline, is being accomplished slowly. The party is seriously concerned about evasions of military duty, non-regulation relations among servicemen, violations of the rules for standing alert duty and breakdowns of the combat equipment—very expensive equipment, it should be said. Formalism has not been eliminated in the political and military indoctrination, particularly in the individual work performed with the servicemen. Far-fetched plans, conferences, orders and directives are sometimes substituted for vital communication with the personnel. All of this taken together is having a negative effect on the missions performed by the Army and Navy and on combat readiness.

These are precisely the things about which the participants in the meeting shared their ideas: an airborne officer from the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the first sergeant of a missile launching battery, the pilot of a MIG-29, a seaman from the cruiser Kiev, a Kantemir NCO.... Surprising as it seems, the fact is that in the Komsomol work a preference is still being given to paper work, meetings and conferences, and not to the specific individual with his strong and weak points, with his attitudes toward military service, with his personal adversities and troubles, if you like.

Twice a year the army and navy receive replenishments. It is well known that the new recruits include young men with criminal records, nonconformists, as they call them today, drug addicts.... This is not something from which one can hide in an office. Has the time not come then, instead of endlessly blaming the family and the school and seeking the sources of the evil somewhere beyond the military post, finally to undertake some serious work—and not just on paper—in the barracks? This thought was clearly enunciated yesterday.

Yes, the dregs—let us call a spade a spade—are showing up in the army collective. Should we “turn over” the crew quarters and the barracks to them? The Armed

Forces constitute one of the best organized components of the society. When there is trouble, who is the first to come to our assistance? The army. One does not have to look far for examples of this. We should assume that the readers are aware of them. Our army's collectivist foundation has always been its strength. We can possibly allow ourselves to reduce somewhat both the weaponry and the numerical strength of the Armed Forces. But only if the Soviet people are confident that the Armed Forces will be able to avert a war under all circumstances.

This is just how far the matter of military discipline extends. And it is made more acute by the poor predraft training, about which the military “Afghaners” should speak out, by international indoctrination work which was somewhat neglected at one time, and by an inability properly to teach the soldier how to fire and toss a grenade well, how to operate a combat vehicle, and how to use a trenching tool as well.

The Army and Navy are one with the people. Yesterday's discussion confirmed this once again. The army Komsomol is perfectly capable of handling the trouble spots in the contemporary organizational development of our defense. This is its main mission from the party.

French Nuclear Forces and East-West Balance

French Posture Considered

52000001 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 44, 28 Oct 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Colonel B. (a pseudonym for a group of officers and diplomats): “Things To Think About: Defending Western Europe—Without American Leadership”; from REPUBLIK [REPUBLIQUE], a quarterly social-political journal by the French socialist party; first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] We are happy to see a lot of positive ideas in official statements by French officials that show a readiness to facilitate the search for ways to reduce the levels of armaments on the European Continent. While speaking at the 43rd United Nations General Assembly recently President F. Mitterrand stressed the paramount importance of reducing the conventional weapons that have been amassed in Europe, expressed his opinion against not only the use of, but also the production of chemical weapons and confirmed his position rejecting the arms race in space. This article analyzes possible approaches to the problem of guaranteeing European security “from the French point of view.” It has some realistic evaluations and very promising conclusions. We will have our commentator address the methods presented by the authors to resolve these issues.

The discussion about the problems of European security have progressed so far in the first three months of 1988 that it has confused many of the observers whose analyses or judgments have begun to lag behind the course of

events. Those who want to eliminate the "evil empire," remain true to the principles of the "Cold War" and feel that Reagan betrayed them (these people even "begged" the United States Senate not to ratify the INF Treaty) certainly feel that there is no need to get into the essence of the changes that have taken place; their goal is simply to continue their attacks. But others who sincerely want to understand where we are moving often do not have factual information.

What can we say about the U.S.-USSR agreement that was formulated as the Washington Treaty? It certainly represents an event of paramount importance for peace in the entire world and in Europe in particular.

J-P. Chevenement (France's Defense Minister—ed.) stated, "The Washington Agreement is first and foremost a positive manifestation, the result of the efforts that we have put forth; it should be hailed as a success and opens futures that can be fruitful if we show clear thought and the ability to imagine."

The minister continued, "Moreover, and this is not the least of the agreement's importance, it presents the problems of European security in a new manner and forces every one of our countries to ask itself the question of what its role and responsibilities are in light of this new situation. Finally, this agreement brings us, and this is its logical consequence, to the necessity of all of us thinking together about the Atlantic Alliance, its desirable future evolution and the possible initiatives that have to be made. We are entering a new phase; we are being confronted with new problems; and there is no assurance that we will be able to resolve them in the necessary manner by being content to preserve the structure and mechanisms that were established in the early 50's."

A Positive Treaty

Despite numerous misgivings, hysterical shouts and whining lamentations, the main thing is that this is a positive treaty. Chevenement says, "I am surprised by the reaction that many officials have to it. Have we already forgotten the situation under which this "bilateral decision" was adopted? Have we already forgotten that we tried to eliminate the inequality that arose in 1977 because of the Soviet Union's unilateral initiatives? Have we already forgotten our goal which has been stated so many times—that there be neither SS or Pershing missiles? One of these missiles was only needed as a response to the other. Their dismantling, removal and destruction meets our present desires."

Chevenement asks those who have been "disappointed in Reaganism" the following basic question. "What is there to fear? Is it the weakening of our defensibility? But concerns about balance answer this and negotiations allow us to achieve exactly this. Do we fear the undermining of "family bonds"? But our alliance (NATO) is a voluntary union of free peoples and sovereign states and

in the end is based on the desire that each of them has to carry out the responsibilities they have assumed in the event the very worst should take place. This desire, this will does not depend on having military equipment of one type or another in position. This will either exists or does not exist."

Francois Mitterrand gets to the root of the question without unnecessary ceremony. A journalist (from U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT), undoubtedly thinking about the European or French "experts" who were confused by Reagan's agreement with Gorbachev, asked him whether he agreed with those in Europe who feel that the summit meeting in Reykjavik and the INF Treaty weakened the American forces' conviction in deterrence? In answer Mitterrand countered with, "This conviction was not weakened at Reykjavik but rather twenty six years ago when its concept was developed and twenty one years ago when NATO adopted the strategy of so-called "flexible response," a concept that was no longer identical to the strategy of deterrence. Disarmament supplements deterrence. Deterrence is used to hinder the outbreak of war and the goal of disarmament is to reduce the risk of war. These are mutually linked. I do not think that the INF Treaty hides the risk of the United States being alienated from Europe. But the strategy of "flexible response" gives rise to an uncertainty that could lead to such an alienation."

It has not been acceptable to talk about this. Never. Hence the bewilderment on the part of the American journalist who asks the question, "Without flexible response we risk 'exchanging' New York or Washington for Berlin and many Americans feel that this is unacceptable both from a political and a moral point of view."

But do they think that the converse is acceptable? And to whom? Francois Mitterrand had no problem answering the journalist: "It was precisely such an analysis that prompted General de Gaulle to choose an independent French nuclear strategy. At this configuration we remain in the exact place as before. You can totally understand that the United States does not want the consequences of a nuclear war in its own territory. But then let us not talk about deterrence any longer."

In addition to this we should ask another question—why are the West Germans so resolutely for the elimination of very short range missiles. F. Mitterrand feels, "The FRG cannot very easily stand the position of a territory that has been sprinkled by a nuclear explosion, a territory that is the very first target in case of a nuclear war. It can (and must) understand this. For the security of Europe we must immediately conduct negotiations for balanced conventional weapons."

Based on this analysis there is one question that automatically comes up. Does the West have to immediately modernize its very short range nuclear weapons? F. Mitterrand answers, "No. It would be paradoxical and inappropriate to get involved with over-arming at a time

when both alliances are making progress toward disarmament for the first time in the post-war period. Let us look for a balance at as low a level as possible."

The main essence of the French position was presented in this manner. The only thing that remained was for the French president to remind us that the "defense of (West) Germany is the responsibility not only of France, but of the entire North Atlantic Organization." He continued, "Chancellor Kohl and I decided to revitalize the military articles of the 1963 Franco-(West) German Treaty that has been in a state of hiatus. This means that by observing all the conditions associated with the various statutes, France and the FRG, with regards to a combined command and nuclear weapons, will make our defense, our military forces and our weapons as mutually complementary as possible. The fact that these two countries are located in Europe, maintain friendly and good neighborly relations and are linked by numerous treaties, want to work even closer together has to be more beneficial for all of their partners. It would suit me if the embryo of some type of European defense were to come to light as a result.

It will take time for Europe to create a European defense. Europe is still affected by the two alliances which divide it into two parts. It is impossible to somehow miraculously transition immediately from this situation to one where Europe is the master of its own fate. But if Europe has the wisdom to act in a measured fashion we will reach our goal."

See how interesting it is to compare formulations by Francois Mitterrand with those that Chancellor Kohl applied a few days before. "We Europeans are aware that stability at the global strategy level and, in the end, European security will also depend to a decisive degree on the counterbalance of American military power vis-a-vis Soviet military power on the European Continent. The presence of American Armed Forces in Europe is a guarantee of American nuclear protection for Europe and no autonomous European security systems can replace that."

Going Beyond the Limits of "Atlantic Orthodoxy"

Unfortunately the majority of our experts have become accustomed to building their arguments based not on our reality (from the point of view of the French and the Europeans), but by confining themselves to the conceptual limitations that, regardless of what they are called, are still always within the limits of "Atlantic Orthodoxy." The central question with Mitterrand's initiatives raise is undoubtedly as follows—"Must we limit our efforts to participating in internal NATO debates which are usually held on the basis of a doctrine that has been dictated by the United States and that is accepted by everyone, as a result of which we are included in the circle of disagreement that is going on among American experts? Or, on the other hand, are we able to THINK [emphasized in original text], basing our thought on the

idea that we are defending the interests of France and the those of Europe, defending OUR defense and security policies and therefore, also defending OUR policy of disarmament?

This is in no way a purely French question. It is taking on a progressively more general European character. How do we continue to give the impression that there is total harmony in NATO and that the alliance is prepared to blindly follow the slightest changes in American strategic thinking, which, as we know, is itself in the full swing of evolution? How can we not underscore in discussions relative to the FRG question the doubts that all of that country's political officials are now expressing more and more openly?

Based on all of this, we will give three observations to clear up the choices.

The first, with which everyone agrees, even if no one dares to say it, is: the thesis of "flexible response" is dead. At this time NATO does not have a strategy because this organization no longer has the weapons to carry out its strategy. The subject "modernizing" battlefield weapons actually has the goal of expending an enormous amount of assets to restore the instrumentation for nuclear war on the European continent, a topic the French have always felt was absurd in a military sense, not only for themselves, but for everyone, and something that would not stand up to criticism from a political point of view. And the West Germans who would be the first victims in the battle categorically reject a course promising such a future.

Thus now is an extremely auspicious time to calmly explain to all our partners that the path the United States chose more than 20 years ago (and this explains our "exit" from NATO), with its allotment of priority to the tactical employment of nuclear weapons and battlefield weapons, was a serious error from a European point of view. Do we have to continue persisting in the erroneous decision and again look for very small conditions that support the strategy of "flexible response" only because the Americans, concerned only, and quite naturally, about their own interests and never asking themselves the question of whether their interests coincide with Europe's interests, are not able to think up something different? This question at least deserves to be raised.

The second observation naturally arises from the first. In questioning the strategy of "flexible response" and the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, we are by no means moving toward depriving Europe of nuclear weapons, but are looking at the necessity of reviewing the role of strategic deterrence whose goal is not to win a war, but to prevent war from breaking out. That which was "improbable" in 1966 is obviously more conclusive today and no one disputes the fact that any country in Western Europe whose "vital interests" are certainly not locked within its borders, has a strategic deterrent force available and is faithful to the strategic concept of "the

weak deterring the strong," is an inherent component of the security of the continent as a whole. There is no need to support the geographically delineated "screen" or any division of responsibilities that no one is demanding from us. If the French strategic deterrent forces did not exist, the moment would now be suitable for creating them since even American leaders are now admitting that the United States no longer envisions the possibility of putting its own territory at risk to defend Europe. In actuality it is no longer a question of Americans and Europeans combining both their nuclear and conventional forces and standing shoulder to shoulder to repel possible aggression (this became problematic beginning in the 60's). From the European point of view and with the Americans working their way toward isolationism (SDI was an exceptionally graphic symptom of this evolution and Soviet-American negotiations have only confirmed it) the question is as followed: is it possible to hold back a potential aggressor when there is no resolute frame of mind to show the aggressor that the Europeans, if necessary, will be able to inflict such losses, especially within the aggressor's territory, that even if he "wins" this first test of strength he will be in no condition to then resist America which will have remained unaffected. This is precisely what the French Armed Forces are for. And if not for this, then for what?

We Have to Re-evaluate the Old Mechanisms

The third observation is: if you feel that in the end Europe must be defended by Europeans (this is undoubtedly one of the necessary elements in the creation of a real political union and does not in the least exclude the need for the Atlantic Alliance whose real mission is to be a mutual aid pact), then the problem for the intermediate period is not one of "returning France to NATO" (this idea is more ridiculous than ever before); the problem is how much longer will NATO (a joint military organization) be able to last in its present form after the disappearance of the conditions that explain why and for what reason it was started in the early 50's (conditions which basically no longer exist in a world that has changed so radically)?

Why have we not looked reality right in the face for forty years? If real progress is to be made in the area of eliminating conventional weapons, if we are to achieve "equivalence at the lowest level" in this area, if we are to succeed in transitioning to the formula of a "defensive defense" that excludes any kind of surprise attack, it will become evident that the mechanisms that support American leadership (military and then political) in Europe have become outdated and the path toward uniting the conventional forces of the European states, especially France and West Germany, under an integrated command, one that will not be American, but European, will be open.

It would have been possible to select the formula for resolving this under the aegis of a strengthened and expanded Western European alliance (a "European support" for NATO).

In short, by criticizing the strategy of "flexible response," publicly expressing doubt as to the advisability of "modernizing" nuclear battlefield weapons, putting a Franco-West German rapprochement into effect and maintaining his Armed Forces' strategic role of deterrence and its dedication to disarmament, Francois Mitterrand asks his partners and European social opinion a question of singular importance to the future of Europe - the question of its independence.

Further Development Could Block Arms Control Process

52000001 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 44, 28 Oct 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Vladimir Ivanovich Yerofeyev, Soviet diplomat, ambassador and member of the USSR delegation to the Stockholm Conference on Measures to Increase Trust, Security and Disarmament in Europe; he worked in France from 1955 to 1959 as an embassy advisor: "Thoughts On 'Colonel B's' Argument"]

[Text] The Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter Range Missiles goes beyond the limits of the relationship between the USSR and the U.S. and is extremely important for Europe. As a matter of fact, it directly affects Europe, for the major part of that class of nuclear weapons is being removed from the European continent. Moreover, the treaty bears powerful political impulse and is stimulating further discussion on the problems of European security with regard to the positive changes that it is making in the international situation.

During its 15-16 July 1988 meeting the Political Consultative Committee for Warsaw Treaty Member States welcomed the entry into force of the INF Treaty, the first important measure for real disarmament. At this meeting European socialist countries called as well this year for the immediate start of negotiations for substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons on the European continent—from the Atlantic to the Urals. Their reaction was active and was directed at guaranteeing further movement along the road to disarmament.

Against the background of a generally favorable European evaluation for the Treaty certain circles there have shown certain signs of anxiety and symptoms of a "crisis of confidence" towards the U.S.'s readiness and NATO's ability to implement the future defense of North Atlantic Treaty members. This in turn has given rise to new and rekindled old plan for organizing the defense of Western Europe using forces under the leadership of the Europeans themselves. The article published in the French journal REPUBLIK is of interest in this regard.

The article recognizes that the INF Treaty "represents a event of paramount importance for peace in the entire world and particularly in Europe" and cites French Defense Minister J-P. Chevenement's statement that the treaty "opens futures which could become fruitful,"

"raises the problem of European security in a new way," and "forces each of our countries to ask itself what its role and responsibilities will be in light of this new situation."

In light of the removal and elimination of medium and shorter range missiles as called for by the treaty "Colonel B" concludes that the thesis of "flexible response" is dead and that NATO no longer has a strategy since it does not have the weapons to carry out its strategy. As regards the U.S., it is slipping into isolationism, does not intend to subject its own territories to attack in order to defend Europe and in general no longer questions whether it will unite its own nuclear or conventional forces with the Europeans to repel possible aggression. Thus there is a "crisis of confidence" in the U.S. and NATO.

This is not the first time such a crisis has arisen in France and in Western Europe. In the late 50's, when intercontinental ballistic missiles appeared in the Soviet Union and U.S. territory lost its invulnerability, European NATO members began to express doubt as to whether the U.S. would defend them in the event of a regional conflict, thus risking a Soviet retaliatory nuclear missile attack on itself. How did France react at that time? General de Gaulle, who was critical of NATO and its organization and methods of leadership from the very beginning, evaluated the changed situation in a somber manner and based on his conviction that the system of military integration was out-dated and that the defense of France had to be French, resolutely withdrew his country from NATO's military organization. In carrying out this action in 1966, he explained to his partners that he was doing this because the situation under which the NATO treaty had been concluded had undergone substantial changes: the U.S. had lost its former nuclear monopoly and Europe had ceased to be the center of the international crisis.

De Gaulle freed his policies, his armed forces and his country's territory from its state of dependence on the U.S. and NATO. He gave French nuclear forces a national character. Moreover he outfitted them to serve the concept of "a defense on all azimuths," i.e., against all types of possible threats. In doing this he openly rejected the assertion that the Soviet Union was aggressive and was the first Western leader to do this. De Gaulle began reproachment with the USSR even during the "Cold War."

And what does this group of French officers and diplomats who united under the pseudonym "Colonel B" offer today for the security of France and Europe under conditions that are much more favorable from the point of view of processes limiting and reducing armed forces and weapons, processes that are gathering speed?

The French people and the Europeans must not blindly follow the swerves of American strategic thinking, but must think for themselves, basing their thinking on their

own conception of the interests of France and Europe, their own defensive policies and, consequently, their own policy of disarmament. One can totally agree with this premise. But "Colonel B's" suggestion goes further. It boils down to the countries of Western Europe uniting into an integrated organization under the aegis of an expanded and strengthened Western European alliance which is nothing other than "NATO's European support." France's nuclear weapons would serve as a means to restrain a potential aggressor both during the transitional period and after the formation of such an organization.

The following is an interpretation of how France and Western Europe on the whole would be defended. "If needed, a potential aggressor will suffer such losses, first and foremost within his own territories, that even if he 'wins' this initial test of forces, he will be in no condition to then resist America which will have remained unaffected."

Let us sort out what we have. Instead of guaranteeing France's security using political means, "Colonel B" is guaranteeing her unavoidable destruction, not even for the sake of saving Europe which could hardly survive the consequences of an exchange of nuclear missile attacks, and all so that someone can then take vengeance against the other side after her destruction! Isn't this paradoxically about the same thing that some are accusing the U.S.—sacrificing Europe at the beginning of the conflict and then getting involved using fresh forces. It seems paradoxical that "Colonel B," who would hardly regret it if things moved toward the disappearance of NATO, makes a recommendation that can breathe new life into that organization since he envisions the creation of a "European Support" for that organization.

And one has to agree with "Colonel B's" assertion that the idea of France returning to NATO is "more hilarious today than ever before." However what still remains unclear is how he, in discussing the thinking within the framework of "Atlantic Orthodoxy," imagines the creation of "Europe—the master of its own fate" and of an independent French and European defense, leaves the door wide open for France's involvement in NATO's strategies and activities.

The collective author's article in the journal REPUBLIK asserts that France is a critical component to the security of the continent as a whole. This is not debated by anyone. There is a lot within Europe's movement toward a firm peace and collective security that depends on France's position. But the question is—what specifically is France putting into this important matter.

According to "Colonel B" France's importance to European security is that it has at its disposal nuclear forces that are a strategic deterrent relative to other parts of Europe. He even feels that if French nuclear deterrent forces did not exist, it would now be time to create them. But this does not tally with the statements by France's

president as cited in the article, statements to the effect that "its would be paradoxical and inappropriate to get involved in over-arming at a time when for the first time in the post-war period both alliances have begun making progress toward disarmament"! And it in no way corresponds to the general trend in the development of international relations, a trend toward arms limitation and reduction, the reduction of military opposition and the strengthen of trust.

Although in this article the French strategic concept depends on the "weak deterring the strong," the situation is such that France has a very ambitious program for comprehensive modernizing and quantitatively expanding its own nuclear weapons many-fold, as a result of which by the year 2000 France will have up to 15 percent of the nuclear weapons that the USSR or the U.S. will have in the even of a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

"Colonel B's" suggestion that France's nuclear potential would serve the continent's security through some Western European military organization cannot, of course, hide the fact that its expansion will become a factor that seriously complicates and may even block the progress of negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and even block nuclear disarmament itself.

Because of its own integrated nature the military organization of Western European states that the article's authors recommend we orient on strongly resembles the regrettable European Defense Association (YeOS) that was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954 as not corresponding to the national interests of France. "Colonel B" adjusts the Western European Alliance to the reality of today and links it to the development of negotiations limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. He feels that when the outdatedness of the mechanisms supporting the U.S.'s military and political leadership in Europe is exposed (and according to his words, this will take place after substantial progress in the area of eliminating conventional weapons is made), when a "balance at the lowest level" is reached and any possibility of a surprise attack has been eliminated, the path toward uniting the conventional forces of the European states, and especially France and West Germany, under an integrated command will be opened.

The measures listed above, measures that the USSR and the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty are persistently working to bring to fruition, have as their goal the strengthening of general European security, the primary prerequisite for overcoming the division in Europe. The question then is, if this is accomplished, why is it necessary to create some new integrated military organization in Western Europe, one which will only consolidate military opposition on the European Continent?

When the conversation moved to plans for military integration in Western Europe and the development of a "Common Market" during his recent conversation with FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs H.-D. Genscher, M. S. Gorbachev stressed the responsibility of European politicians to insure that this did not cause the loss of positive beginnings in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of trust that are already becoming a reality and does not undermine the Helsinki progress and the conception of a "common European home" oriented on general cooperation for the interests of everyone. It would not be bad for the group of French officers and diplomats who published under the pseudonym of "Colonel B" to pay heed to this observation.

The new political thinking is undoubtedly making its way to France and it has specifically found its expression in the report about military doctrine given by President F. Mitterrand on 11 October and in the Paris negotiations by USSR Secretary of Foreign Affairs E. D. Shevardnadze. In his speech F. Mitterrand spoke about a French defense "against any aggression" without naming the enemy (the Soviet Union) beforehand as he had previously done, for example, in the preamble to France's military program for 1987-1991; he praised the INF Treaty and stated that France "intellectually, psychologically and morally subscribes to the idea of the necessity of disarmament." The Franco-Soviet dialogue that was held during E. A. Shevardnadze's visit exposed the high level of commonality in priorities that the USSR and France have in the area of disarmament and also their readiness to operate in a practical level in this area.

M. S. Gorbachev's upcoming meetings with F. Mitterrand will undoubtedly strengthen and develop the positive trends and take Soviet-French relations to a new, higher level.

12511

Soviet Risk Reduction Center on Progress in Missile Stock Reduction

*LD3012112888 Moscow TASS in English
1123 GMT 30 Dec 88*

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS—The medium- and shorter-range missile stockpiles have "dwindled" substantially both in the USSR and the United States during the outgoing year. A TASS diplomatic correspondent was told at the Soviet National Centre for Lessening the Nuclear Menace that more than 600 combat and training missiles of the two classes had been destroyed in the USSR in December 30th in compliance with the INF Treaty. This accounts for approximately a third of the stockpiles that have to be destroyed in the USSR under the treaty. As a result of this reduction 24 operational missile bases had to be shut down in the USSR.

The process of destroying medium- and shorter-range missiles is continuing in the United States, too. According to the Soviet National Centre, more than 200 combat and training missiles have been destroyed there so far.

It is believed in Soviet military circles that elimination of INF missiles has not reduced the security of the United States and NATO, on the one hand, and the USSR and Warsaw Treaty nations—on the other. On the contrary, this has strengthened it. Fulfillment of the INF Treaty

under reciprocal control and verification promotes confidence between Moscow and Washington, as well as between the two major military-political alliances, contributes to the consolidation of strategic stability.

The experience, which the two sides have gleaned in drawing up the treaty and in its implementation, is undoubtedly useful also at the present stage of the preparation of an agreement to cut by 50 per cent the strategic offensive armaments of the two sides.

Genscher on Need for SR Missile Negotiations

*LD1512115288 Hamburg DPA in German
1053 GMT 15 Dec 88*

[Text] Bonn/Munich (DPA)—The great urgency of a Western negotiating mandate for short-range missiles has once more been stressed today by Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In this area (up to a range of 500km) the Eastern superiority is at its greatest, Genscher stressed in a speech on the 40th anniversary of the Society for Foreign Studies in Munich. The text was circulated by the foreign Ministry in Bonn.

The urgency which Genscher has repeatedly stressed over the last few weeks is aimed at negotiating a reduction in these missiles with the result that both sides would have equal upperlimits but at a lower level. This goal had been set by the NATO Council of Ministers back in 1987 in Reykjavik. According to NATO's figures 88 U.S. lance missiles oppose 1360 various shortrange missiles of the Warsaw pact. For this reason a significantly greater degree of disarmament would be expected from the Soviet Union.

Genscher said in Munich that it must be taken into account "that the significance of nuclear weapons for the strategy of deterrence becomes less the shorter the range." For this reason the removal of nuclear artillery grenades with a current stock of around 4,000 should be continued.

The Federal foreign minister emphasized the significance of Gorbachev's policies and the necessity for a positive response by the West. In this Genscher cited recommendations by Andrey Sakharov, Lech Walesa and Alexander Dubcek.

It was also wrong to "conclude diminishing readiness for defense from a reduction of the feeling of threat in our population," Genscher stated. Citizens' feelings that the danger of a military confrontation has become less is "however right, based on a correct analysis."

Nonetheless citizens do not consider the Bundeswehr superfluous for this reason. Genscher acknowledged that German forces do not need a picture of an enemy. This is foreign to the nature of a democratic institution.

Vogel Proposes To Halve Nuclear Battlefield Weapons

*LD1712132288 Hamburg DPA in German
0909 GMT 17 Dec 88*

[Text] Minaz (DPA)—SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel has proposed a unilateral halving of nuclear battlefield weapons as the West's response to Mikhail Gorbachev's disarmament initiative.

In an article for the ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in Mainz (Saturday edition), Vogel writes that Gorbachev's step is suited to reducing Soviet superiorities and introducing a

process of change which would culminate in the two alliances' Armed Forces being capable only for defense and not attack. By contrast, NATO's response was "half-hearted and inadequate" in terms of recovering the West's initiative in such an important area. NATO failed to propose a clear concept for conventional disarmament. CDU Bundestag deputy Juergen Todenhoefer described Vogel's demand as illogical. If the latter's proposal is implemented then the reduction announced by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union's immense military supremacy in Europe will be virtually negated. Vogel's method of disarmament will never achieve a balance in Europe.

Kohl Against Prior Concessions in Disarmament Policy

*LD1712125888 Hamburg DPA in German
1111 GMT 17 Dec 88*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has again spoken out against prior concessions in disarmament policy. He will on no account adopt a position of this nature, which has been consistently put forward by the SPD in the past few years, Kohl said today in an interview on Sender Freies Berlin radio station.

He adhered to his view that without the stationing of the West's INF missiles, the Soviet Union would not have been prepared to conclude the INF Treaty on dismantling medium-range missiles. He believes that there is now a "very good chance" that the INF treaty will be followed by further steps, the chancellor added. He cited the sphere of intercontinental missiles in the so-called START negotiations, a total ban on chemical weapons, and a reduction of the imbalance in the conventional sphere.

The SPD Bundestag group has now passed on its demand to the United Nations for convening a conference of all nonnuclear weapon states. A relevant letter from parliamentary group chairman Vogel was sent this week to the secretary general and the president of the UN General Assembly and to other international peace organizations, SPD disarmament expert Hermann Scheer announced in Bonn today. Scheer said the SPD believes that new international initiatives and intensified efforts for nuclear disarmament are needed in order to uphold the international system of treaties against proliferation in a number of nuclear weapon states.

Admiral Discusses Possible Security Policy

*AU1912154488 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Dec 88 p 8*

["Text" of speech that Admiral Elmar Schmaehling "intended to deliver" at the German-American Institute in Heidelberg; date not given; speech not given due to inclement weather]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In order to be able to pursue a policy that is of vital importance and worthwhile, we must put an end to the phase of militarizing relations among states and alliances. The time is now ripe for this.

For beginning a new phase of German policy beyond the shadows of the last world war and beyond U.S. hegemony, the FRG must adopt the following position:

1. The FRG must get the principle of "most affected nation" accepted by the Alliance. In other words, it must demand the right of codetermination on all decisions concerning the deployment and possible use of other nations' weapons systems on German soil.

2. The FRG must insist on a change in the nuclear strategy. The threat of using nuclear weapons first, if necessary, and of expanding nuclear war in a premeditated way, if necessary, must be given up. This strategy has contributed more to eroding our people's defense willingness than glasnost and perestroika have done. If the choice of strategic nuclear weapons is reduced to a few hundred systems in both alliances, and if the apparently usable military theater weapons are totally abolished, we must arrive at a concept where the use of nuclear weapons—to the extent that they cannot safely be reduced to zero worldwide—is only threatening if a possible adversary threatens or uses nuclear weapons.

In the future, nuclear weapons must by no means be deployed or stockpiled on the territory of a country that does not possess such weapons.

3. The introduction of new weapons systems must be rejected in the German interest, even if it is carried out under the label of "modernization." The existing military potentials will allow countries to freeze their defense budgets, at least for several years, until results have been achieved in disarmament, or until it seems to be sure that no results can be achieved.

4. Europeanizing security in Europe must be advanced. Instead of sharing the burdens as defined by the United States, in other words, burdens that are based on the policy of military strength and the capacity to wield power worldwide, the Europeans should take over the really necessary burdens, in other words, burdens that are based on the lowest possible level as a result of bilateral disarmament.

5. The FRG must urge conventional disarmament. The objective must be that ultimately, the military potentials on both sides only have the size and the structure of armed forces that are necessary to guarantee sufficient defense. This is supposed to finally lead to a stable situation of mutual defense superiority in the scope of which an interalliance collective and cooperative security system will develop which can finally replace the two military alliances. In this way, the permanent deployment of foreign troops can also be discontinued, which is an unnatural situation for any country.

Differences in Bonn Over Gorbachev Proposals
AU1912133988 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Dec 88 pp 1-2

[“BAN” report: “Controversy in Bonn on Reaction to Gorbachev’s Proposals”]

[Text] Bonn, 18 December—SPD Chairman Vogel and social-democratic defense and security experts reproached the Federal Government as well as the Western Alliance over the weekend for not having reacted adequately to the disarmament proposals submitted by Soviet chief of state Gorbachev. Vogel termed NATO’s response “half-hearted and insufficient.” He advocated halving theater nuclear weapons unilaterally. Federal Chancellor Kohl, on the other hand, said in an interview with Sender Freies Berlin that he does not at all share the view that disarmament policy “decisions should be made by way of advance concessions, so to speak.” Stating the reasons for this, he said that without the decision on the deployment of intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union would not have been prepared to sign the INF Treaty. He said that Soviet policy should be judged by its deeds and not by its words. Kohl added: “I think nothing of a position of refusal as has been occasionally recommended to us even by people in the West.” Disarmament is not an end in itself; it only makes sense if it leads to more security and more confidence, Kohl said.

The SPD spokesman in the Bundestag Defense Committee, Horn, reproached NATO for demanding that the Soviet Union reduce its “superiorities,” and at the same time “keeping to its own superiorities without presenting a disarmament offer of its own.” He said that NATO has failed to work out a conventional disarmament concept, and does not sufficiently urge that nuclear weapons with shorter ranges be reduced. “To that extent, Gorbachev’s initiative remains a test for the Western Alliance’s functioning and political credibility,” said Horn. After Gorbachev announced that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from the GDR and the CSSR, it would be “no catastrophe for us, if the United States now were also to withdraw troops from Europe.” Instead of extending military service, Horn suggested in a ZDF interview, we should reduce it to 12 months. He proposed a better training for reservists. The Chairman of the Defense Committee, Biele (CSU), also suggested that the extension of military service to 18 months should be postponed for the time being. The Young Liberals [FDP youth organization] also rejected the planned extension of military service. The FDP youth organization’s Federal Presidium urged the FDP Bundestag group in Bonn on Sunday [18 December] not to give in now to the CDU/CSU on this point. The Chairman of the Young Liberals, Neubauer, said: “Postponing the extension of military service is the absolute minimum for us.” Policy-makers should not inflexibly stick to decisions when realities change.

Meanwhile, the SPD Bundestag group has proposed a conference of all non-nuclear countries. Vogel formulated this wish in a letter to the UN Secretary General.

SPD deputy Scheer said that the SPD believes "that new international initiatives and accelerated efforts regarding nuclear disarmament are necessary to maintain the international treaty system against an increase in the number of nuclear countries." Scheer recalled that the nonproliferation treaty is only valid until the year 1995. The danger is growing that additional countries will procure nuclear weapons during the next decade. "This treaty system, which is of vital importance for the entire globe, is in jeopardy if the nuclear states are not prepared more rapidly to further reduce nuclear weapons, and instead continue to keep to the principle of nuclear deterrence," said Scheer. The United Nations should take the initiative to convene an international conference, and the Federal Government should support this, he said; that is what the SPD demands. He added that it is "shortsighted and irresponsible for NATO and the Federal Government to insist on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence." This is "not the way to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear states," said Scheer.

DIE WELT Views SPD Disarmament Proposals

AU2012133688 Hamburg *DIE WELT* in German
20 Dec 88 p 2

[Joachim Neander commentary: "Pressure To Grant Prior Concessions"]

[Text] Whoever hints in this country that he is skeptical about Gorbachev's deeds and particularly his announcements, risks being accused of trying to defend his old conservative hostile image of the evil Soviet Union. The fact that nearly all German and foreign experts have expressed a certain degree of skepticism and concern is hardly noticed.

The same is probably already happening to former chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In a radio interview, he has emphatically warned against Western advance concessions in the disarmament sphere and against the danger of returning to old Soviet policies in case Gorbachev should fail. However, the comrades within the SPD will only shrug their shoulders at this. Without interruption, they continue to call for more advance concessions. Opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel has demanded a 50-percent reduction of NATO's nuclear battlefield weapons, and Deputy Erwin Horn has even called for cuts within the Bundeswehr and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. In addition to that, the SPD has demanded that all low-altitude military flights be abandoned, which, if one takes a close look, has nothing to do with disarmament because no arms are involved here.

The only thing that is important for the SPD is that the statements are in line with the current mood of the people, a mood in which political satirists can make everybody laugh with the simple mentioning of the

"threat from the East." To base its policy on gales of laughter provoked by satirists or on opinion polls that reflect the mood of the day is not worthy of the great social democratic people's party. Therefore, the only possible explanation is that the SPD does not expect to regain power and responsibility in Bonn in the near future. If the SPD were in the position of having to govern the country, it would encounter the greatest difficulties because of the absurdity of its own defense-political proposals, no matter whether Gorbachev remains in office or not.

NATO Stance on Short-Range Missiles Criticized

AU2412192788 Frankfurt/Main *FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE* in German 24 Dec 88 p 10

["Nm" commentary: "Encouragement for Moscow"]

[Text] The NATO allies have realized the importance of the "overall concept," a term that until recently has been used with irritation. They have realized that trying to achieve a balance between abstract statements and the practical muddling through of the 16 partners is not sufficient to counter Gorbachev's proposals. Bonn is concerned about short-range nuclear weapons. There is agreement within the Bonn Government that nuclear artillery—with ranges of about 50 km—could be considerably reduced because of its "self-deterrent" effect. Agreement seems also to be in sight on the modernization of the "Lance" missile: The option for a positive decision should be kept open, but the decision should be linked with the results of the talks on conventional disarmament in Vienna. This provides Moscow with the opportunity to play up this topic again and again. It would have been wiser to support the modernization and—in continuation of the NATO dual-track decision—to offer to abandon the modernization plans in case the Soviets behave accordingly. This would have encouraged the Kremlin to offer a compromise during negotiations.

Genscher Says West Should Promote Disarmament

LD0101094989 Hamburg *DPA* in German
0702 GMT 1 Jan 89

[Text] Bonn, (DPA)—In the view of Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, (FDP), NATO is "in no way under pressure of time" with regard to modernizing its short-range nuclear weapons. It is wrong to make this topic the central issue of security in Europe, Genscher said on Sunday in an interview with Radio Luxembourg.

"The thing we must do at the moment is to develop the overall concept of the Western alliance," Genscher stressed. This overall concept, as decided by the foreign ministers, would be in favor of arms control and disarmament, and not for armament.

Genscher supports a "cooperative security" in Europe. Within structures appropriate to making attack less and less possible, the Bundeswehr will also play a significant and indispensable part. In order to fulfill its task, it requires security policy assent, precisely because it is a conscript army. This assent will "absolutely and certainly not" be endangered as a result of the

Soviet Union's new policy. It can "only be endangered if the West misses real chances of disarmament." This, however, is not the case. Genscher said verbatim: "I do not share the concern of those who fear that the will to defend would be weak. Our citizens know very precisely the important function the soldiers fulfill for our security."

Tobback on NATO Meeting, SNF Modernization
52002404 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch
5 Nov 88 supplement p 3

[Article and interview with Belgian Minister of Interior Louis Tobback, by Oscar Garschagen: "Louis Tobback: Perhaps the Belgians For Once Had a Better Understanding"]

[Excerpt] The Belgian Alleingang, or "solo course" in that country's third official language, within NATO was short-lived. After the two-day meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Scheveningen, Belgium dutifully fell in line with modernization. End of drill, dismissed! The dove of peace might have been fluttering about for a little bit. Just a foray or the truth?

"What? Is this a provocation?" growls Louis Tobback, 50, who—it sounds strange, but every country has its own political mores—as minister of Interior is one of the architects of Belgian defense policy. FRG Minister Scholtz spoke afterwards of a "tempest in a teacup." U.S. Secretary of Defense Carlucci said, "I don't see any hesitation. We are going ahead with modernization, because I have the full support of my colleagues." Dutch Minister Bolkestein, who did not understand the Belgian policy, also used words to that effect.

One thing was clear: For the first time, the outside world has truly noticed that a change of government has taken place in Belgium (socialists instead of liberals). A government that is full of politicians, that thinks back with frustration and irritation at the cruise missile affair. Prime Minister Martens, for example, who first discovered that his country was fully committed during a visit to President Reagan. Socialists who are desecrated by this same Martens, who knew that the first cruise missiles were being flown to Florennes the night of the missile debate in parliament.

Last week was the first time that it was perceptible in Belgium itself that the socialists are in the coalition, since the presence of the Left is more difficult to measure amidst all the fumbling with percentages in the socio-economic and financial domain.

"Our minister of Defense, Mr Coeme, did exactly what he had to do, because that had been decided upon by the Belgian government. The allies had been amicably invited to approve a series of recommendations concerning the modernization of short-range weapons and several other principles. And so we did not do so. Those are the facts."

[DE VOLKSKRANT] There is nothing in the communique about Belgian reticence.

[Tobback] "I can't do anything about the fact that such complicated procedures are used at NATO, and that so much of a smokescreen is always created. That type of communique is for the press, after all. It says nothing to

me, it obligates neither me nor the government. What would have obligated us was approval of the recommendations of the High Level Group. So it didn't happen!"

[DE VOLKSKRANT] Just a piece of paper, the communique?

[Tobback] "Oh, a communique is a communique. Every journalist knows the difference between a communique and a genuine decision."

[DE VOLKSKRANT] Carlucci says that NATO is going ahead with the modernization of nuclear short-range weapons.

[Tobback] "I can't tell any more whether Mr Carlucci has problems with his hearing or with his eyes. Perhaps he is mistaken. Every ally is free to say whatever he wants afterwards. I am not a censor for Mr Carlucci, who at any rate cannot make any statements on behalf of the Belgian government. I am not among the people who must vouch for the fact that Mr Carlucci has the right pair of glasses on, or that he has his hearing aid turned on. To listen to Carlucci, the Dutch government as well has decided to modernize the 155 mm nuclear artillery, the F-16 and the Lance missile. I can't imagine that, so in short it's all rubbish and confusion. Let me be perfectly clear: Nothing, and I mean nothing, has been decided."

[DE VOLKSKRANT] But the communique states that nuclear weapons remain necessary for the foreseeable future. I thought that the Socialist Party wanted to eliminate those weapons by the year 2000?

[Tobback] "I have no problem with a statement like that. People try to attribute things to me that I have never felt. I do not share the folly of the Dutch peace movement in saying that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated, starting in the Netherlands and Belgium. I have always opposed that sort of nonsense. Eliminating all nuclear weapons is a goal, an ideal that, if at all possible, we should be able to achieve before the end of this century. So OK, I am not at all in favor of the third zero option as an objective to be achieved immediately."

With firm resolution, Tobback says: "But I, uh... the Belgian government has absolutely no desire to see the recommendations of the High Level Group result in the INF treaty being emptied of meaning. We are on the verge of getting rid of the missiles in Florennes, our Woensdrecht, and after that we would, in the sneaky manner known to all, agree to doubling the number of F16s, which are equipped with modern missile systems. These F16s currently carry an ordinary bomb, which is being replaced by a missile system, the tactical air-to-surface missile, with a range of 400 km beyond the range of the F16, which is also 400 km. Thus, you fly to the border, to the Iron Curtain, and fire the missile. What this means in practice is a direct replacement for the cruise missile, the destruction of which was just decided

on. The possibilities of short-range weapons are multiplied. Is that modernization? If replacing the V1 with a Titan missile is modernization, then it is all hypocrisy."

For Tobback, modernization of the SNF weapons means replacing worn-out handles with new handles. If a launching installation has become a little rusty, the machinery can be replaced too. A technical improvement, such as shortening the launch time, is also possible. In short, technical issues for military personnel and NATO diplomats, nothing for them to bother politicians with.

This does not include doubling the number of F16s and equipping them with new nuclear missiles. Nor, of course, does it include the introduction of a grenade for 155 mm artillery, which if equipped with a tritium charge assumes the character of a neutron bomb. Still, the NATO High Level Group, with Carlucci's support, is attempting to stealthily force this far-reaching modernization on the allies.

"Don't think that Dutch public opinion does not see through what is going on. It is frustrating to be minister and thus bound to a certain degree of reserve in the wording of my appreciation. After all, a Dutch minister shouldn't interfere in Belgian politics either, should he?"

Again ironically: "I can only say that I was surprised at the rashness with which this matter was handled. Perhaps, just perhaps, the Belgians for once had a better understanding than you did. Hey, sorry, we won't make a habit of it." The minister's booming laugh is probably audible at the editorial offices of the Brussels newspaper LE SOIR, which occupies the building next door.

[DE VOLKSKRANT] Did you not see Van Kooten and De Bie's "Week in Review" program?

[Tobback] "No, I was in London for a long weekend."

[DE VOLKSKRANT] De Bie did a piece on how just how gullible the NATO member states are.

[Tobback] "Yes, it could be that De Bie is right. It's very possible."

At any rate, the Belgian position is not as clear as Tobback represents it. Brussels is against modernization as long as there is no overall plan for NATO security needs. And Minister of External Relations Tindemans recently stated in LA LIBRE BELGIQUE that the demarche in Scheveningen should not leave behind any permanent tracks. His message was that Belgium cannot ridicule and isolate itself.

Sitting on the edge of his seat and formulating carefully: "I cannot speak for Mr Tindemans. There were strange things in that interview, which I read with surprise. He says that he was not present at the preparations for Scheveningen, because he was in Finland. I will withhold commentary and stick to the facts: He was at the two meetings of the ministerial committee that was supposed to prepare for Scheveningen, and he was at the cabinet meeting headed by Martens at which the decisions were made, unanimously and by consensus.

"The head of Belgian diplomacy says rather amazing things. Either he was completely misquoted by the journalist or something is amiss with his memory or something is wrong with his engagement calendar. I might note that it was not until 20 October of this year that the head of our diplomatic corps became aware of what former Minister of Defense De Donnea agreed to, and in fact promised, about the recommendations in the High Level Group in April of this year."

[DE VOLKSKRANT] What's going on?

[Tobback] "Two things. NATO wants to sneak in and effect a decision. They continually say, 'You don't have to decide if, just say yes.' First in April and now again in Scheveningen: You don't have to decide anything if you just say yes. We're on time now, unlike in 1979 when the actual deployment decision on the cruise missiles was made at the beginning of that year in Guadeloupe. NATO is for defending democracy, not for letting a group of military men and diplomats propose things that you, as a politician, can only say yes to. Secondly, in April Mr Tindemans was a member of a government with liberals, and now is a member of a government with socialists."

Full of sarcasm: "That's too bad, regrettable, even awful, there are people who can't sleep at night because of it, which I can imagine vividly, since it means that I am doing a good job. I find it surprising that many people are surprised by the change in this country's position. And I will concede this to Mr Tindemans: I think that he is surprised at what has happened.

"In the parliamentary External Relations Committee, PS Minister Coeme is also emphatically supported by members of parliament from the Christian People's Party, Tindemans' party. I do not know which viewpoint is more popular in Flanders, that of Mr Tindemans or mine, but I think that Mr Tindemans has the short end of the stick." In fact, it is possible that Tindemans will be leaving the Ministry of External Relations in early 1989 for the European Parliament. [passage omitted]

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